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ABSTRACT 
The present dissertation has as a main goal to identify and describe relevant design and 
communication processes taking place during co-design meetings, in a way suitable to 
inform practice in similar settings in the field of eLearning design and development. 
The need for such a research emerges from the inadequacy of prescriptive models that 
can guide professionals in their communication during the design of on-line courses. This 
inadequacy has been evident also in other design fields, thus a tendency towards 
empirical team design research has been recently established. In the margins of this 
research tendency, several different methods of analyzing how a team actually interacts 
during design have been hitherto proposed. Our research applies an Interaction analysis 
approach, akin to take into consideration various aspects of both the design and 
communication processes taking place in parallel during a professional co-design meeting. 
Such an approach allows for the study of the team’s double focus during task-oriented 
interaction: the realization of the task on which interaction focuses on, and the task of 
communicating about it. 
Thus, on the basis of viewing team design activity mainly as a socio-cognitive interaction 
activity, a method of corpus construction and analysis is proposed, namely DROMEAS. 
DROMEAS takes its name from the coding dimensions to which it refers, namely: 
Design activity, Representational act, Object, Meta-epistemic reference, Dialogue act, 
and dialogue sequence. The selection of these dimensions over others is based on the 
theoretical constructs this dissertation addresses, which are: design co-construction, 
	  dialogicality, deliberativeness, intermediary representations, design-related arguments, 
and user experience.  
Applying DROMEAS to an extended dataset (7625 interaction units) derived from 15 co-
design meetings of two teams – as representative of high reputation European Distance 
Universities – has led to several insights and observations regarding both the team design 
practice in the field of eLearning, and the adequacy of DROMEAS as a method to gain 
such insights. As far as the former is concerned, our results refer to the structure of design 
and communication processes, in terms of activities, acts, and objects involved, the 
content “put on the table”, the arguments produced, and the task-related emerging roles. 
Regarding the latter, methodological considerations such as the adequacy of dialogue 
acts, instead of speech acts, to describe interaction, the argumentation schemes emerged, 
and the merging of semantic-cognitive and dialogical aspects regarding communication 
acts are discussed. 
As a conclusion, it is found that the design and the communication processes are mutually 
dependent, and both depend of the team goal appearing as predominant at each instance 
of interaction. The selection of an Interaction analysis approach has been proven 
adequate to richly describe team interaction at various levels and through different 
focuses. Finally, the identification of argumentation schemes in a naturally emerging 
dataset has been possible, and also the relation between arguments and design-relevant 
representations – such as proposals, constraints, and requirements.  
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
 
The present dissertation lies in-between two research fields, team communication and 
instructional design, and selects as context of application the eLearning design and 
development.  
The focus of instructional design (ID) is “to plan, develop and implement an effective 
and efficient learning environment for certain educational goals and for certain learners” 
(Latzina & Schott, 1995; p. 131). The complexity of ID and its differentiation from other 
types of design is mainly rooted in the following aspects: a) it implies the design of a 
process, and going further, the design of an experience (McLellan, 2000), rather than the 
realization of a product; b) this process is cognitively, socially, and emotionally complex 
(Garrison & Anderson, 2003), and, as such, is experienced differently by each user-
learner; and c) the ID process forms part of a broader institutional strategy, and thus, it is 
guided, shaped, and, often, constrained by it (Kessels, 1999; Bates, 2000; Rothwell & 
Kazanas, 2008). 
To be added to this complexity, the use of “new multimedia technologies and the 
Internet to improve the quality of learning” (CEC, 2001; p.2), also known as eLearning, 
has entered the ID scenery during the last 50 years. The first so-called “computer-based 
system used in the engineering of education” became operational in 1964 (Bitzer & 
Johnson, 1971). eLearning design shares the same focus as ID, as it is mainly an 
education-guided practice (Goodyear, 2005). However, a number of additional aspects 
need to be taken into consideration, such as: a) the use of multimedia technologies and 
the Internet also during the design process; b) users-learners become even more 
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“unknown”, as Distance Education (Peters, 1988/2004) is offered to an amplified range 
of people, with different needs, expectations, and familiarization with this mode of 
teaching-learning; and c) innovation is always a desired – and sometimes required – 
outcome, regarding the most efficient and effective combination of technological 
solutions with learning goals. 
Given such complexity, it is easily understood why most of the eLearning design 
nowadays is done in teams (van Merrienboer & Martens, 2002; Bates & Poole, 2003). 
Different technology, pedagogy, and management-based backgrounds and expertise are 
needed in order for efficient and effective solutions and decisions to come up, in response 
to a ranged variety of problems, requirements, and constraints. Such multidisciplinarity 
and cognitive multifacetedness render the eLearning design process a very rich and 
creative process. At the same time, as decisions need to be taken collectively, 
communication becomes a key aspect of eLearning design and development.  
Having said that, the focus of the present dissertation is on team design communication in the 
eLearning design context. More precisely, our main interest is on how communication 
and the design process intermingle one with another. To do that, various dimensions 
and aspects of team members’ interaction are taken into account, in accordance to the 
richness and complexity of the subject as treated by the literature (Chapter 2). After 
framing the research with concrete goals, questions, and hypotheses (Chapter 3), and 
presenting our theoretical background (Chapter 4), we continue with our second main 
interest: the construction and application of a multi-level coding scheme, akin to 
embrace the double complexity of team design as both a communication and a design 
process (Chapter 5). Results (Chapter 6), Discussion (Chapter 7), and Conclusion 
(Chapter 8) continue with this double focus: the practice-oriented, and the method-
oriented. Therefore, our observations regard both how eLearning designers 
communicate while designing in teams, and how such communication can be analysed. 
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The present chapter is composed of four Sections. In Section 1, we present our main 
theoretical perspective of communication as a social activity, taking place in various 
forms. Subsequently (Section 2), we treat in detail the main macro-form of 
communication, namely dialogue, and its various types, i.e. possible faces with which it can 
appear in every-day interaction. The section ends with a constraint of the dialogue 
analysis approach, which gives place to the selection of Interaction analysis as our main 
approach. Section 3, titled “Interaction types”, is a brief account of this theoretical 
paradigm, presented in detail in Chapter 4. Finally, Section 4 is dedicated to “Context”, 
its conceptualization and influence on any interaction, and subsequently, on the 
eLearning, team design interaction.  
	  8	  
1.1 COMMUNICATION FLOWS 
 
Being  comple te ly  invo lved  in  an  ac t iv i ty  for  i t s  own sake .  
The ego  fa l l s  away .  Time f l i e s .  Every  ac t ion ,  movement ,  
and thought  fo l lows  inev i tab ly  f rom the  prev ious  one ,  l ike  
p lay ing  jazz .  Your  whole  be ing  i s  invo lved ,  and you’re  
us ing  your  sk i l l s  to  the  u tmost .  
 
—CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,  1991 
 
As Clark (1996) notes, “to communicate is, according to its Latin roots, to make common, to 
make known within a group of people” (p. 153). Kreckel (1981) adds that 
“etymologically, the concept of communication stems from the two roots communicare, i.e. 
a one-way process of transmitting information and communion, i.e. a two-way process of 
sharing information” (p. 20). And he continues by making explicit the main research 
problem in any study of communication: “not everything that is available or transmitted 
is taken up, and not everything that is taken up is shared” (p. 20). 
According to some authors, this process of making common or known is subset to 
criteria of efficiency, also known as “communication requirements” or “maxims”.  
Hereby, we present two main theoretical accounts of such criteria, the one proposed by 
Grice (1975) and a more recent, proposed by Allwood, Nivre, & Ahlsèn (1992). Grice 
(1975) proposes 4 maxims, namely Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. As he 
explains: 
 the category of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under 
it fall the following maxims: (1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for 
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the current purposes of the exchange). (2) Do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required. (…). Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim –“Try 
to make your contribution one that is true”- and two more specific maxims: (1) Do not say 
what you believe to be false. (2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Under the category of Relation I place a single maxim, namely, “Be relevant”. (…). 
Finally, under the category of Manner, which I understand as relating not (like the 
previous categories) to what is said but, rather, to how what is said is to be said, I include 
the supermaxim –“Be perspicuous” (…) (p. 45-46) 
From their part, Allwood et al. (1992) give their own account of communication 
requirements, as following: 
First, communication requires that at least two agents are willing and able to 
communicate. Second, communication requires that the receiving agent is willing and able 
to perceive the behavioral or other means whereby the sending agent is displaying or 
signalling information. Third, communication requires that the receiving agent is willing 
and able to understand the content that the sender is displaying or signalling. It is also 
often helpful if the receiver can perceive and understand various types of indicated 
information. Finally, communication requires that the receiving agent is willing and able 
to react attitudinally and behaviorally to various aspects of the content that the sender is 
displaying or signalling. Again, it is sometimes beneficial for communication, if the 
receiver also reacts to indicated information (p. 4). 
Both accounts describe communication as a sender-receiver situation: the first focusing 
on the sender, and the second focusing on the receiver. In one way or another, the 
dynamic and systemic aspects of team communication are not adequately expressed. 
In this respect, the view of group communication process as a systemic function gives 
some replies. In general, four criteria-factors apply as group communication 
requirements according to this approach (Mabry, 1999): (1) group coordination and 
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integration, expressed either as distributional structure, i.e. array of messages across different 
content classifications, or as sequential structure, i.e. the ordering of observed messages; (2) 
group regulation and stabilization, and especially the role of the task as both constitutive, 
in the sense that it provides a common frame of reference for the group members, and 
normative, as tasks are also collective representations of how group members perceive their 
action; (3) group learning and motivation, as entropy and ambiguity causes the system to 
engage in information-seeking activities, even when those activities require the system to 
redefine is goals or restructure its internal relationships; and (4) group innovation and 
change, predetermined by structural constraints, which derive from the fact that group 
systems are morphostatic, “in the sense that a thermostat will turn on or off a furnace only 
at preset temperatures” (p. 80). 
Even though such dynamics are akin to describe communication, when it regards teams, 
they are still too general at the time of prescribing, pre-defining, or just framing how 
teams should communicate in an efficient way. In other words, no requirements or 
maxims of group communication exist, even when it refers to a specific team, based at a 
specific institution, working on a specific project, and for a specific period of time. If this 
is one possible definition of a workplace community, then the Activity system triangle 
(Figure 1), proposed by Engestrøm (1987) can give us a closer account of how a team 
communication system functions.  
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FIGURE 1. THE ACTIVITY SYSTEM TRIANGLE (ENGESTRØM, 1987) 
 
According to Activity Theory, a community-based system, such as an institutional 
working team, is composed of: a) the object, which corresponds both to the problem 
space, and to the goal towards which the whole activity is oriented (Leont’ev, 1981); b) 
the subjects, i.e. the people engaged in an activity, who are the focus of a study on the 
activity; c) the tools, which are the physical objects and systems of symbols (like language) 
that people use to accomplish the activity; d) the rules, referring to the community culture 
rules influencing the activity; e) the division of labour or roles regarding how the work is 
divided, e.g. institutional and task-oriented roles; and f) the members of the broader 
community, in which the activity system is embedded, meaning people and groups whose 
knowledge, interests, stakes, and goals shape the activity. 
Two important implications, influencing the present study, derive from the Activity 
system theory, as introduced and expanded by Engestrøm. The first is that “An Activity 
system contains a variety of different viewpoints or ‘voices´” (1994, p. 46), deriving both 
from the “subjects” and the “community” components of the system. The second is that 
the object-goal motivates and shapes the activity system, and more precisely its 
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communication flow (Engestrøm, 1992), i.e. the relations expressed between the activity 
components. In workplace activities, three types of communication flows are possible, 
namely: co-ordination, co-operation, and reflective communication. The third one is also known 
as reflective co-construction (Bardram, 1998), or collaboration (Campos, 2003). Table 1 shows 
the main differences between these three flows, in activity terms. 
 
TABLE 1. THE THREE COMMUNICATION FLOWS (BASED MAINLY ON ENGESTRØM, 1992) 
	   Co-­‐ordination	   Co-­‐operation	   Collaboration	  
Object	   Individual	  task	   Shared	  	   Re-­‐conceptualized	  
Roles	   Scripted	   Beyond	  scripted	   Re-­‐conceptualized	  
Rules	  (Script)	   Unquestioned	   Unquestioned	  	  
(at	  least	  not	  explicitly)	  
Questioned	  
Goal	   Successful	  
performance	  of	  the	  
assigned	  actions	  
Find	  mutually	  acceptable	  
ways	  to	  conceptualize	  and	  
solve	  the	  problem	  
Re-­‐conceptualizing	  
interaction	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  shared	  objects	  
 
The three flows described above normally co-exist in the same work activity system. 
Therefore, what matters at the time of describing a system’s communication processes is 
the internal organization of each flow along time and the transition from one flow to 
another. In both cases, mediational tools, especially language, and their use by the 
system’s actors play a determining role.  
In sum, considering communication as an activity, the following implications need to be 
considered: a) team’s goal, b) object status, c) actors’ behavior, and d) concrete actions 
and activities. The type and intensity of relation(s) between these four can allow the 
analyst to distinguish among good or less good co-ordination, co-operation, and reflective 
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communication. Thus, such dynamic relations, apart from describing the team as a system, 
also have a predictive – and subsequently prescriptive – potential power upon it. This 
assumption forms the main rationale of this research. 
In this section we argued that Engestrøm’s Activity Theory (1987, 1992, 1994) can 
provide us with a valuable descriptive framework of analyzing team communication, 
possibly more valuable than pre-established maxims, requirements, or generic dynamics. 
Viewing team communication as an activity system allows for various components and 
their behavior to be taken into account simultaneously, and to describe the whole 
system’s behavior based on the components’ dynamic relations. The most powerful of 
these relations, in which all components are participant, is the so-called communication 
flow. Distinguishing between various “levels” and “degrees” of this flow constitutes our 
main view of analyzing communication. 
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1.2 DIALOGUE TYPES 
 
Al l  d ia logue  ar i se s  f rom a  prob lem,  d i f ference  o f  op in ion ,  
or  ques t ion  to  be  reso lved .  
  
—WALTON, 1989 
 
Considering only the verbal dimension of a communication system, the main unit of 
analysis is a dialogue. Dialogue is defined as “a goal-directed conventional framework in 
which two speech partners reason together in an orderly way” (Walton, 1998; p. 3). 
Seven main types of dialogue have been hitherto defined and formalized, as identifiable 
systems:  persuasion dialogue, information-seeking dialogue, negotiation dialogue, 
inquiry dialogue, eristic dialogue, deliberation dialogue, and discovery dialogue (Walton, 
1989; Walton & Krabbe, 1995; Walton, 2011). Table 2 shows the main goal and 
characteristics for each dialogue type.  
Another very common type of dialogue is argumentative dialogue. As Patterson (2011) 
observes, for scholars such as Johnson (2000), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), 
Goodwin (2007), and Walton (2008), argumentation has not a function itself. This means 
that argumentation does not appear among the dialogue types presented above, because 
it does not form a normative type of dialogue itself; its quality depends on the quality of 
dialogue it is embedded in. This also means that argumentation is a potential part of any 
dialogue (Walton, 1998). Given the importance of argumentation in the context of co-
design, as we will see later on, our position regarding whether it is a dialogue type or a 
dialogue function will be briefly exposed hereby. 
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TABLE 2. MAIN DIALOGUE TYPES 
(ADAPTED FROM WALTON, 1991, 2011; WALTON & KRABBE, 1995) 
Dialogue	  Type	   Goal	   Main	  notion(s)	   Special	  type(s)	  
Persuasion	   Test	  the	  comparative	  strength	  
or	  plausibility	  of	  arguments	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  a	  controversial	  or	  
contentious	  issue	  
Commitment	  
Burden	  of	  proof	  
Critical	  Discussion	  (van	  
Eemeren	  &	  Grootendorst,	  
1984)	  
Inquiry	   Collect	  and	  organize	  all	  the	  
relevant	  evidence	  on	  some	  
particular	  proposition	  
Cumulativeness	   Scientific	  Inquiry,	  
Empirical	  Inquiry	  
Negotiation	   Get	  to	  a	  deal	   Wise	  agreement	  
Interest	  
Commitment	  to	  
action	  
Distributive/Integrative/	  
Intra-­‐organizational	  
Bargaining,	  Attitudinal	  
Structuring	  
Information-­‐
seeking	  
Information	  pooling	   Search-­‐find	   Interview,	  Expert	  
Consultation	  
Deliberation	   Reach	  a	  conclusion	  on	  how	  to	  
act	  prudently	  in	  a	  given	  
situation	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  
specific	  goals	  
Practical	  
reasoning,	  Burden	  
of	  proof	  
Public	  and	  Political	  
Deliberation	  
Eristic	  dialogue	   Win	  a	  verbal	  victory	  by	  any	  
means	  
Irrelevant	  ad	  
hominem	  attack	  
Quarrel	  
Discovery	   Choose	  best	  hypothesis	  for	  
testing	  
Risk	  assessment,	  
Novelty	  
Chance	  Discovery	  
(McBurney	  &	  Parsons,	  2001)	  
 
Argumentation has been mainly treated in relation to persuasion dialogue contexts 
(Walton, 1989; Walton & Krabbe, 1995). In these contexts, there is usually an issue to 
argue about, and two contrary positions generated by this issue, namely the thesis and the 
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antithesis.  The person who proposes the thesis, called the proponent, tries to rationally 
persuade the other party, called the opponent, to become committed to her propositions. 
In such dialectical settings, the probative function (Walton, 1989) of argument is what 
counts. Also, argumentation can be more or less successful or an argument may or my 
not be won regarding the controversial issue-at-hand. Other dialogue contexts in which 
argumentation may be strongly manifested are the inquiry, negotiation, and deliberation 
contexts. The argumentation stage of an inquiry dialogue transforms inquiry into a 
discovery dialogue, in which some hypotheses are selected for testing. Argumentation 
during negotiation of interests is mainly person-based and arguments ad hominem or 
even threats may appear. Finally, deliberative argumentation is very similar to 
persuasion, in terms of shifts of the burden of proof (Walton, 1988) until a final statement is 
made. On the other hand, deliberation dialogue is more collaborative in its nature 
compared to persuasion dialogue, which is more conflict-based. To be more specific, 
deliberation has been defined as this type of dialogue “in which parties collectively steer 
actions towards a common goal by agreeing on a proposal that can solve a problem 
affecting all of the parties concerned, taking all their interests into account” (Walton, 
2010a). 
Going now to the team design situation, and more precisely to a meeting setting, it can be 
said that the dialogue macro-goal is that of deliberating on issues where the team’s 
opinion is needed. A first issue to consider is that the predominance of deliberation as a 
team design goal does not mean that the whole interaction taking place during a meeting 
is deliberative. Thus, analysis on the basis of the ‘deliberation’ type of dialogue is not 
possible. Regarding the other three types of dialogues, relevant to team design because of 
their relation to argumentation, a special interest has been paid to negotiation, as main 
process of a collaborative task-oriented interaction. However, how negotiation has been 
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defined as part of a collaborative practice is different than how it was proposed as a 
dialogue type.  Here is what Dillenbourg & Baker (1996) observe in respect to this: 
in task-oriented interactions, negotiation can occur on three main levels : (1) 
communication (meaning, signification of utterances, words, ...), (2) task (problem-solving 
strategies, methods, solutions, ...) and (3) management of the interaction on previous levels 
1 and 2 (coordination, feedback on perception, understanding, attitudes) (p. 188). 
During the task-oriented type of negotiation, two main types of argumentation are 
possible to take place (Baker, 1996): a) regarding the epistemic status of the object, and b) 
regarding its epistemological nature. The first one refers to the transformation of an 
object “s1” either to an object “s2” or to an object of another type, for example “p1”. In 
design terms, this means that a proposed solution can either be negotiated in the face of 
an alternative solution, or it can be revised and considered as a problem. As far as the 
epistemological nature is concerned, argumentation takes place in the form of different 
perspectives belonging to different types of personal and disciplinary knowledge. The 
same object “o” can be seen either from a perspective “P1” or from a perspective “P2”. 
When both perspectives are made explicit, the object is negotiated, without the goal 
being the persuasion towards one perspective instead of another, although this may also 
happen. 
As far as the inquiry dialogue is concerned, a noncore type of argumentation known as 
exploratory argumentation (Goldman, 1994) can be identified. During this, 
a person may often experiment with an argument, or "try it on for size", without meaning 
to commit herself to its premises or conclusion. The speaker invites the audience to 
consider premises and conclusion as possible truths, not only for the audience's possible 
enlightenment, but because the speaker can test their credibility for herself by seeing 
whether they survive the audience's critical scrutiny (p. 33). 
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When such exploration takes place in teams, emerging interaction is very similar to what 
Dewey (1941) calls a “joint inquiry”. Dewey defined inquiry as “the set of operations by 
which the situation is resolved (settled, or rendered determinate)” (p. 181). But, as 
Koschmann (2003) observes, the problem or aspect of the situation that renders it 
indeterminate is not given; it must be discovered through the processes of inquiry. 
What happens in co-design situations is that participants have to deal with a double 
ambiguity: one that has to do with the ill-defined nature of design, and the other that has 
to do with the fluidity of ideas being communicated in a creative context (both aspects 
will be explained later on). The combination of these ambiguities renders the co-design 
meeting a space of argumentation itself: participants continuously try to better define 
and convince themselves and the others of the superiority of certain constraints, 
requirements, and solutions against others. Values and perspectives play a major role in 
the formation of design judgments and their negotiation, in the sense described above. In 
such a context, even though the team’s macro-goal is design deliberation, no specific 
types of dialogue are a priori prescribed as to be the best functioning for certain 
decisions.  
In this context, persuasion is possible to take place as an embedded-in-deliberation 
dialogue. However, the probative function of the arguments may be difficult to identify, 
mainly because the issue does not normally have a Y/N nature, but a multiple criteria-
choices nature. Secondly, the dialogue agents, i.e. the team participants, are all experts 
in the issue discussed, and in most cases their expertise is also complementary. Finally, 
team deliberation is more similar to a polylogue rather than a dialogue (Kerbrat-
Orecchioni, 1997, 2004; Lewinski, 2011). Given these particularities of the team design 
setting, we would argue more in favor of team design argumentation as a type of co-
constructive interaction (see also Baker, 1999), during which different types of dialogues 
may emerge. 
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1.3 INTERACTION TYPES 
 
Par ler ,  c ’e s t  communiquer ,  e t  communiquer ,   
c ’e s t  in ter -ag ir .  
 
—KERBRAT-ORECCHIONI,  1990 
 
Interaction can describe reality more closely than dialogue, for the simple reason that it 
is not necessarily oriented towards a concrete communication goal. Thus, when we speak 
of naturally emerging talk, the main unit of analysis is “talk-in-interaction” (Schegloff, 
1987). Both of these components, i.e. talk and interaction will be defined in this section.  
As far as the latter term is concerned, the present study is focused on a specific macro-
type of interaction, known as institutional interaction. This type of interaction is 
characterized by two principal characteristics: a) it is goal-oriented, and b) institutionally 
relevant and often constrained (Drew & Heritage, 1992). Goal-oriented means that 
interaction “involves an orientation by at least one of the participants to some core goal, 
task, or identity (or set of them) conventionally associated with the institution in 
question” (Drew & Heritage, 1992; p. 22). The involvement of the institution in goal, 
task, and identity definition allows the institutional setting to influence on interaction, 
and more precisely on the “shape, form, trajectory, content or character of the 
interaction that the parties conduct” (Schegloff, 1992; p. 111).  
At the same time, although institution seems to define interaction in a “top-down” 
approach, participants seem to negotiate their role in it in a “bottom-up” way, using 
Drew and Heritage’s (1992) metaphor (p. 23). This means that although the goals, tasks, 
and/or identities of the participants are already known, as being pre-defined by the 
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institution, participants’ understanding and contribution to them may differ. Even when 
these goals promote co-operation, as in team design, it is not said that participants will 
truly collaborate. In other words, pre-defined co-operation does not necessarily imply 
emerging collaboration. This depends on the type of talk participants will be enrolled in. 
When speaking of institutions, team talk is a main “situated action” (Suchman, 1987). As 
such, “it is used both to construct versions of what the team is currently doing and 
constitutes ways to act that respond to those versions” (Middleton, 1998; p. 236). In team 
talk, two levels of analysis emerge: the individual practice, meaning the type of participation 
and contribution of each participant, and the team practice. A main differential aspect 
between these two, regards the fact that team practice reflects team work, both as a task 
and as a topic. In other words, people through team talk try to solve both the uncertainties 
regarding their work-at-hand (e.g. design task), and the uncertainties regarding how their 
communication process should be, in order to reach their goals. Let’s call the latter 
communication task.  
In both cases of institutional talk-in-interaction, the notion of object plays an important 
role. This object, following the double sense of task presented above, can be either a 
design object or a communication predicate. In most of the cases it is both (see for 
example Darses, Détienne, Falzon, & Visser, 2001). To define whether an interaction, or 
a piece of interaction, is object-oriented, and thus task relevant, the criterion of 
constructiveness has been proposed (Miyake, 1986; Baker, 1999). According to Baker 
(1999), for an interaction to be constructive, two criteria need to be fulfilled: firstly, “if it 
literally leads to the (co-)construction or building of something –meaning, understanding, 
solutions to problems and sometimes knowledge”; and secondly, “if it generally 
contributes in some way to cooperative goal-oriented activity” (p. 180). 
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A main condition of any interaction is interdependency (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1990; Lave, 
1991). This means that an interaction is an essential interpersonal activity, in which 
actions of agents are mutually dependent (Baker, 1999). Nevertheless, for an interaction 
to also be co-constructive, and subsequently collaborative, additional conditions need to 
apply. Among them, two are distinguished in the relevant literature, namely sharedness 
and dialogicality.  
Three main constructs can and need to be shared during an interaction: conceptions, 
knowledge, and perspectives. According to Roschelle & Teasley (1995), “collaboration is a 
coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct 
and maintain a shared conception” (p. 70). Such shared meaning is established and 
continuously re-established “via the construction and accumulation of a common 
ground, a body of shared knowledge” (p. 75), or the “degree of conceptual convergence 
between communicants” (Kreckel, 1981; p. 26). Finally, shared perspective refers to the 
disposition of the communicants for both converting their individual experience and/or 
knowledge into shared knowledge and for participating in future interactions (Kreckel, 
1981).  
Moreover, according to the definition previously given, all interaction is interpersonal, 
thus dia-logic (from Greek διά-λογος, meaning “through discourse”) in the sense of 
based on word exchange (Bakhtin, 1977). Nonetheless, not any dialogic interaction is 
also dialogical (the distinction in french in Kerbracht-Orecchioni, 1990 is between dialogal 
and dialogique). In the same way, a monologue is mono-logic, in the sense that it expresses 
one speaker’s words. But it is not necessarily monological, meaning that it potentially 
contains dialogical characteristics (see also Billig, 1987). 
The main unit of analysis in a communicative interaction is the communicative action. In 
order for a communicative action to be co-constructive, it needs to be composed of 
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dialogical acts contributing to some sort of sharedness, of the three defined above. An act 
is dialogical either when it constructs on another person’s utterance, or when it encloses 
at least one, other than the speaker’s, voice. Such multivoicedness (Wertsch, 1985) is an 
important aspect of any collaborative interaction, as it promotes intersubjectivity (Bakhtin, 
1929), and with that, dialogical learning (Flecha, 2000). The presence of other voices is 
expressed though the use of enunciative subjects in discourse. If sharedness and 
dialogicality are fulfilled, we can speak of joint actions in communicative interaction 
(Clark, 1996). 
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1.4 CONTEXT 
 
To know an  ob jec t  i s  to  lead  to  i t  through a  context  which  
the  wor ld  suppl ie s .  
 
—WILLIAM JAMES,  1911 
 
In written communication, context is anything that goes with the text in order to form a 
discourse (Adam, 1992). This amplified definition of context justifies Rigotti & Rocci’s 
(2006) position that “there is no context that is not the context of something else” (p. 158). 
The expansion of this position gives place to a two-fold definition of context, both as a 
context of and as a contextualized. In other words, “context is not a container but a 
constituent of the communication process” (Perret-Clermont, 2006; p. 181).  
Continuing in the line of Rigotti & Rocci (2006) and Muller & Perret-Clermont (1999), 
communication context is constructed on two main dimensions: the institutionalized and 
the interpersonal dimension. The interpersonal dimension can be translated into two 
main components: the inter-individual context, and the cultural context. The latter refers to the 
myths, rites, and models (Cantoni, 2004), which participants “carry” with them as part of 
one or more cultural communities. On the other hand, inter-individual context concerns 
the interpersonal level of communication, i.e. that part of the interaction not focused on 
the task, but on communication itself. This context is either intra-personal, referring to 
the personal stories (Rigotti & Rocci, 2006), or frames (Goffman, 1974), through which a 
person perceives the communication context and re-acts to it. In other words, it is the 
“social organization of individuals’ experience of the situation” (Drew & Heritage, 1992; 
p. 9). At the same time, inter-individual context is highly interpersonal, referring to the 
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continuous “conversational negotiation”, in Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s (2005) terms, in which 
communication partners are involved. 
The institutionalized dimension of communication context, or the activity type in 
Levinson’s (1979/1992) terms, is composed by the “actual” social reality, known as 
interaction field, and the “virtual” one, defined as interaction schemes (Rigotti & Rocci, 2006). 
The interaction field corresponds to what is usually referred to as context in everyday 
language. It mainly refers to the type of institution, in which the interaction takes place, 
but also to its general frame and its specific spots (Rigotti & Rocci, 2006), forming essential 
part of a communication analysis. On the other hand, interaction schemes are culturally 
shared “recipes” for interaction (Rigotti & Rocci, 2006), corresponding to a specific 
interaction field, but not defined by it. This means that the types of interaction and their 
internal organization form a type of context for the activity they are “contained” in. 
Together with the interaction field, they give life to two dynamic aspects of 
communication context, namely communication roles and communication flows. Figure 2 
represents the main components of communication context and the relations between 
them, as we briefly described above. 
	   25	  
 
FIGURE 2. THE COMMUNICATION CONTEXT (IN RIGOTTI & ROCCI, 2006; P. 171) 
 
The present study focuses on a specific aspect of interaction schemes, namely the joint, 
task-oriented, content co-ordination actions, as it was previously defined in Section 1.3. These 
actions take place in and, the same time, influence on concrete, interaction-field based 
joint activities, relevant to the macro-activity frame of communication (in the present case, 
design meeting). The way such joint activities are organized, in institutionalized, task-
oriented communication flows, defines the quality of communication. In summary, the 
present study has three main focuses: the relation between joint actions, the relation 
between joint actions and joint activities, and the relation between joint activities and the 
meeting activity type (Allwood, 2000). 
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2 .  STATE OF THE ART 
 
As it was made clear in the Introduction, context is an essential part of the 
communicative interaction. However, there is another type of context, not 
necessarily related to the communicative type of context, treated in this dissertation, 
which is the research context, also known as field of application. As the dissertation’s title 
indicates, the field of application treated is eLearning design and development. This field 
forms part of a broader field of application, namely Design Research. The 
phenomenon observed in this context, i.e. communication processes, implies another 
characteristic of the field, which is team-based. In total, the general field of application 
of the present study is Team-based Design Research.  
Team-based Design Research focuses on design activity as part of the team 
communication process. Traditional models of design as a more or less staged 
problem solving process need to be abandoned, in order to adopt such a view. On 
the other hand, team activity is also process-based, but the nature and structure of this 
process cannot be defined a priori. 
What was shortly stated here is explained throughout this chapter in four sections. 
Section 1 describes the conceptualization of design as a cognitive process, from a 
problem solving perspective to more context-considering approaches. Section 2 
presents the shift from this view and the re-conceptualization of design as an activity, 
regarding both individuals and teams. Section 3 presents a synthesis of empirical 
studies in team design research field. Finally, Section 4 focuses on how 
communication has been hitherto treated in this field.   
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2.1 DESIGN AS PROCESS 
 
Des ign  i s  a  process ,  i t  i s  not  a  s ta te  and cannot  be  
adequate ly  represented  s ta t ica l ly .   
 
—CARROLL & ROSSON, 1985 
Design has been traditionally considered as a process of formulation, analysis, 
synthesis, and evaluation (Asimow, 1962; Jones, 1970). This approach is very near, 
almost identical, to the problem solving approach (Simon, 1969/1996). Limiting 
design space to the problem space, design process is composed of the following steps 
(Goel & Pirolli, 1989; Maher, 1990): a) identifying the goal(s) of the design problem; 
b) exploring and decomposing the problem; c) combining the identified partial 
solutions into the problem solution; and d) assessing and/or controlling whether the 
goal(s) have been satisfied. Under this view, the design problem space is largely 
considered as “a problem space with major invariant characteristics across all design 
situations” (Goel & Pirolli, 1989; p. 20). In other words, a generic model of design 
process is possible. 
A first generation of generic design problem solving models focuses on the design task 
environment (DTE) as a necessary condition for distinguishing a design from a non-
design process. According to Simon (1969/1996), “everyone designs who devises 
course of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones” (p. 111). 
However, this definition is quite broad, and implies that the intellectual activity 
behind design is the same as in many other non-design activities. To respond to this 
problem, Goel & Pirolli (1989) propose the DTE approach, as it is shown in Figure 3.   
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FIGURE 3. STRUCTURE OF A PROTOTYPICAL DTE (GOEL & PIROLLI, 1989; P. 22) 
 
As shown above, the DTE approach introduces two main aspects of the design 
process: time, and world’s feedback.  Those two also are the main characteristics of a 
more recent approach of the design process, known as meta-design (Fischer & Scharff, 
2000). The rationale behind this approach is summarized in the following: 
design problems in the real world require open systems that users can modify and 
evolve. Because problems cannot be completely anticipated at design time (when the 
system is developed), users at use time will discover mismatches between their 
problems and the support a system provides (p. 398). 
Figure 4 represents the above statement. 
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FIGURE 4.  (THE PROBLEM OF) DESIGN AND USE TIME 
(IN FISCHER & SCHARFF, 2000; P. 398) 
 
The problem described by these authors, namely the problem of design and use time, 
is mainly encountered in systems’ design, where anticipation of outcomes is highly 
required. A solution is proposed with the Seeding, Evolutionary Growth, Reseeding 
(SER) model (Fischer & Scharff, 2000; Fischer & Ostwald, 2002): 
In the SER model, system developers and users develop an initial seed, which is a first 
attempt at creating a tool to support work within a specific domain (…) Because it is 
impossible to capture any design activity completely, the seed must be able to grow 
through use. In this way, a seed can be initially underdesigned (…) As the seed is used 
for real design activity, it goes through a period of evolutionary growth in which the 
designers make incremental modifications to the system over time (…) Eventually, it 
will become necessary to do a significant reconceptualization of the system, or 
reseeding (…) The cycle of evolution and reseeding continues as there are people 
actively using the system to solve problems (Fischer & Scharff, 2000; p. 399). 
Thus, within this approach, participatory design, meaning the involvement of users in 
various stages of design, is very important. Another sub-type of this approach refers 
to rapid prototyping, also broadly applied in the field of Instructional design. The main 
elements of a rapid prototyping process in the ID field are: set objectives, construct 
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prototype, utilize prototype, and finally, install and maintain the system (Tripp & 
Bichelmeyer, 1990). Transferring this approach to eLearning team design, rapid 
prototyping obtains a double function: that of involving students-users as testers who 
utilize the prototype, as implied from previously, but also, that of a communication 
catalyst between the members of the team, given the team’s multidisciplinarity. This is 
mainly fulfilled through “concentrating on facts and results, and not on theories or 
prejudices about learning technologies. Enhanced and focused communication 
fosters the development of mutual understanding among the different professionals 
involved in the project, and the creation of trust” (Botturi, Cantoni, Lepori, & 
Tardini, 2006).  Figure 5 shows the two main sub-processes of fast prototyping in 
eLearning design. 
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FIGURE 5. REPRESENTATION OF A FAST PROTOTYPING PROCESS 
(BOTTURI ET AL., 2006; P. 275) 
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What is common among the presented approaches is that the “pure” design process, 
however contextualized, is a highly cognitive process. It consists of the construction of 
a scenario (Botturi et al., 2006), which evolutionary grows (Fischer & Scharff, 2000) 
with or without the immediate users’ participation, leading to a continuous artifact’s 
specification and interpretation (Goel & Pirolli, 1989), until the final version of the 
product. In other words, design is conceptualized as a twofold process, composed of a 
pre-development phase or planning, and a design phase or development of the 
planned artifact. 
In all cases, actual design processes seem to be more complex than their 
conceptualizations. Starting with planning, Rittel & Weber (1973) observe that: a) 
there is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. “The information needed to 
understand the problem depends upon one’s idea for solving it. That is to say: in order 
to describe a wicked-problem in sufficient detail, one has to develop an exhaustive 
inventory of all conceivable solutions ahead of time” (p. 161); b) every solution to a 
wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there is no opportunity to learn 
by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly; and c) the planners-designers 
have not right to be wrong, as they are “liable for the consequences of the actions 
they generate” (p. 167).  
Regarding artifact development, empirical studies have shown that it is not 
exclusively alleged to the problem space, as solutions also intervene (Lloyd & Scott, 
1994) or co-evolve (Maher, Balachandran, & Zhang, 1995; Dorst & Cross, 2001) 
within the process. Moreover, if any process is present, is rather whirling rather than 
linear (Hickling, 1982), opportunistic rather than hierarchical (Guindon, 1990; 
Visser, 1994), and dynamic rather than static (Carroll & Rosson, 1985).   
Given these constraints, the need to describe the concrete design activities taking 
place during design and development is more and more made explicit. Section 2.2 
presents some main ideas regarding the conceptualization of design as an activity that 
forms part of a process, and not as a pre-defined process itself. 
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2.2	  DESIGN	  AS	  ACTIVITY	  
 
Des ign  i s  not  prob lem so lv ing :  des ign  invo lves  prob lem 
so lv ing .   
 
—VISSER,  2006  
This chapter begins with a valuable observation made by Dorst & Dijkhuis (1992): 
As a designer, you are in a situation that you are continually faced with the very 
concrete challenges of your perceived design problem, and you have to decide on the 
kind and content of the action to take in this situation. `What does this situation 
mean?’ and `What action can/should I take in this situation?´ are eternally recurring 
questions. In most cases, considerations linked to the content of the design situation 
(the perceived design problem, the designer’s goals and the perceived possibilities for 
the next step) will determine the `kind of action´(process-component) (p. 265). 
Thus, describing the design activity forms part of many design methodologies aiming 
at a better understanding of the design process. As it can be easily understood, there 
are not many empirical studies under the rational problem solving paradigm. This is 
mainly because design activity is such a broader entity, thus it is difficult to describe it 
while staying “limited” by this strict paradigm. However, there are some empirical 
studies that did so. Here we briefly describe two of them, focusing on both their 
methods and results. 
McGinnis & Ullman (1992) propose five categories for coding the design activities, 
namely: a) acts, b) goals, c) contexts, d) topics, and e) auxiliary topics. It is worth 
mentioning that acts refer to the “literal” acts designers perform while designing, such 
as write, think, sketch, take a break, etc. Also goals are not a priori defined but 
correspond to observations regarding the protocol. Contexts refer to the various 
perspectives from which the designers look at the problem. Together with topics, they 
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form the designer’s “knowledge state” (Newell & Simon, 1972). Acts, goals, and 
topics together describe the designer’s behavior and lead to the formation of patterns, 
which echo design strategies or heuristics (Dorst & Dijkhuis, 1992). In McGinnis & 
Ullman’s (1992) study, such patterns emerged during designer’s routine-like behavior, 
such as information seeking activity. However, the conceptual phase showed an 
erratic jumping between activities, with hardly any pattern at all. 
Another problem solving based activity method is proposed by Lloyd & Scott (1994). 
These authors propose the utterance as a unit of analysis, and three main categories 
characterizing utterances, namely generative, deductive, and evaluative. The distribution of 
the type of coded utterance per designer and through time gives as result a number of 
reasoning mode patterns. This method also allows for a phase segmentation of the 
protocol, according to the predominance of one activity over the other during a pre-
defined period of time. Doing so allows the comparison among cases, in an overall 
way, and also the description of the design process as a series of emerging phases. 
Although such macro-perspective could be enlightening to understand the design 
process, Lloyd and Scott’ s study has a small number of participants (5), so their 
observations are limited to the individual, idiosyncratic level. 
Apart from problem solving, another cognitive macro-activity related to design is that 
of planning, as we already mentioned. Planning has been defined as the process of 
setting goals, developing strategies, and outlining tasks and schedules to accomplish 
the goals. This general definition makes planning seem quite similar to problem 
solving. However, the following distinction should be made: when goals are so ill-
defined or not well-structured, tasks seems to be “fuzzy”, and subjects appear to do 
“anything and everything” with respect to the goals (Hoc, 1988). In such situations, 
which are characteristic of most design settings, planning rather than problem solving 
takes place. In design, this process refers to a representational process in which the 
external world interacts with the expected world, as the design object refers to what 
which “does-not-yet-exist” (Nelson & Stolterman, 2006). As Kannengiesser & Gero 
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(2009) put it, “designers perform actions in order to change their environment. By 
observing and interpreting the results of their actions, they then decide on new 
actions to be executed on the environment. The designers’ concepts may change 
according to what they are ‘seeing’, which itself is a function of what they have done” 
(p. 3). Figure 6 represents this point of view. 
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FIGURE 6. THE INTERACTION OF THREE DESIGN WORLDS 
(IN KANNENGIESSER & GERO, 2009; P. 4) 
 
Planning, when considered as an activity, involves reflection, in order for the designer 
to make the necessary connections between the external and the expected world. On 
of the most known reflection theories also applied to design is that of the reflection-in-
action approach (Schøn, 1983). For Schøn, doing and knowing form one unit, that of 
“doing design”. The categories proposed are quite generic, and they are applicable to 
both individual and team design. As this dissertation focuses on team design, a 
representative study of applying reflection-in-action theory to team design protocol is 
presented. More precisely, Valkenburg & Dorst (1998) apply Schøn’s four main 
actions, which are: naming, framing, moving, and evaluating (reflecting). Although the 
authors claim that coding is easy and understandable, given the fact that 9 hours of 
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interaction were coded, no inter-rater reliability is provided. Another uncertainty 
arises from the fact that they use the categories in order to describe design episodes, 
thus sequences of actions, and not individuated actions, as in Schøn’s original 
proposal. Apart from these constraints, the method presented represents a good 
example of the systematic application of the theory to team practice. Results are still 
quite descriptive, and they are limited to a comparison of the most predominant 
activity between cases. No comparison of activity flows is provided, maybe because 
the level of analysis remains too general. 
Both planning and reflection can be considered as parts of a broader approach 
focusing on the use of design strategies. These mainly refer to: a) use of a limited-
commitment-mode control strategy (Goel & Pirolli, 1992), which means that “when 
working on a particular mode, it does not require the designer to complete that 
module before beginning another. Instead, one has the option of putting any module 
on hold and attending to other related (or even unrelated) modules, and returning to 
the module on hold at a later time” (p. 422); b) reuse of past design (Détienne, 2003; 
Visser, 2003), referring to the exploitation of different experiences from the past; c) 
design fixation, as a tendency of easy accommodation to re-use rather than new 
creation (Cross, 2001), as a fixation on “being different” (Purcell & Gero, 1996), or as 
a “premature commitment to an idea” (Visser, 2003); and finally, d) ambiguity and 
uncertainty, as related to design creativity (Stacey & Eckert, 2003; McDonnell, 2010). 
All these examples described so far, either from an empirical or a theoretical point of 
view, have one common basis: the view of design as an activity that forms the 
process. Apart from few exceptions limiting this activity to problem solving, such as 
the studies by McGinnis & Ullman (1992) and Lloyd & Scott (1994), the rest sees 
design activity as broader. However, the nature of this activity and its interference 
with the process still remains an issue.  
From a Cognitive Psychology perspective, an answer to the above problem is given 
by considering design as a dynamic and continuous construction of representations (Visser, 
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2006, 2006b). Representations are very important in design, and even more, in team 
design (Hendry, 2004), as they form the vehicle to communicate ideas. Making 
explicit designers’ representations is a first step in their communication regarding the 
collaborative task. A second step is to decide which representation is the most valid at 
a certain time instance and for a specific goal. Two cognitive processes may intervene 
here: that of optimizing, and that of satisficing (Simon, 1969/1996). In one way or 
another, the design process is considered complete when a final specification at a 
representational level takes place. In the case of team design, if such specification is 
result of co-conception, it corresponds to some inter-designer compatible representation 
(Visser, 2006, 2006b), which is also the basis of collaborative design. 
In this dissertation, we adopt the view of design as construction of representations for 
several reasons: first, because the dynamic nature of design is respected; then, 
because it also considers team design situations; and last but not least, because it can 
shed more light on the nature of design activity, its components, and their relations.  
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2.3 TEAM DESIGN 
 
Des ign  work  can  no  longer  be  adequate ly  conceptua l ized  
in  terms  o f  ind iv idua l  “ in te l l igence” ,  nor  as  a  l inear  
process  w i th  a  se t  o f  des ign  s tages ,  but  ra ther  as  a  
s i tua t ion  in  which  jo in t ,  coord inated  learn ing  and work  
prac t ices  evo lve .   
 
—PERRY & SANDERSON, 1998 
In this section, we offer an overview of team design research in the last three decades. 
First, we present some general observations regarding the research in the field, from 
a methodological point of view. In continuation, we draw the focus on the most 
salient empirical results of selected reviewed studies, organized on three basic lines, 
namely actors, contents, and strategies (methods). 
It can be said that team design research has started with Bucciarelli (1984, 1988), and 
his broadly known ethnographic studies in the engineering design field. One of the 
main problems he faced is that “they [the designers] think about the work on the 
design in quite different ways. They do not share fully congruent representations” 
(Bucciarelli, 1988; p. 167). Thus, the analysis of how representations are shared 
during design has been his main research focus. More precisely, he proposes two 
main modes of analyzing team design processes, the narrative and the topical mode 
(Bucciarelli, 1984), and identifies three main types of design discourse observed, 
namely: constraining, naming and decision discourse (Bucciarelli, 1988). 
Apart from ethnography, another main data collection method in design research 
has traditionally been the think-aloud method (Eastman, 1970), in which the 
designers are asked to make explicit what they think while they design. The protocol 
method was also expanded to team design activity, under the assumption that “the 
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verbal exchanges of members of a team engaged in a joint task do seem to provide 
data indicative of the cognitive activities that are being undertaken by the team 
members” (Cross, Christiaans, & Dorst, 1996; p. 3). A first organized effort regarding 
the launch of the team protocol method is represented by the Delft Workshop that 
took place in 1994 in the Netherlands. During this workshop, various researchers 
with different methodological perspectives and backgrounds were asked to analyze 
the same protocol dataset. This consisted of two transcribed experimental sessions: 
one with an individual designer, and another with a team of three designers. Both 
aimed at the design of the same product –a mountain bike device. Half of the studies 
(10 out of 20) included the team protocol in the analysis. Among them, only seven 
focused on the team as their exclusive unit of analysis.  
Just recently, a shift to the team as the main focus of analysis is observed, mainly 
from a Cognitive Ergonomics’ point of view (e.g. Darses, et al., 2001; D’Astous, 
Détienne, Visser & Robillard, 2004; Détienne, Martin & Lavigne, 2005), but also in 
the broader Design Research field (e.g. Valkenburg & Dorst, 1998; Stempfle & 
Badke-Schaub, 2002; McDonnell & Lloyd, 2009). More precisely, a great part of 
team design research consists of video recording design teams in natural or 
experimental settings, and analyzing their interaction using some type of coding, or 
other case-studies methods. A common aspect between all these studies is the fact 
that they are empirical, meaning that they describe design as it actually happens. 
However, a great variety of methods has been hitherto proposed in this regard, 
reflected in a second shared data analysis effort, as presented in McDonnell & Lloyd 
(2009). The so-called “DTRS7 dataset” is totally focused on team design meetings, 
both in Architecture and in Engineering design fields. Also, compared to the Delft 
protocol, the DTRS7 describes authentic design practice, as it reflects in situ 
professional design meetings.  
At this point, two important distinctions regarding research in design teams should be 
made. First, between co-located and distant design. By distant, it is meant not  only 
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design made asynchronously (as in Craig & Zimring, 2000; Lahti, Seitama-
Hakkarainen, & Hakkarainen, 2004; Sack, Détienne, Ducheneaut, Burkhardt, 
Mahendran, & Barcellini, 2006), but also design requiring co-ordination among 
various teams or departments in a company (as in Bucciarelli, 1984, 1988; Perry & 
Sanderson, 1998), or in large-scale software development (as in Curtis, Krasner, & 
Iscoe, 1988; Hendry, 2004). The present study focuses on “close” design situations, 
which, in general, can be one of the following: co-design meetings, concurrent 
engineering design meetings, or team design sessions, referring to quasi-experimental 
settings. A second distinction needs to be made between students and professionals as 
study participants. It has been shown that expert designers think, and thus design, 
differently than the novices (Smith & Leong, 1998). Therefore, this aspect needs to be 
taken into account when describing team design. 
In order to give an overview of the most representative studies in team design, 
deriving from different contexts and methodological perspectives, a literature search 
was conducted in the most relevant to the topic electronic databases (ABI Inform, 
Science Direct, and ACM Digital Library). The keywords used were: 
design/designing, team, activity, process, communication, 
collaboration/collaborative. The selected studies contained the word “design” and at 
least one of the other keywords in the title. In addition to that, their focus should be 
on team design, rather than on individual design processes. The journal articles’ 
search was completed with the references of the studies found, and also, with some 
representative book chapters, a research report, and two Phd dissertations (Walz, 
1988; Minneman, 1991), due to their great relevance to the topic. Conference 
proceeding publications were not taken into consideration, neither studies focusing 
on computer-supported collaborative design. A total number of 46 references, 
corresponding to 40 studies (some of the studies are reported in more than one 
publications), were reviewed according to their domain, their main methodology, 
and their main contributions. Appendix 1 presents the results of the review. The 
studies’ selection is representative and cannot be considered as exhaustive. 
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Regarding domain, we mean the specific design field of application. More precisely, 
57.5% of the studies reviewed belong to the general engineering domain, comprising 
industrial, mechanical and electrical design; the 22.5% are studies in the field of 
software design; the 15% belongs to the architectural design field; and only an 
accumulative 5% belongs to other fields, including instructional. Regarding 
methodology, we distinguish between open qualitative methods, including in-situ 
observation or grounded analysis, coding methods based on the proposal of pre-
defined categories, survey techniques, e.g. questionnaires and interviews, socio-metric 
techniques, e.g. social network analysis and text mining, and other design-related 
methods. A vast majority of the studies (58.8%) used coding methods, either 
exclusively or in relation to other methods, to analyze professional design meetings. 
The main empirical results obtained can be summarized into three dimensions, 
regarding contents, actors’ roles, and strategies. 
Contents. Designing requires discourse across different object-worlds, a discourse 
that arches across differences in language, across different priorities regarding 
performance, different histories of design practice (Bucciarelli, 1984, 1988). Problem-
specific terminology, history, interpretations, and designer’s measurement systems 
form what Minneman (1991) calls “designers’ recipient design”, meaning the content 
of the utterances being communicated, and appealing to their perception by the 
listener’s knowledge. According to Mabogunje et al. (2009), constraints have a major 
role in shaping the design conversation and extending the designers’ collective 
memory. Moreover, these authors claim that design conversations might exhibit two 
different patterns: a) a linear pattern which corresponds to a process driven by 
multiple potential goals that are pursued in parallel in the absence of a clearly defined 
goal, and b) a resumption pattern which can be visualized as a spider-web 
representation.  
Actors’ roles. Good co-ordination is related to specific communication roles, 
adopted by the team members. These can be either referring to the internal team 
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relationships, or to the team’s co-ordination with other experts, or the users 
themselves. Regarding the former, some of the possibly emerging roles are: 
“Intergroup”, “Intertask”, and “Interdisciplinary star” (Sonnenwald, 1995, 1996), 
“expert”, “translator”, “manager”, and “asker” (Walz, Elam, Krasner, & Curtis, 
1987; Walz, 1988), “scheduler/time-keeper” (Cross & Cross, 1995), “creative leader” 
(Kratzer, Leenders, & van Engelen, 2008), and “boundary-spanners” (Curtis et al., 
1988). Regarding the latter, it can be either performed “physically”, meaning that 
they are persons who literally move among different teams transferring information 
about the state of the project (Détienne, 2006) – mostly observed in object-oriented 
design (Herbsleb et al., 1995) –, or “virtually”, in the sense that team participants 
incorporate, in a way, an external perspective. This second case is described by 
Baker, Détienne, Lund, & Séjourné (2009) as an enouncing role, when other voices, 
for example the users’ perspective, are adopted.    
Strategies. Regarding specific strategies adopted during co-design, these can be 
distinguished into two big categories, namely verbal and non-verbal. Few studies 
report on concrete observations regarding the use and function of non-verbal acts, 
such as gestures or use of tools in team design. Tang & Leifer (1988) for example 
report that gesture actions constitute over 1/3 of all the workspace activities 
observed, and they were almost always accompanied by verbal talk. Integration 
among verbal and non-verbal acts is also the focus in the studies of Détienne & Visser 
(2006) and Visser (2009). As far as the use of tools is concerned, they seem to be very 
related to design collaboration, either as intermediary objects (Boujut & Laureillard, 
2002), or as catalysts of common knowledge construction (Peng, 1994; Eckert & 
Boujut, 2003).  
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2.4	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  COMMUNICATION	  IN	  DESIGN	  
 
Des ign  i s  a  soc ia l  process .   
 
—BUCCIARELLI,  1984;  1988 
Getting more into detail in design verbal activity, communication is an essential part 
of team design. According to Sonnenwald (1995): 
(…) communication in design may be characterized as “contested collaboration” (…) 
Participants must collaborate and mutually explore one another’s life-world and 
specialized knowledge so that they can come to a working understanding of how the 
artifact will co-exist with and, ideally, support patterns of work activities, social groups 
and personal beliefs (…) The need to collaborate with other [designers and] groups 
requires participants to gain an understanding of one another’s life-world, including 
one another’s language, expectations and normative behavior” (p. 872-873). 
Focusing on the inside-team design communication, two main types of contributions 
are identified: the ones focusing on “bad” communication and the ones focusing on 
“good” communication.  
Regarding the former, a number of studies focus on communication problems or 
breakdowns. According to Curtis et al. (1988), communication breakdowns depend 
on: communication skills of individuals, existing incentive systems, different 
representational formats, rapid change, local jargon, breakdown of information 
capture, cultural mores, and norms for individual behavior. Sonnenwald (1995, 
1996) found that conflicts in groups consisting of designers, developers, and end-users 
are mainly based on: a) theme incompatibility, b) language differences, c) incomplete 
specialized knowledge, and d) power relationships. The same breakdowns in a team 
consisting only of designers are due to: errors in understanding the design 
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requirements, misinterpretations of the information, misunderstanding of apparently 
shared concepts and forgetfulness of requirements (Cross & Cross, 1995; Eckert, 
2001). 
However, the vast majority of the studies reviewed focuses on “good” 
communication, and more precisely on those process-based behaviors considered as 
desirable for team design activity, either because they refer to predominant activities 
at a team level, or because they are systematically observed in form of “collectibles” 
(Tang & Leifer, 1991), meaning recurring patterns of activity at a session or project 
level. The main empirical results considering both perspectives are hereby exposed.  
Distribution of team design activities. The evolution over time of shared 
mental models follows a counterintuitive reduction pattern that indicates that quality 
of shared views, or salience, and not quantity is the key to effective teamwork (Botturi 
& Del Percio, 2009). Considering the evolution of the design process, sharedness is 
more possible to occur during the beginning (of the) meetings (Badke-Schaub, 
Lauche, Neumann, & Ahmed, 2009). Regarding the process organization, agenda is 
not always followed (Cross & Cross, 1995), as it is also shown in other types of 
meetings (Deppermann, Schmitt, & Mondada, 2010). In addition, in design 
meetings, activities may be initiated tacitly, without a formal decision to undertake 
the activity; there is opportunistic drifting from the agreed plan (Cross & Cross, 
1995). Transitions from topic to topic depend either on team members’ actions, on 
the topics, or on the processes (Brereton et al., 1996). On the other hand, discussed 
contents when combined with design thinking structures, are shown to be correlated 
forming efficient design patterns (Goldschmidt, 1996; Goldschmidt & Weil, 1998). 
Again, though, when considered in isolation, and not in a specific conversational 
context, design cognition is apparently disordered, without any clear pattern or 
meaning of organization (Radcliffe, 1996). 
Also, it is possible that the level of problem definition and explanations increase over 
time (Badke-Schaub et al., 2009), as similarly as the duration of analysis (Smith & 
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Tjandra, 1998). In terms of efficiency, two main observations emerge from team 
comparison: first, that the more efficient teams are the ones that choose to scrap their 
initial design and to start afresh with a new design concept (Smith & Tjandra, 1998); 
and second, the successful teams are the ones that spend more time on coming up 
with different problem frames, rather than just identifying problem features, instead 
of potential solutions (Valkenburg & Dorst, 1998). In addition, missing information 
seems to be the key factor for unsuccessful goal analysis, whereas individual 
competence is positively related to successful solution search (Badke-Schaub & 
Frankenberger, 2002). In general, process efficiency has been treated as a relevant 
aspect in team design, on the basis that how a design team works together is 
positively linked to what it actually produces (Busseri & Palmer, 2000). 
Regarding the distribution of team design activities in time, e.g. throughout one or 
more meetings, project and meeting management has an important part. In the study 
by Olson, Olson, Carter, & Storrosten (1992), this occupied about one fifth of the 
total time, whereas in the more recent study by Stempfle & Badke-Schaub (2002), 
group process discussion accounted for the one third of the total meeting time. 
Among the design-oriented activities, not all of them focus on the production of 
design knowledge: in Design Evaluation Meetings, most of the time (41%) is spent on 
cognitive synchronization activities (D’Astous et al., 2004), whereas in Object-
Oriented Design meetings, more episodes of summary and walkthrough occur in 
comparison to traditional project meetings (Herbsleb et al., 1995). Finally, regarding 
the specific emerging design communication acts, a significant amount of those (63%) 
is related to the solution space (Stempfle & Badke-Schaub, 2002). In this space, 
alternatives occupy an important place. Olson et al. (1992) report that most issues 
have an average of 2.5 alternatives offered, and one third of these are never explicitly 
evacuated. In support of this result, D’ Astous et al. (2004) observe that alternative 
elaboration is almost as frequent (21%) as solution evaluation (26%).  
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Finally, team’s behavior is described regarding its collaboration with external agents, 
such as users and clients. In their analysis of the architects’ case of the DTRS7 
dataset, Goldschmidt & Eschel (2009) observe that the utterances contributed by the 
clients were almost the double (60,4%) of the utterances produced by the architects 
(39,6%). In the same dataset, McDonnell (2009) observes the following negotiation 
patterns between architects and clients: a) architects’ tentative appeals to building 
users’ perspectives, b) building users as custodians of the design concept and of design 
integrity, c) collaborating to justify agreed design decisions, and d) deferring to 
expertise and assertion of expertise. On the other hand, in object-oriented software 
design, Herbsleb et al. (1995) report the use of metaphors as a main strategy to 
communicate complex issues to clients.  
Team design communication patterns. Beginning from the most general 
systematic observations of team design behavior, a first pattern concerns the number 
of participants guaranteeing collaboration. More precisely, it has been broadly 
observed that design collaboration takes places in small coalitions rather than in large 
groups (Walz et al., 1987; Kurtis et al., 1988; Détienne & Visser, 2006). A second 
observed pattern type has to do with the consensus achievement among the 
participants. In Walz (1988), an interesting consensus pattern among seventeen 
design meetings was observed and confirmed through a logistical regression method. 
This pattern refers to an inverted U-shaped curve that characterized acts of 
agreement, meaning that agreement decreased right after ten meetings, when a first 
commonly accepted intermediary artifact was produced. The fact that consensus is 
not the primary goal in team design meetings is also congruent with Cross & Cross 
(1995), who systematically observe that designers often prefer to postpone agreement, 
or with Minneman’s (1991) observation that negotiations found in these meetings 
frequently produce only better understandings of the position of other parties, and no 
marked closure is reached. 
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Getting more into detail, Medland (1992) observes four communication models 
emerging in team design: delegation, reporting, awareness, and problem handling. 
Regarding delegation, the following mechanisms of viewpoint integration are 
identified: negotiation of constraints, evocation of shared knowledge, and argument 
of authority (Martin, Détienne, & Lavigne, 2002). More precisely, constraints and 
arguments play a major role in design delegation. Constraints are the “ends”, the 
utility of which is maximized through the selection and optimization of the right 
alternatives (Simon, 1969). Their use in design is very important and leads to 
meaningful patterns of behavior, as the combined assessment mode (Détienne, 
Martin, & Lavigne, 2005) composed of three steps: 1) Analytical assessment of the 
current solution, 2) If Step 1 has not led to consensus, comparative or/and analogical 
assessment is involved, 3) If Step 2 has not led to a consensus, one or more arguments 
of authority are used. Considering arguments, two main modes are recognized in 
team design research, namely associations, meaning rhetorical argumentation schemes 
providing links between statements, and dissociations, meaning schemes “introduced to 
overcome an incompatibility by separating an established concept into new 
concepts” (Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002). Some patterns observed regarding these two 
modes are the following (Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002): a) association clusters 
surrounding dissociations, b) more dissociations observed in the first half of the design 
sessions than the second. 
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3 .  RESEARCH FRAMING 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, a passage from focusing on design as a problem 
solving process, with pre-defined stages and outcomes, has given its place in the 
recent years to a more activity-based approach of design. Problem solving is just one 
of the possible activities to emerge during designing. Other activities, of both 
cognitive and social nature – in the case of team design – are possible to occur. 
In order to understand the nature of team design process, the study the specific 
activities taking place during it is necessary. This becomes possible by adopting an 
empirical research methodology, focusing on what designers actually do, in terms of 
contents, roles, and methods or strategies. Such an approach has begun to appear in 
fields such as engineering, software, and architectural design, but not as much in 
eLearning design. Thus, the need to further research empirically the team design 
communication processes in this field emerges as primary.  
In this chapter, the empirical part of this dissertation is introduced. In Section 1, the 
state of the art regarding the ID and eLearning design fields is presented. In Section 
2, we present our main research goals in response to the identified problems. These 
goals lead to a number of research questions, presented in Section 3. 
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3.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Beginning with the nature of ID, and subsequently eLearning design, a first relevant 
observation concerns the fact that it is more practice-based rather than theory-based 
(Goodyear, 2005). This means that theories exist to guide practice, but at the same 
time practice informs theories, given that not one “correct” model of ID exists. 
Moreover, ID practice is driven by a vast number of theories, which do not 
necessarily coincide with learning theories, as other complex cognitive and 
management processes are involved  (Reigeluth, & Carr-Chellman, 2009; Richey, 
Klein, & Tracy, 2010; van Rooij, 2010). This recent observation in the ID field has 
led some scholars towards the adoption of a design-based approach of ID, rather 
than a leaning theory approach. However, “a small number of these have attempted 
to derive a generic model of the design process” (Perez, Fleming-Johnson, & Emery, 
1995, p. 324). In addition, these few existing generic models, such as ADDIE 
(Molenda, Pershing, & Reigeluth, 1996), are shown to be too general (Molenda, 
2003), unclear (Bichelmeyer, Boling, & Gibbons, 2006), missing important 
dimensions, such as culture and interaction (Thomas, Mitchell, & Joseph, 2002), or 
just serving as conceptual frameworks for practice (Kenny, Zhang, Schwier, & 
Campbell, 2005). 
In general terms, the image of ID research is similar to the one of design research, as 
we briefly presented it in Section 2.1, at least regarding two main problems: a) the 
inadequacy of a process-based model, as such process is more complex than what 
one type of model can prescribe; and b) the inadequacy of a generic model of design, 
as they remain at a general level. As we saw in the previous chapter, these two 
problems have led researchers to adopt an empirical approach of design research. In 
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the ID field, a recent review of what instructional designers actually do (Kenny, et al., 
2005) has led to some interesting insights regarding the issue, such as: 
• Instructional designers do not systematically perform all the steps in an ID 
model, but they rather create layers of ID activities based on the specific 
design situation. 
• Rather than exclusively working on ID tasks, instructional designers spend 
over half of their professional time in other, organizational nature activities. 
• ID models are useful to designers and inform practice, but few if any 
designers actually use models to confine their practice. 
These observations were obtained from only 10 articles – the only ones that were 
considered relevant to the topic at the time of the study’ publication. Among them, 
only 3 were somehow related to the team practice, as they reported individual 
designers’ experiences with working in teams. To these three, we add the study of 
Latzina & Schott (1995), even though it reports results at a theoretical level, and the 
one by Botturi & Del Percio (2009), which, as we already mentioned, focuses on 
eLearning design teams. However, most of these studies report the experience of 
individuals designing in a team; no protocol-based study – at least, in our knowledge 
– has been hitherto reported in the field of instructional or eLearning design.  
The need to empirically study how eLearning designers perform in teams is essential, 
not only because of the inadequacy or lack of models that guide team design practice. 
There are at least three other factors that call for a special attention on this issue. The 
first one has to do with the cross-disciplinarity of eLearning design teams. As Epton, 
Payne, & Pearson (1983) claim: 
There are tasks that require for their objective completion contributions from more 
than one discipline. Such tasks are defined as cross-disciplinary. Cross-disciplinary 
tasks can be carried out using either of two different organizational forms: The 'pure' 
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multidisciplinary form - in which portions of the task are carried out by 
organizationally separate units each of which includes practitioners of only one 
discipline [or] the 'pure' interdisciplinary form - in which the elements of the task are 
carried out within a single unit that: (a) includes practitioners of all the disciplines 
necessary for the completion of the task, (b) has an internal structure such that 
transactions between members can take the form described (...) as consulting (p. 6-7). 
We prefer to use the term cross-disciplinary, rather than multidisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary, as it is usually used by other authors, to stress on the double 
possibility of a team composed of different disciplines to be either multidisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary. More precisely, multidisciplinarity refers to a type of cooperation 
between disciplines that neither readily integrates the findings of different disciplines 
nor adequately addresses knowledge gaps (Acutt et al., 2000). Braun & Schubert 
(2003) succinctly define it as “when disciplines work side by side on distinct problems 
or aspects of a single problem” (p. 185). A desideratum of any multidisciplinary team 
is interdisciplinarity, which has been defined as the “emergence of insight and 
understanding of a problem domain through the integration or derivation of different 
concepts, methods and epistemologies from different disciplines in a novel way” 
(Rogers, Scaife, & Rizzo, 2005; p. 3).  
The second issue refers to the Design Rationale (DR), meaning the reasoning process 
underlying design (Fischer, Lemke, McCall, & Morch, 1991). DR has been hitherto 
understood in three ways: a) as a documentation process used by the designers to 
keep track of design artifacts leading to design decisions (Fischer et al., 1991); b) as a 
communication process consisting of questions, options, and criteria (McLean, 
Young, Bellotti, & Moran, 1991); and c) as an argumentation process composed of 
three basic elements, namely issues, positions, and arguments (Kunz & Rittel, 1970). 
An integrated approach between these three seems to be needed, because in practice 
all of these rationales appear, making the adoption of one approach being incomplete 
(Shipman & McCall, 1996).  
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Last but not least, uncertainty about the nature and quality of collaborative design is 
another relevant research problem. The social nature of the design process has been 
emphasized since early years (Bucciarelli, 1988; Schøn, 1988). However, it is not until 
recently that collaborative design has started gaining attention as an object of study 
itself, and not only as the macro-context of a teamwork practice. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, different methods of analyzing team design activity have been proposed 
(see, for example, McDonnell & Lloyd, 2009). Among the emerging units of analysis, 
the most related to the concept of collaboration are: viewpoints (Martin et al., 2002), 
arguments (Détienne, et al., 2005), epistemic roles (Baker et al., 2009), and sequences of co-
operation (D’ Astous et al., 2004). The presence and role of these mechanisms have not 
been yet studied in the field of eLearning design and development.  
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3.2 RESEARCH GOALS 
 
A bet ter  unders tanding  o f  workspace  ac t iv i ty  cou ld  a l so  
lead  to  ins ights  in to  improv ing  the  des ign  process .   
 
—TANG & LEIFER,  1988 
As it was already made explicit, the need to describe, analyze, and evaluate team 
design communication process is still a desideratum in the relevant field. Moreover, 
this has to be done in a systematic way, which would allow the identification of 
meaningful patterns of interaction. Such meaningfulness should be at least two-fold: 
first, for the interaction itself, from a communication analysis point of view; and 
second, but not less importantly, for the present and future participants of such 
interactions.  
The macro-context of this research is Distance Higher Education, and more 
specifically, the design of totally on-line University courses. According to Bates & 
Poole (2003), the following modes of course development are possible: a) the lone 
ranger approach, in which instructors work alone, as for example individual cases of 
teachers as in-their-classroom innovators; b) the boutique course development, in which a 
professor works together with an instructional designer or technology support person 
a one-on-one basis; c) the collegial materials development, in which several academics 
work collaboratively to develop online or multimedia educational materials; and d) 
the project management mode, in which a complex project is carried through by a team 
of individuals, each contributing different skills and assuming clear roles. Although all 
these four process modes describe ID, only the two latter explicitly refer to team 
processes guiding design, and only the project management mode is considered as 
representative of Distance Education Higher institutions.  
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Having said that, our specific context of analysis is an institutional eLearning project 
meeting. Apart from an institutional routine, meeting also forms a type of 
communicative activity with its own characteristics. Some of them appear on Figure 
7, as described by Allwood (2000). 
7
2.4 Activity coding for FORMAL MEETING
Activity structure Subgoals Procedures
PURPOSE
Every issue being
discussed defines a
subactivity, normally
consisting of:
1. Definition of the
problem or issue
or following up on
an earlier issue
2. Discussion or try
to solve the
problem
3. Delegating
4. Try to solve
problems that
arise
5. Delegate
assignments
If there is an agenda,
it is followed and
issues are being
discussed in that
order. Otherwise, the
chairman usually
gives the word to the
different participants.
Every decision should
be written in the
protocol by the
secretary.
Compe-
tence
Rights Obligations
Chairman Familiarity with
routines during
a formal
meeting
Lead the meeting Lead the meeting
Let everyone talk
who wants to
Listen to
problems/opinions
Project/
department
employees
Express
problems and
opinions
Wait for turn
ROLES
Secretary Knowledge
how to write a
protocol
Ask for
clarification or
specification
Write a protocol
Instruments Media
ARTIFACTS Agenda (poss.)
Protocol
Direct speech
(video or tape recorder used for
recording purposes)
Social–Cultural Physical
ENVIRONMENT
If this is a meeting in a workplace, most of the
meeting participants know each other and are
probably workmates. In other meetings there
is often a lack of familiarity between
participants.
Meeting room at work
Participants are seated
around a table
 
FIGURE 7. THE MEETING ACTIVITY TYPE (ALLWOOD, 2000; P. 7) 
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Considering the design meeting as the main macro-activity to focus on, co-design 
activity becomes the primary unit of analysis. In general, as Sim & Duffy (2003) 
observe, there are two main types of design activities: those that manage the 
evolution of a design problem into design solution(s), and those that manage the 
design process as the design evolves. The former belong to what is defined as 
exploration of the design space, whereas the latter refer to the task management aspect of 
design. Both types of activities, if task relevant, they focus on one or more design 
objects, meaning those components of the design space towards which the activity is 
oriented. Figure 8 shows a generic representation of any design activity, as an object-
oriented system. 
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FIGURE 8. A GENERIC REPRESENTATION OF DESIGN ACTIVITY  
 
Transferring the design activity’s generic concept to the field of co-design, any 
transformation of the design space necessarily becomes part of the management 
space. This is more obvious in the meeting context, in which planning has a primary 
place, instead of actually designing. Moreover, the nature of eLearning design 
renders decision-making as the central activity of co-design, as it does not allow for 
“putting-hands-on-the-product”, as in Architectural design meeting, for example (in 
that case, the actual design of the product takes place during the meetings). Having 
said that, the two intermingling spaces in team design activity are: design space and 
the communication space. In other words, designers are confronted with a dual task, 
that of developing the product, even though at a planning or decision-making level, 
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and that of communicating their ideas about this development to each other. As the 
efficiency of ideas development cannot be guaranteed before the product, i.e. the on-
line course – gets to the users, communication efficiency has a primary place, as it 
guarantees that all different disciplines, voices, and concerns have actually been taken 
into consideration, before it is “too late”. 
This dual task from part of the participants calls for a dual research goal from our 
part: one focusing on the design practice, and how it actually takes place during 
eLearning project meetings; and another, focusing on the communication practice of 
the designers as main activity of the same meetings. In other words, we are interested 
in investigating the design-in-communication process, from one hand, and the 
communication-in-design process, from another. More precisely, our research goals 
can be identified as following: 
Research goal 1  To identify and describe relevant design and communication 
processes taking place during co-design meetings, with the aim of 
evaluating how they interact one with another. 
Research goal 2  To inform team design practice with empirical conclusions that can 
render their communication more efficient. 
 
We can further say that the first goal is method-oriented, and as such, it could apply 
for any co-design situation, whereas the second goal is practice-oriented, and as such, 
it focuses on the specific context of team eLearning design. Both goals are equally 
important for the present dissertation and will be similarly addressed. 
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3.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
As it was already explained in the Introduction, context is an essential component of 
the communicative interaction. Thus, before concrete questions are posed, it is 
important to situate ourselves in the specific context we are interested in: eLearning 
design and development. To do that, a conceptual framework proposed by Cantoni, 
Botturi, Succi, et al. (2007) is used, as it is presented on Figure 9. 
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FIGURE 9. THE KEY-ELEMENTS OF E-LEARNING DESIGN 
(IN CANTONI ET AL., 2007; P. 149) 
 
The main elements of the framework, namely people, methods, and contents, correspond 
to the main design activity elements, as se defined them in Chapter 2. However, as it 
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can be seen from its secondary elements, this framework refers to the whole 
eLearning design activity, not to the specific team design communication 
“producing” this activity. Adopting it to the context of co-design meetings, and 
according to what we have hitherto said, it takes the form shown on Figure 10. 
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FIGURE 10. THE KEY ELEMENTS OF AN E-LEARNING DESIGN MEETING 
 
Based on this conceptual framework, and on our previous discourse regarding the 
notion of activity as central in team design process, the following questions are posed: 
1. How is an eLearning design meeting structured in terms of design and 
communication activities? 
2. How is the content of team design activity related to the design object, i.e. the 
on-line course? 
3. How do people relate to the design object through their communication 
process? 
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4 .  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Analyzing communication in institutional settings is a complex task and not only one 
method exists to do so. Studies in conversational analysis frequently have institutions as 
their context of analysis, whereas discourse analysis comes into game each time specific 
interpersonal verbal dynamics need to be explored. On the other hand, small group 
communication research has for several years influenced the ways in which such 
interaction is analyzed in order to inform future practice. In this line of research, various 
methods are possible and usually a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches is 
proposed as the most adequate option. 
The perspective adopted hereby of communication as a socio-cognitive interaction calls 
for a special attention on the Interaction Analysis paradigm, as it was mainly developed by 
the French school (e.g. Trognon, 1999). This paradigm is based on both conversational 
and discourse analysis (Brassac, 1992), but it is also different from those in various 
aspects, as it will be explained later on. Its main assumption is that during interaction, an 
interlocutory logic between the participants is created, and discourse is the main agent of its 
construction. To go further into how discourse promotes construction and co-
construction of concepts and relations, several types and classifications of discourse 
relations have been proposed. A special type of those refers to the ones forming 
arguments and argumentation sequences. For their identification and analysis, some 
notions from the Informal Logic field are considered necessary. Moreover, as the 
interaction we are interested in is object-oriented, the definition of the cognitive aspects 
of the design object(s) is possible with some help from the Cognitive Ergonomics field. 
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Chapter 4 provides a more detailed account of what was briefly described here. Section 
1 is dedicated to giving an account of the most important inter-personal communication 
studies and methods applied in the small group communication field. Section 2 describes 
Interaction analysis and its main assumptions and applications. Section 3 presents some 
notions from the Cognitive Ergonomics field, also relevant for team design situations. 
Section 4 focuses on the issue of discourse relations and presents their communication-
oriented conceptualization in the margins of Connectivity model. Finally, Section 5 
provides an overview of what Informal Logic refers to and its main ideas and 
applications of analysis. 
It is worth noting here that what will be exposed in the following sections is just a 
selection of the study’s potential theoretical background, paying attention at the notions 
directly applied or taken into consideration in this research. 
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4.1 INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS 
 
Tout  se  passe  au  passage  de  la  paro le                           
que lque  chose  se  passe  entre  le  passeur  e t  l ’autre  r ive  
que lque  chose  arr ive  
 s ’ i l  n ’arr ive  r ien ,  la  paro le  e s t  perdue .   
 
—JOSEPH WOLMAN, unknown ed i t ions  
As it was already made explicit in the previous chapter, the main goal of this research is 
to describe and analyze the communication processes taking place in a team of people in 
a task-oriented situation. According to Fisher (1975), “four elements are inherent in a 
process – action or acts, a continuous change in time, advancement or progress over time, and 
a goal or result” (p. 16). And he concludes using David Berlo’s words, saying that “if we 
accept the concept of process, we view events and relationships as dynamic, on-going, 
ever-changing, continuous” (p. 16). 
The notion of process has been considered of great relevance regarding small group 
communication research. In this context, group has been assigned the following 
characteristics (Brilhart, 1967): a) a number of people sufficiently small for each to be 
aware of and have some reaction to each other; b) a mutually interdependent purpose in 
which the success of each is contingent upon the success of the others in achieving this 
goal; c) each person has a sense of belonging or membership, identifying herself with the 
other members of the group; d) oral interaction, not exclusively but mainly; and e) 
behavior based on norms and procedures accepted by all members. 
Analysis of group communication processes is of interest to this research, mainly in 
respect of three perspectives: a) the network perspective, b) the communication systems 
perspective, and c) the group as a decision-making system perspective. 
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A social network consists of a set of actors (nodes) and the relations (ties) among these 
actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In interpersonal communication networks, the nodes 
correspond to individuals forming part of a group, whereas the ties can be both at an 
individual-individual and an individual-to-group level. The most used measures in 
network analysis are either qualitative, e.g. sociograms, or quantitative, e.g. through the 
use of network metrics. As Katz, Lazer, Arrow, & Contractor (2005) summarize, the 
most frequently used metrics include: a) actor degree centrality, i.e. the extent to which actors 
send or receive direct ties; b) betweeness centrality, i.e. the extent to which actors have ties 
with others who are not directly connected; c) closeness centrality, i.e. the extent to which 
actors are directly or indirectly connected to the rest of the actors in the network; d) 
reciprocity, i.e. the extent to which there are mutual ties between actors; and e) transitivity, 
i.e. the extent to which actors who are connected to one another are also connected to 
the same other actors. 
Empirical communication network studies can be grossly classified into two big 
categories: the ones that conceive network ties as an input, and the ones that conceive 
them as an output. In the first category, a major structure component for task-oriented 
groups is centrality. Bavelas (1950) identified five main patterns regarding centrality, 
namely: all-channel, circle, chain, Y, and wheel patterns (the names correspond to the 
actual shapes of the network schemes). Their classification is hierarchical, from more 
decentralized to more centralized patterns (“all-channel” and “circle” are considered to 
be at the same level). In, mostly, experimental studies, these pre-existing or prescribed (as 
an experimental condition) patterns have been evaluated in relation to their influence on 
group performance measures, such as accuracy and satisfaction of group members 
(Leavitt, 1951/1975; Cohen, 1962; Shaw, 1964, 1971; Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & 
Kraimer, 2001). In all of these studies, more decentralized network structures are related 
to greater performance and members’ satisfaction. On the other hand, studies 
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considering the network type and quality as an output are more interested in issues 
related to the question: What conditions do influence the emergence of a centralized 
pattern of ties? (Katz et al., 2005). Among the potential condition “candidates”, low task-
complexity (Hirokawa, Ebert, & Hurst, 1996; Brown & Miller, 2000), and high stress and 
tension (Argote, Turner, & Fichman, 1989) are related to more centralized 
communication patterns.  
The analysis of group communication processes as networks’ formation is relevant to the 
goals of the present dissertation. However, there are a number of limitations that emerge 
and need to be taken into consideration. First of all, in natural, face-to-face settings, it is 
not always clear whether group structures should be conceived as the input or the output 
of performance. Secondly, even if this is the case, group structures cannot be conceived 
as static and unchangeable entities, but rather as dynamic, continuously changing 
systems. This is the approach of groups as communication systems, which will be 
explained subsequently. Thirdly, people’s emerging communication roles, rather than 
their position in the system, are more informative regarding the individual behavior in 
relation to the group processes. Finally, a last limitation emerges from the fact that in 
team communication usually each message is directed towards the whole of the team, 
and not only to one person (McGarth & Altermatt, 2001). 
As far as studying groups as communication systems is concerned, both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives need to be taken into account. According to Mabry (1999), four 
theoretical perspectives grounded in the systems metaphor deserve attention, namely: 
Field Theory, Social Exchange Theory, Developmental Theory, and Structuration Theory. Hereby, we 
provide a brief account of each one. 
Field Theory focuses on explaining the interdependencies of the part-whole relationship, 
and more precisely the influence of individuals’ attributes on group processes and 
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performance.  Its main assumption is that “achieving groupness depends on how successful 
members are at (a) managing and dissipating tensions created by simultaneously 
attempting to achieve individual and group goals, and (b) moving toward goals in the 
face of barriers in the group´s external environment or members’ countervailing efforts 
at satisfying their own needs” (Mabry, 1999; p. 81). Some of the most important 
individual-based factors of group communication performance have been shown to be: 
sex/gender, communication skills, conflict management style, and culture. As Bonniwell-
Hasslett & Ruebush (1999) observe, diversity in group composition has been explored 
from a number of different perspectives (e.g. demographic, communicative, cognitive, 
and cultural), and its outcome effects have primarily been on conflict expression and 
management, creativity, and quality of decision making.  
Another group communication theory is represented by the Social Exchange. Its main 
idea is that “people are motivated to interact because they anticipate obtaining 
something of value, at the least possible cost to themselves, through their interactions 
with others” (Mabry, 1999; p. 81). This mechanism is very related to task-oriented 
interactions, such as group problem solving or decision making, because participants are 
necessarily interdependent in order to produce valued outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1969). The interdependence among group members calls attention to the significance of 
members’ relationships. As Scheerhorn, Geist, & Teboul (1994) observe, “decision 
making is merely one type of predominant activity within real decision-making groups” 
(p. 256). Although few scholars concentrate on the relational content of communication 
messages, some interesting tools have been provided on how to do so, namely: the 
Interact System Model (ISM), the System for the Multiple Level Observation of Groups 
(SYMLOG), and the Interaction Process Analysis (IPA). A brief presentation of each 
approach is considered methodologically relevant to the present study, even though our 
focus is on the socio-cognitive dimension rather than the emotional-affective dimension 
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of interaction (for some recent work on the latter see Baker, 2010; Andriessen, Baker, & 
van der Puil, in press). 
The main unit of analysis of ISM (Fisher & Hawes, 1971) is the interact, e.g. the 
contiguous speaking act of one person followed by the act of another. The main 
contribution of the ISM method is the operationalization of interaction into three levels: 
patterns of messages and message sequences, interact phases composed of clusters of 
patterns, and cycles of interact phases related to specific group task performance.  
Similarly to ISM, the precursor IPA (Bales, 1950), describes both the types of messages 
and patterns of interaction in groups. In addition, it offers 12 categories to describe 
members’ communicative acts, based on the distinction between task and relational 
categories. More precisely, task messages may be one of the following: give or ask for 
suggestion, give or ask for opinion, and give or ask for orientation/information. The 
socioemotional (relational) acts are: show solidarity/seem friendly, dramatize/release 
tension, and agree – for positive member relations; disagree, show tension, and show 
antagonism/seem unfriendly – for negative member relations.  
As an expansion of IPA, SYMLOG (Bales & Cohen, 1979) adds three dimensions with 
respect to the relational field, namely: dominance/submissiveness, friendly/unfriendly, 
and instrumentally controlled/emotionally expressive. According to Keyton (1999), “the 
SYMLOG system is particularly good for revealing polarizations or tensions among 
group members on the three dimensions” (p. 198).  
In the margins of Developmental Theory, two main types of models have been 
proposed, namely: phase models, and continuous models. Many phase models of group 
communication exist; however, focusing on task-oriented group communication, few of 
them have been tested in practice.  A well-known example is the theoretical model of 
group communication proposed by Bales & Strodtbeck (1951), composed of three 
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phases: orientation, evaluation, and control. Its empirical testing by Fisher (1970) led to a 
four-phase model of decision development: orientation, conflict, emergence, and 
reinforcement. Other stage models of small group development have been proposed by 
Tuckman (1965), Tubbs (1995), and more recently also in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence (e.g. McBurney, Hitchcock, & Parsons, 2007). However, unitary sequence 
stage models have many problems, summarized in Mabry’s (1999) observation that 
“although groups emulate some of the same phases, the exact composition, number, and 
ordering evolves more particularistically” (p. 83). As an alternative, Poole (1983) 
proposes the use of multiple sequence models instead of unitary sequence or stage models.  A 
major difference between the two approaches is that the first one is top-down, meaning 
that a priori stages are applied to the data, whereas the second one is bottom-up, 
meaning that phases are defined in terms of particular patterns of group activities 
occurring within them. 
A series of studies applying the second, multiple-sequence approach have led to some 
insightful results regarding patterns of group communication in task-oriented groups. To 
begin with, in the first application of the Multiple Sequence Descriptive System to ten 
decision-making groups, Poole (1983) examined a series of activities, among which: a) 
the ideational content of each segment, distinguishing between problem analysis, proposal 
development, and combined mode; b) the focus units, namely cooperative idea 
modification, elaboration, integration, and disagreement; and c) sequential patterns, 
identified as simple confrontation, devised confrontation (repartée mode), negotiation, and 
recurrent conflict. As a result, patterns of idea development, conflict management, and 
content patterns emerged. A comparison with Group Developmental Stages was also 
applied (Poole, 1983b), and the study was expanded to 47 decision episodes, deriving 
from different decision-making groups (Poole & Roth, 1989). The following results have 
been acquired: 
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• Although eleven out of the 47 decisions had the traditional unitary sequence 
path, 22 of them additionally had complex cyclic paths, characterized by two to 
seven problem-solution cycles. Moreover, those cycles were not unitary for the 
majority of decisions. 
•  In 24 of 47 decisions the groups began with a solution focus, rather than with 
significant problem analysis or orientation periods. Only 10 of the 24 later shifted 
back to problem analysis; the rest focused on solutions throughout the entire 
session. 
• Some shifts of attention, in terms of group activity, can be translated as critical 
breakpoints. These are of at least three types (Poole, 1983b): a) normal breakpoints, 
which refer to topic shifts, natural breaks, or “planning moments” in which one 
or more members “breaks” group discussion in order to propose a plan of action; 
b) delays, also called “comprehension cycles”, referring to holding periods during 
which the group recycles the same development process; c) disruptions, meaning 
either conflict outbreaks or major re-orientations. In Poole & Roth’s (1989) study, 
34 out of 47 decision paths had recycles, while twenty groups experienced 
conflict outbreaks. Such breakpoint instances alter one with another in a 
punctuated equilibrium way (Gersick, 1988): “systems progress through an 
alternation of stasis and sudden appearance –long periods of inertia, punctuated 
by concentrated, revolutionary periods of quantum change” (p. 16). 
• A significant amount of group interaction was classified as disorganized periods, 
showing that not all task-oriented discussion is meaningful regarding decision 
making. Regarding the amount of such periods, there is a significant variance 
among the groups. Considering the instance of their appearance, no concrete 
prediction can be made, confirming again the insufficiency of a stage model. 
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Some answers to these issues are given by Structuration Theory. Its main concept, 
structuration, refers to “the process by which systems are produced and reproduced 
through members’ use of rules and resources” (Poole, Seibold, & McPhee, 1996; p. 117). 
According to Giddens (1984), those rules and resources that group members use are the 
structures, or the “recipes” for acting. Systems have patterns because of these structures. 
However, not only the system is produced and reproduced through structuration, but the 
structures themselves also do. There is a duality of structure, meaning that they are both 
the medium and outcome of social practices (Giddens, 1984; Poole et al., 1996). Having 
said that, studies focusing on structuration, mainly search for two things: a) the 
interdependence between structures and system, or, better said, between individual 
action and structural factors; and b) a method to do so that does not consider structure as 
a stable, given aspect of the group and its members, but as an emergent product of 
member activities.  
As it has been already implied, a special attention has been given to group 
communication as a decision-making system. Based on the overview by Hirokawa & 
Salazar (1999), the relationship between group communication and decision-making 
performance has been conceptualized through three main perspectives: the mediational, 
the functional, and the constitutive perspective.  
According to the mediational perspective, communication is a medium through which 
“the primary group determinants of performance exert their influence” (p. 172). Three 
main tendencies can be distinguished in the margins of this perspective: a) studies that 
focus on the superiority of groups over individual decision-makers; b) studies that focus 
on communication as a means of acquisition, distribution, and pooling of information 
among group members, and c) studies that examine the effects of different 
communication techniques on group decision-making performance. The second 
perspective will be briefly examined separately due to its relevance to our focus on 
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naturally emerging, task-oriented interactions. Among the studies applying observational 
coding schemes to examine the relationship between information, communication and 
accuracy of group decision-making performance, Hirokawa & Salazar (1999) distinguish 
two studies as representative: the one by Lanzetta & Roby (1960), and the other by 
Katzell, Miller, Rotter, & Venet (1970). In the first study, four measures were used to do 
so, namely: a) total number of communicative acts produced; b) total number of 
messages providing information; c) total number of requests for information; and d) the 
relative proportion of transmitted information. In the second study, Katzell et al. (1970) 
applied IPA categories as proposed by Bales (1950). A common result between these two 
studies is that “information-related communication categories are inversely related to 
group decision accuracy” (Hirokawa & Salazar, 1999; p. 173), without providing a 
justification for such an unexpected relationship. On the other hand, a more recent 
mediational perspective application offered by Hackman (1990) seems to fill in the gap of 
considering those independent factors that “enable” a group to make high-quality 
decisions. These conditions, or “process criteria of effectiveness” (Hackman, 1990; p. 9), 
are: a) effort to accomplish the task at an acceptable level of performance; b) knowledge and 
skills relevant to the task; and c) strategies appropriate to the task-performance. 
Despite this more functional version provided by Hackman (1990), communication from 
the mediational perspective is still perceived as a medium, and not as a function per se. Such 
a functional view is the main idea of the so-called Functional Perspective, in which 
effective group decision making is functional, in the sense that “it represents the means 
by which group members attempt to meet the requisites for successful group decision-
making” (Gouran & Hirokawa, 1983; p. 170). 
According to the Functional Perspective, a group’s “final” decision is the result of a series 
of small steps or sub-decisions, which emerge during interaction as answers to the 
following questions (Gouran & Hirokawa, 1983; 1996): a) Is there something about the 
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present situation that requires a choice of some kind to be made?; b) What do we want to 
achieve or accomplish in deciding what to do?; c) What are the choices available to us?; 
d) What are the positive and negative aspects of each choice?. The accuracy of a group’s 
answers to these questions is related to the quality of the decision performance. More 
precisely, 
• Consistent with Functionalists’ main assumption that it is not the discussion 
procedure that a group applies in order to reach a decision but the group’s 
satisfaction of certain functions that matters, the following functions have been 
more related to effective decision-making than the others: analysis of the problem 
(Hirokawa & Pace, 1986), understanding of the choice making situation 
(Hirokawa, 1985), and evaluation of alternative choices (Hirokawa, 1985; 
Hirokawa & Pace, 1986; Orlitzky & Hirokawa, 1997). 
• The evaluation of alternative choices can be oriented either towards the positive 
or the negative qualities of those. However, as Hirokawa (1988) observes, it has 
been broadly discovered a non-significant main effect for the assessment of 
positive qualities. This observation “may be a consequence of the fact that groups 
tend to employ a “negative” (as opposed to a “positive”) approach in evaluating 
alternatives” (p. 499). 
In spite of the evidently greater functionality attributed to communication by the 
Functional Perspective, still its consideration as a structure influenced by the system and 
not able to influence on the system is predominant. This duality of communication 
structures as both determined and determinants, highlightened by the Structuration 
Theory, is re-visited by the Constitutive Perspective in relation to group decision-making 
systems. Seen from this perspective, “the role of communication in group decision 
making involves facilitating the creation and reinforcement of the social structures that give rise to 
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decisions” (Hirokawa & Salazar, 1999; p. 172). Its main focus is the socially constructed 
environment and its influence on group performance. As main social processes, scholars 
working under this perspective have hitherto underlined the symbolic convergence, and the 
rhetorical vision construction. The former refers to the group´s effort to achieve common 
understanding of the symbols, i.e. concepts and procedures, related to the task. The 
latter refers to a way of achieving such convergence, through the use of “group 
fantasies”, such as pragmatic, social, and righteous rhetorical visions (Cragan & Shields, 
1981). In general, those studies have all focused on the identification and evaluation of 
inhibited and established group norms that influence on the way decisions are taken. 
However, more research is needed “to identify and assess the impact of endogenous 
factors on the structures group members draw on in communicating with one another” 
(Hirokawa & Salazar, 1999; p. 186). 
Finally, it is worth noting that a special attention has been paid to group argumentation, in 
the margins of both Structuration theory and group decision-making. As it was already 
mentioned in the description of Structuration theory, structures that emerge in group 
interaction have been considered with a double function, as both means and outcomes of 
the practice. The same has been assumed for argument structures (Meyers, Seibold, & 
Brushers, 1991). At a general level, Canary, Brossmann, Brossmann, & Weger (1995) 
observe that argument structuring has been shown to occur simultaneously through 
three modalities: as norms for acceptable reasoning and interaction, as facilities enabling 
the exercise of power, and as schemes for interpretation and sense making. More 
precisely, regarding the emergence of argument as “result” of the interactional structure, 
group argument has been defined as a convergence-producing discourse (Seibold, McPhee, 
Poole, Tanita, & Canary, 1981), meaning discourse that reflects others’ views (Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Also, group argument is mainly characterized by four 
strategies, namely: extended elaboration, questioning and testing, repetitive agreement, and tag-team 
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arguing, meaning the production of positive position towards a sub-group’s proposal, that 
is, therefore, considered as influential (Meyers & Seibold, 1990). As far as the argument 
structure is concerned, simple, compound, eroded, and convergent arguments are possible to 
emerge in groups seeking consensus on a decision (Canary, Brossmann, & Seibold, 
1987). Finally, concerning argument as a means for group outcomes, Canary et al. 
(1987) have found that groups reaching consensus have more argument acts and 
structures than dissensus groups, and the predominant type of those is convergent 
arguments. 
In sum, it can be said that small group communication and decision making has been 
approached through very different perspectives and methods leading to results of 
different nature and relevance to the goals of the present study. Focusing our research on 
the “close” collaboration processes among the members of a task-oriented team, 
observations coming from the fields of Functional and Structuration Theory appear to 
be more related to our goals. Such results include the type of discourse and 
argumentation produced during group communication, the type of communication 
sequences, and the “cycles” or patterns of such sequences throughout interaction. On 
the other hand, to confront with these issues at a micro-level, as our focus is on the 
relations between people, methods, and contents, Interaction analysis emerges as the 
most adequate method, as it will be better explained in the following section. 
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4.2 INTERACTION ANALYSIS 
 
Dia logue  i s  not  a  “window on the  mind” ,  
i t  i s  a  mani fe s ta t ion  o f  minds  in  operat ion .  
 
 —BAKER, 2003 
Group interaction refers to the “simultaneous and sequential behaviors (verbal and 
motor) of group members as they act in relation to one another and to the tasks that the 
group is trying to accomplish, over time” (McGrath & Altermatt, 2001). An early 
appearance of the study of group interaction is identified with Bales’ (1950) Interaction 
Process Analysis (IPA) coding system. As it was already described in the previous section, 
the initiation of the Harvard School of Interaction analysis, in which the study of Bales is 
situated, focused on the systematic study of the “whole” group, having as main unit of 
analysis an act, equivalent to a simple sentence or its nonverbal equivalent. Bales focused 
on four symmetric groups of acts: positive and negative reactions (socio-emotional 
dimension), and problem-solving attempts and questions (task dimension). 
Following Bales’ tradition, a considerable number of scholars were interested in 
examining the relation between exchange structures and other group processes, such as 
power relations, the emergence and development of status structures, and their relation 
to emotions. We hereby give a short account of each, based on the review by Burke 
(2003). First of all, power is defined as being determined by the network of relations, and 
more precisely, as the inverse of the degree to which a person depends upon another. 
Regarding status emergence, it is shown that individuals’ characteristics, such as initial 
status advantage and task skill, influence on the structure development. Finally, status 
processes are highly related to members’ emotional reactions, in a mutually dependent 
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way, and also the latter is connected to task behaviors, such as agreements and 
disagreements. 
Parallel to the Harvard School of Interaction Analysis, the Michigan School, started by 
Kurt Lewin at MIT (e.g. Lewin, 1946), focused on group cohesion, as result of positive 
interaction, cognitive dissonance, or identity construction. In the first perspective, 
successful exchanges lead to positive emotions, which in turn lead to relational cohesion. 
Sometimes the same is perceived by group members as a result of their effort to reduce 
their negative feelings, such as task pain, by attributing a high value to their belonging in 
the group. A similar approach is adopted by the identity theorists who suggest that it is 
not the exchange process as such that brings about group cohesion, but the process of 
self-verification in the group context, which also guides to a process of mutual identity 
construction in the other group members.  
In one way or another, the approaches briefly described here define interaction as a 
relationship between two (or more) entities that influence each other. This has been 
defined as a factorial approach of interaction (Markova, 1997; Grossen, 2010). According to 
this approach, context is taken into account, at a greater or less degree, but always “as a 
set of external variables that have certain object characteristics” (Grossen, 2010; p. 4). By 
contrast, according to a dialogical approach, “the unit of analysis is the interaction as a 
whole, for example the individuals and their social and physical environment” (p. 4). As 
Grossen (2010) also observes, this approach is similar to Lewin’s  ecological theory, 
regarding that “the context in which the subject acts is also an outcome of his or her own 
psychological activity” (p. 4).   
The dialogical approach of interaction has been investigated in various disciplinary 
fields, such as Sociology, Linguistics, and Distributed Cognition (for a recent overview of 
the interactionist paradigm see Streeck, 2010). Our goal here is not to focus on each one 
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of the approaches, as different issues and methods apply to each one. Instead, given the 
author’s background in Psychology, an overview of how this approach has influenced 
various psychological theories until the emergence of “interlocutory logic” as the main 
paradigm guiding the present research will be given in the following paragraphs. 
It can be said that the dialogical paradigm started with Bakhtin, whose work has 
influenced many social fields, including Psychology. Bakhtin’s main contribution was to 
define language as a dialogical entity. As he said,  
word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is 
meant. As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker 
and listener, addresser and addressee (Bakhtin, 1929; p. 86).  
The same approach has been adopted by a number of psychologists. According to Mead 
(1934), each I-position creates a voice, which relates to other voices of I-positions in a 
relation of dialogicality. This phenomenon is also known as “multivoicedness”. Vygotsky 
(1978) went a step further and defined language as the semiotic tool that “carries” such 
dialogicality both intra-personally and inter-personally. More recently, Markova (2003) 
defines dialogicality as “the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create, and 
communicate about realities in terms of the ‘Alter’” (p. 85).   
The dialogical perspective has been also expanded to both social and socio-cultural 
psychology. In social psychology, Billig (1987) introduced the notion of discursive 
psychology, with a focus on the argumentative nature of human thinking, both in its 
monological and dialogical form. Wertsch (1991), mainly based on Vygotsky and his 
mediational theory of language, introduced “a sociocultural approach to mind (that) 
begins with the assumption that action is mediated and that it cannot be separated from 
the milieu in which it is carried out” (p. 18). Bakhtin’s influence is also evident on 
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Wertsch’s work, concerning the role of context, in its broader sense, on the expression of 
voices. According to Wertsch (1985),  
voices … are not those of isolated, ahistorical individuals; they are the ideological 
perspectives or ‘axiological belief systems’ (Bakhtin, 1981; p. 304) that can adequately be 
understood only in terms of a specific sociohistorical setting (p. 226, citation of Bakhtin is 
in the original). 
A remarkable influence of the dialogical approach has been noticed regarding the 
psychological theories of thinking and learning (e.g. Rogoff, 1990; Perret-Clermont, 
Perret, & Bell, 1991), which have led to the theories of collaborative learning 
(Dillenbourg, Baker, Blaye, & O’Malley, 1999). Some common ideas behind these 
theories, all of them focusing on what can be called as “meaning co-construction”, are 
the following (based on Grossen, 2010; p. 7): 
• Meanings are not inscribed within language; they are constructed through 
discourse and derive from interaction. 
• The interlocutor’s possible response is contained within the speaker’s discourse, 
and any piece of discourse has one component made up of responsivity and 
another of addressivity. 
• Human cognition and learning have to focus upon joint activity as it is achieved 
within a certain context. 
Thus, within a dialogical approach of interaction, the unit of analysis is not the 
individual but the individual together with the other present or absent participants. This 
assumption creates the need for a method akin to grasp the logic of interaction as a logic 
per se, not as a sum of individual “logics” neither as a social phenomenon to be 
observed. Instead, it has to be seen “as an internal reality of any cognitive process and 
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(as) the observer cannot access the reality of the cognitive evolution, (he can do so) 
because it [the social interaction] is manifested, is communicated in a socialized way to 
the interlocutors” (Perret-Clermont & Nicolet, 1988; p. 13; original in French, translated 
by the author). This method is best described through the interlocutory logic (Trognon, 
1999) approach. 
The main idea of the interlocutory logic analysis – we use the term Interaction Analysis (IA) 
to refer to this approach– is that any element of conversation is both a social and a 
cognitive fact, and these two aspects are not separated or independent from the 
conversational element, but they derive, as functions, on the one or the other dimension. 
This also means that the social dimension contributes to the cognitive and vice versa. 
Another main idea is that this double nature is manifested at all levels of interaction, 
from the most micro, i.e. acts, to the most macro, i.e. transactions. Furthermore, it is this 
nature that defines how, when, and which acts will be considered as an exchange or as a 
sequence, and not their physical order in interaction, as it is implied by the “adjacency 
pair” (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), main unit of analysis in Conversational Analysis (CA). 
Interaction analysts take into consideration the fact that the acts that are connected in 
sequences may often be far apart, argue that the notion of pair betrays a CA bias toward 
two-party conversation, and emphasize that the units forming sequences are not turns, 
but actions (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2010). Furthermore, interaction analysis is always 
interpretative (Baker, 2010), meaning that its main goal is to describe interaction as it 
naturally occurs including in this description as many contextual factors as necessary to 
make such interaction meaningful.  
Interaction analysis, being an approach and not a method itself, “borrows” 
characteristics and resources from other methods, such as CA, Discourse Analysis (DA), 
Pragmatics, and other theories that are considered relevant to the context of research. 
This is why some scholars adopt an “eclectic approach” towards it (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 
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2010). Even so, there are some main assumptions that guide the present research 
following this paradigm, and they will be hereby summarized. 
From an illocutionary to an interlocutionary logic. Speech acts (Austin, 1962; 
Searle, 1969) are not sufficient or adequate in order to understand a dialogue or 
conversation. In order to support his position, not explicitly stated as such in his early 
works, Trognon (2001) quotes Searle (1992) who himself seems to be aware of this 
limitation of speech act theory: 
in a dialogue or conversation, each speech act creates a space of possibilities or 
appropriate response speech acts. Just as a move in a game creates a space of possible and 
appropriate countermoves, so in a conversation, each speech act creates a space of 
possible and appropriate response speech acts. The beginnings of a theory of the 
conversational game might be a systematic attempt to account for how particular 
“moves”, particular illocutionary acts, constrain the scope of possible appropriate 
responses. But when we investigate this approach, I believe we will see that we really do 
not get very far (p. 8). 
From an illocutionary logic perspective, in which meaning is co-constructed with the 
Other, a more functional conceptualization of language acts is necessary. As Baker 
(2010) puts it, if the goal is to analyze collaboration, then the unit of analysis should not 
be the individual speech act; this is the smallest monological unit. Interaction analysts do 
not propose a “magic” list of new acts to replace the traditional ones; however, they do 
propose as a minimal level of analysis the exchange (Trognon, 2001; Baker, 2010), 
meaning that an interaction unit cannot be considered outside from its proximate 
discursive context. A similar approach is found in Clark & Carlson (1982), who propose 
informative acts as additional to the illocutionary acts: 
In our proposal, the speaker performs two types of illocutionary act with each utterance. 
One is the traditional kind, such as an assertion, promise, or apology; this is directed at the 
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addressees. The other, called an informative, is directed at all the participants in the 
conversation-the addressees and third parties alike. It is intended to inform all of them 
jointly of the assertion, promise, or apology being directed at the addressees (p. 332, 
abstract) 
Acts are necessary to define sequential structure. In hierarchical-functional 
models of conversation or discourse, the minimal unit of analysis is the act (Sinclair & 
Coulthard, 1975; Moeschler, 1989; Roulet, 1981; Roulet, Filletaz, & Grobet, 2001). 
Maintaining a “traditional” approach of speech acts, the consideration of the exchange 
as the minimal unit of analysis, as the Interaction analysts propose, is still necessary. 
However, if a new, more functional approach of acts is adopted, the one in which the 
Other’s response is taken into consideration at the time of defining the act, the CA point 
of view can still be valid. Nonetheless, from an IA perspective, the nature of these acts 
needs to be cognitive, because “a speaker can never be sure to have been understood”, 
thus “the speaker’s intention should be mutual knowledge” (Trognon, 2001; p. 132). 
This is also the reason why the cognitive dimension plays a major role in the IA 
approach. It also has implications at the time of segmentation, as speech acts alone do 
not always contain all the propositional content that is communicated at the instance of 
interaction in which they are expressed, and utterances often include more content, in 
the sense of message units being communicated. We will return to this issue in detail in 
Chapter 5 (Method). 
The importance of task. Interactions are finalized with the realization of tasks, 
imposed by the external to the participants. Therefore, interaction analysts propose, 
wherever it is possible, to complement the analysis of the interaction with an analysis of 
the task the participants are engaged in (this is why IA has been largely adopted by 
Cognitive Ergonomists, as it will be explained in the next section). The nature of tasks is 
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highly context-dependent, but it is always focused on a cognitive object (Gilly, Roux, & 
Trognon, 1999).  
There is not only one way of analyzing interaction. As Baker (2010) explicitly 
puts is, “there is in fact, no unique object of scientific study called ‘interaction’ (…) if 
there is no unique phenomenon called ‘interaction’, there can be no unique 
methodology and method for studying it (…) new methods will have to be elaborated for 
achieving precisely this objective” (keynote speech quotation). This undoubted fact leads 
some interaction analysts to be “eclectic”, in Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s (2010) words, some 
others to invent their “own” methods, that finally belong to one or another approach 
such as CA or DA, and many to be encountered in the middle: always focusing on 
interaction as the main object of analysis, in contrast to other approaches, but considering 
various aspects on different dimensions. 
One of the most recognized efforts of a systematic approach to analysing interactions is 
Baker’s (1999, 2003, 2010b) dialogue analysis approach, which combines analyses along 
seven theoretically separate dimensions, namely: dialectical, rhetorical, epistemological, 
discursive (“conceptual” in Baker’s early works), dialogical (“interactive” in his early works), 
affective (emotional), and socio-relational. In this approach, the argumentative dimension is 
also present and especially treated, and it is related either to the dialectical or the 
rhetorical dimension. An explanation of each one of these dimensions and how they 
have been hitherto treated in some of the most representative works will be hereby given. 
The dialectical dimension. In task-oriented collaborative interaction, dialectical 
analysis more often refers to “negotiation” of the epistemic status of a cognitive object, 
e.g. a solution, than to “real” persuasion on a viewpoint. Or better said, persuasion may 
exist, but it refers to a task-related thesis or position, rather than to a pro or contra 
viewpoint. In any case, dialectical analysis has been shown to be a useful tool at the time 
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of analysing and guiding students’ problem-solving interactions (e.g. Baker, 1996; 
Ravenscroft & Pilkington, 2000), as students’ attitude changes, when they occur, seem to 
obey to rules of dialogical rationality (Baker, 2003). Such rationality is explained on the 
basis of dialectical moves, consisting of: a) the propositional content, and the attitude 
(pro/contra) towards such content, when it is made explicit; b) the speech act type, 
which defines if the proposition is interrogative, assertive, exclamative, or a “foul move” 
(Baker, 1999) such as the “Ipse dixisti!” (i.e. you already said it yourself!) defined by 
Barth & Krabbe (1982); and c) the pragmatic character of the move (M), referring to its 
function (e.g. “attack”, “request”, “concession”, “defense”, etc.) in respect to the debate. 
Figure 11 presents an example of a dialectical analysis applied to an interaction corpus. 
N. Utterance M John Mary Pragmatic character 
180 There are several to be done. 
One there. 
a A  John’s solution 
 Should another one be put there?     
181 Pprrrttt ! b  A? Attack: how do you defend A? 
182 You see it leaves from a reservoir 
and it comes back to a reservoir 
c B  Direct defense of A 
183 It’s true!? d  B? Attack: how do you defend B? 
184 A reservoir to start and a 
reservoir to finish 
e B’  Defense of B 
185 Have we got two batteries John? f  C Attack on B/B’ 
186 No! g   Concession of C 
187 Have we got two batteries!? h  C’ Attack on B/B’ 
188 No i   Concession of C 
189 Then why do you talk nonsense! j  GR! Explicitation of dialectical 
outome: B refuted 
190 What have we forgotten then? k   Concession of dialectical 
outcome 
FIGURE 11. EXAMPLE OF DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON BAKER (2003) AND BAKER 
(IN PRESS). EXCERPT FROM BAKER (IN PRESS) 
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The rhetorical dimension. In task-oriented interactions, the term “rhetoric” refers to 
any epistemic effect that is produced as a result of an argumentative interaction. Baker 
(1999) defines “epistemic effect” as following: 
Epistemic effects are concerned with the status of representations from the point of view of 
individuals, their attitudes with respect to them – being in a state of knowing, believing, 
suspecting that something is the case, viewing it as plausible, certain, or as a defensible 
opinion, etc. In interactions, these attitudes can shift, or be revised (p. 189). 
In students’ collaborative interactions, three types of attitude shift have been hitherto 
identified and studied (Baker, 2003; Jermann & Dillenbourg, 2003): attitude weakening 
(the most frequent), attitude strengthening, and no attitude change. Figure 12 presents 
an example of attitude weakening (from “YES” to “NO”). 
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13 
 
Table 5: First example of attitude weakening (“YES” to “NO”) 
T(m:s) L Linda Elaine 
   Statement 3: “Since the groups of A and B 
mol arrive towards the C mol, they make an 
impact with the tam” 
  Attitudes before: 
  NO YES 
9:36 36 it was nice of you to have put yes to 
everything for me, but for the 3, I 
think that the “a” mol aren’t in 
contact with the “c” mol  
 
14:40 37  of course they are, because if you have a 
wave  all the molecules, like billiard balls, 
will be displaced because the hit on the 
tambourine it’s as if we’d pushed them all 
the mols will mix up and hit on the tam no, 
17:39 38 ah! after all perhaps you’re right, 
but I ask myself whether they’ll mix 
together as much as all that, don’t 
you think that the “b” will create a 
barrier between the “a” and the “c” 
 
20:36 39  i don’t know maybe i’m wrong so i’m going 
to chang[e] and after we change question to 
go onto the 6 
  Attitudes after 
  NO NO 
 
In the sequence reproduced in Table 5, the same problem, P, is discussed as with the sequence shown in Table 
3 — what happens to the A,B and C molecules between the two tambourines? 
The dialectical analysis of this sequence is shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Dialectical analysis of first attitude weakening sequence
*
 
L Linda Elaine Pragmatic character of dialectical move 
  A Statement 3 of Elaine’s text 
 contra(A) pro(A) Expression of attitudes on check-boxes 
36 B  Attack on A 
37a 
 
37b 
37c 
 ¬ B 
 
C 
D 
Counter-active defense of A: attack on B 
(that attacks A) 
Defenses of ¬ B 
38a 
 
38b 
D? 
 
E 
 Calling D into question; request for 
justification of D. 
Attack on D 
39  (?)pro(E) Concession of E (attack on D, that defended 
thesis A), in an hypothetical form “perhaps”. 
  contra(A) Concession of refutation of A, expressed on 
interface check-box 
*
 Key: A: Since the groups of A and B mol arrive towards the C mol, they make an impact with the tam.  
B: the “a” mol aren’t in contact with the “c” mol 
C: if you have a wave  all the molecules, like billiard balls, will be displaced because the hit on the tambourine it’s as if we’d 
pushed them  
D: all the mols will mix up and hit on the tam 
E: the “b” will create a barrier between the “a” and the “c” 
 
 
FIGURE 12. AN EXAMPLE FOR ATTITUDE CHANGE FROM ‘YES’ TO ‘NO’ 
(IN BAKER, 2003; P. 60) 
 
The epistemological dimension. As it has already been made explicit, in 
collaborative interactions the epistemological dimension plays a major role, especially if 
it is about a complex cognitive problem. The following epistemological aspects have 
been hitherto taken into consideration (Baker, 1999): a) the intrinsic properties of knowledge, 
and more precisely whether it is on-task or off-task discourse (De Vries, Lund, & Baker, 
2002; Weinberger & Fischer, 2006), and, in case it i  on-task, whether it focuses on the 
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construction of problem space, the conceptual space, or relations between the two 
(Fischer, Bruhn, Gräsel, & Mandl, 2002), as in the case of concepts representing 
constraints (Baker et al., 2009); b) the knowledge domain, meaning a body of knowledge as 
possessed by a recognised social group of experts, and its sub-domains, for example 
eLearning design has three main knowledge sub-domains, namely Technology, 
Pedagogy, and Management/Organization (Jochems, van Merrienboer, & Koper, 2004; 
Seufert & Euler, 2004; Sangrà, Vlachopoulos, Cabrera, in press) and c) the source of 
knowledge, referring to whether it is direct or indirect (Pomerantz, 1984), and in the case of 
indirect if it “belongs” to other individuals (e.g. experts), teams, or also a whole 
institution. 
The discursive dimension. In contrast to the other dimensions, not as much work 
has been proposed regarding the nature of collaborative discourse in task-oriented 
interactions. Apart from its characterizations at a general or macro-level –e.g. meaning 
negotiation (Baker, 1999; 2003), negotiative argumentation (Andriessen, Erkens, van de 
Laak, Peters, & Coirier, 2003), exploratory talk (Mercer, 2000) and so on– few efforts 
exist regarding how smaller discourse segments relate to each other in order to 
“produce” meaningful collaborative sequences. Baker’s (1993, 1995) early efforts to 
combine rhetorical relations with his analysis of interactions have been abandoned, 
mainly because of difficulties in applying the predominant model of such relations, 
Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Thompson, 1988), to oral interactions (instead of 
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texts that are the focus of this theory). The same difficulty has been faced by many 
researchers in Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language Processing who tried to apply 
rhetorical relations to agent communication (Chris Reed, personal communication, 
Chile, 7/10/2010). The present dissertation, focusing mainly on the discursive 
dimension of interaction, provides a solution to this problem, using a more recent model 
of discourse relations, the Connectivity model (Renkema, 2009), which seems to be very 
promising at the time of analyzing communication. We will return to this issue in Section 
4.4.  
The dialogical dimension. Moreover, knowledge co-elaboration processes have been 
described in terms of types of cognitive-linguistic operations, or ways of doing cognitive 
work with language exchanged in dialogue. Based on empirical works of Baker (1994, 
2010b) and Mephu-Nguifo, Baker & Dillenbourg (1999), there are four main classes of 
such operations: a) generalisation—specialisation (exploring degree of generality of 
application of classes); b) additive—subtractive (conjoining, agglomerating or else 
subtracting propositions); c) foundational (arguments, justifications, verifications, 
explanations); and d) language-meaning based (repetitions, reformulations, negotiation of 
meaning). Subsequently, according to Baker (2010b), there are four types of dialogical 
thinking, namely: extensional, cumulative, foundational, and interpretative. Table 3 
shows the main characteristics of each one of them. 
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TABLE 3.  DIALOGICAL THINKING AND COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC OPERATORS 
(BAKER, 2010B; P. 59) 
Dialogical	  thinking	  	   Definition,	  cognitive-­‐linguistic	  operators	  	  
Extensional	  	   Generalizing	  or	  restricting	  scope,	  defining	  set	  inclusion	  of	  
propositions;	  giving	  specific	  examples	  or	  instances	  	  
Cumulative	  	   Conjoining,	  agglomerating,	  synthesizing,	  making	  inferences	  from	  
propositions,	  exploring	  other	  alternatives	  (disjunction)	  	  
Foundational	  	   Expressing	  (counter-­‐)arguing,	  justifying,	  explaining,	  verifying	  	  
Interpretative	  	   Repeating,	  reformulating,	  defining,	  negotiating	  meaning	  	  
 
The affective dimension. The affective dimension in task-oriented interaction has 
been mainly studied in terms of affective regulation regarding the tension-relaxation 
progress of interaction. On one hand, focus on the task and the (cognitive) diversity of 
participants are expected to create tension in interaction. On the other hand, such 
tension should be released during collaboration in order for “deeper” processes such as 
mutual learning and efficient problem solving to occur. However, studies in students’ 
computer-supported interaction show that sometimes argumentation is deepened 
precisely because of a high degree of tension (Andriessen et al., in press). Nonetheless, the 
time needed to “take over” after a verbal conflict and until the re-establishment of a 
relaxed climate tends to “lag” behind the debate (Baker, 2010b). Apart from context-
dependent differentiations, a general observation seems to emerge: the construction of a 
collaborative working relation that allows affective regulation is a necessary condition for 
collaboration (van der Puil & Andriessen, in press; Andriessen et al., in press), and it is 
related to cognitive regulation processes, such as dialogical thinking (Baker, 2010b). An 
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example of a tension-relaxation analysis, together with the emergent argumentation acts, 
is given on Figure 13. 
N. Speaker Utterance Argumentation T/R 
74  Betty  Which opinion?  Question  T: request  
75  Carla  it's true that nature is the work of  Concession  R: concession  
  Madam super nature  T: sarcasm  
76  Betty  oh oh that's so beautiful   T: sarcasm  
77 Carla that you are against but it would be 
good if you would still admit that if it 
worked then it would be beneficial for 
everybody 
Argumentation T: counterclaim 
FIGURE 13. EXCERPT OF AFFECTIVE REGULATION (T/R) ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTATIVE 
INTERACTIONS (ANDRIESSEN ET AL., IN PRESS) 
	  
 
The socio-relational dimension. The socio-relational dimension forms the basis of 
the affective dimension, and also, it can be said, of all other dimensions. As it was 
implied in the previous paragraph, without a collaborative working relation, no 
collaborative interaction can be meant. However, social relations should not only be 
considered from an affective perspective, especially in task-oriented interactions (maybe 
in other types of close relationships, the affective dimension is the most important). Not 
much interaction analysis empirical work has been done considering the expression of power 
and the emergence of task-related roles, which are two other important socio-relational 
aspects. On one hand, power refers to the participants’ hierarchical status, usually 
related to their institutional position and role. On the other hand, emergent roles depend 
upon participants’ actions, mainly the discursive ones (Baker, Détienne, Lund, & 
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Séjourné, 2003; Sonnenwald, 2006). What is interesting from a socio-cognitive analysis 
point of view is that emergent roles do not necessarily correspond to status roles. In 
asynchronous, on-line, task-oriented discussions, for example, it has been shown that in 
general prescribed roles predict participants’ involvement in the interaction (Barcellini, 
Détienne, Burkhardt, & Sack, 2008). However, the way this is done may vary according 
to the context of interaction. For example, when on-line discussions get too task-
oriented, they become quasi-synchronous, and time of reaction plays an important role 
for the participants’ involvement in the interaction. The way power is expressed through 
task-related roles, e.g. through discourse, needs to be further investigated in 
synchronous, face-to-face interaction, especially in situations where expertise also plays 
an important role for the validation of opinions inside a team.        
In this section, the main methodological and empirical extensions regarding Interaction 
analysis, on the basis of interlocutory logic as mainly proposed by Trognon (1999), were 
presented. Among them, two main conclusions can be drawn: no unique method exists 
to analyze interaction, and interaction can be approached through at least seven 
different perspectives, namely: dialectical, rhetorical, epistemological, discursive, dialogical, 
affective, and socio-relational. Our focus on the discursive dimension will be further founded 
in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Before that, another field related to task-oriented interaction 
analysis, Cognitive Ergonomics, will be presented in Section 4.3.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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4.3 COGNITIVE ERGONOMICS 
 
Cognitive ergonomics, in the way they get approached by this research, form part of the 
Francophone Ergonomics Society, which follows this general methodological bottom-
line, as explained in the web-site of SELF (Société d’Ergonomie de Langue Francaise): 
Throughout the years, Francophone Ergonomics has shown its specificity, insisting on the 
predominance of Ergonomic Work Analysis as a central method. In this context, 
laboratory studies have become, over the years, mostly accessory to field studies which are 
conducted in the actual workplace on real work and actual working conditions. 
Francophone ergonomists insist on the important differences between task, which they 
define as a rather theoretical representation by the organization of work to be done, and 
activity, which is the real, situated work as actually produced by the operators: to be able 
to intervene and improve the efficiency and comfort of the operator, Francophone 
ergonomists insist that one has to start with a fine description and understanding of the 
true activity of workers. Bottom-up approaches are therefore the core of Francophone 
ergonomics (Desnoyers & Daniellou, 1989; p.3). 
According to the same authors, “the demand for ergonomic intervention deals more and 
more, at least in European countries, with cognitive activities” (p. 4), thus the emergence 
of the Cognitive Ergonomics as a separate methodological field is not surprising. The 
main theoretical foundation of Cognitive Ergonomics is closely related to Activity 
Theory (Green & Hoc, 1991). More precisely, the activity is seen as the interaction 
between a subject and a task, including the subject’s conception of the task and the 
cognitive processes she performs in order to carry out the task. The basic unit of analysis 
is the situation, which is defined as a functional subject-task system (Hoc, 1988). The 
differentiation between task and activity, and the emergence of the second as the main 
	  92 
unit of analysis, is a need rather than an option regarding complex cognitive situations, 
such as design. The main reason for that is because task goals are usually ill-defined in 
situations like that; “the more remote a goal, the fewer the possibilities for anticipation, 
and the greater the necessity to define subgoals to regulate task accomplishment” (Hoc, 
1988; p. 19). 
Thus, as the focus of Cognitive Ergonomists is the actual task, or the activity participants 
are engaged in, the conception of such task is also of great importance. Two main 
distinctions, relevant to our study, can be made regarding conception: its object, i.e. 
whether it is focused on the task or the task domain; and its nature, i.e. whether it is 
individual or collective (the component parts of each distinction are not mutually 
exclusive, as the second components always pre-suppose the first). A brief presentation of 
each type of conception and its relation to design will be now given. 
Task conception. Regarding the conception of the task, two things need to be 
considered: the specific activity object constituting the cognitive task at the moment of 
conceptualization. Each task has its own cognitive objects. It can be said that, in general, 
all design situations treat the following objects (Newell & Simon, 1972; Darses et al., 
2001): a) problems, referring to the situations that need to be resolved; b) solutions, referring 
to concrete actions or concepts that potentially form part of the final artifact; c) goals, 
referring to general requirements or vision(s) regarding the final artifact and its use; d) 
methods, referring to plans of action leading to a goal satisfaction; e) domain objects, 
referring to any artifact, resource, or task domain concept that serves as intermediary object 
(Jeantet, 1998); f) domain rules, referring to existing institutional or task domain related 
procedures or constraints; and g) tasks, when the focus of the cognitive activity is the task 
itself, e.g. actions’ co-ordination, meeting management etc.  
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Task domain conception. On the other hand, the concept of task domain is broader 
than that of the task, as it consists of “an organized set of objects, the property 
descriptors of these objects, and the operations performed on these objects” (Hoc, 1988; 
p. 22-23). There are two main levels of task domain description: the “epistemologically 
adequate”, which are the lowest and the most constrained, and the “heuristically 
adequate”, which are the highest and the most schematic (Hoc, 1988). More precisely, 
“the lowest levels integrate more strategic or detailed information for implementing 
concrete actions” (p. 24). Whereas the upper level refers to the conceptual field as a 
whole, meaning a well-systemized network of concepts and relations expressed with a 
specific technical vocabulary or “lexicon” in Clark’s (1996) terms.  
Individual conception. Individual conception refers to the specific type of 
representation through which the object is conceived by a specific person. This 
representation is externalized in form of contributions, reflecting the representational 
state of the conceiver. In design, representational activities are mainly of three types 
(Visser, 2006, 2006b): a) generation, referring to the construction of “new” representations, 
meaning those whose main source is one’s memory; b) transformation, meaning any type of 
activity aiming at transforming a representation into a slightly or totally different version; 
and c) evaluation, when some type of assessment of a representation takes place. In 
combination with their objects, such representations form the basic acts upon which 
activities are constructed, for example, solution generation, goal transformation, problem 
evaluation, and so on. 
Collective conception. According to Visser (2002, 2003), collective conception can 
take two forms: a) co-conception, referring to the situation in which the conceivers work 
together on a conception project, sharing the same goal, and contributing to this goal 
according to their specific competences (note that this definition is very similar, if not 
identical, to our view of ‘collaboration’ described in Section 1.1); and b) distributed 
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conception, referring to situations in which the conceivers work in parallel but not jointly, 
meaning that each one accomplishes with one task, forming part of the common task 
(note that this definition is very similar to our view of ‘co-operation’ described in Section 
1.1). In the case of co-conception, two additional tasks-activities, apart from the task 
conceptualization, are observed: a) actions’ coordination, through which time and 
actions are distributed (in French, synchronization temporo-opératoire); and b) cognitive 
synchronization, which aims at establishing a context of mutual knowledge, at building a 
common operative system of reference (Darses et al., 2001).    
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4.4 DISCOURSE RELATIONS 
 
“Why are  you  dr ink ing?”  Demanded the  l i t t le  pr ince .   
“So  that  I  may forget ,”  rep l ied  the  t ipp ler .   
“Forget  what?”  Inquired  the  l i t t le  pr ince ,  who a l ready  fe l t  
sorry  for  h im.   
“Forget  that  I  am ashamed,”  the  t ipp ler  confes sed ,  hanging  
h i s  head .   
“Ashamed o f  what?”  Ins i s ted  the  l i t t le  pr ince ,  who wanted  
to  he lp  h im.   
“Ashamed o f  dr ink ing !”  
 
—ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPÉRY, t h e  l i t t l e  p r in c e  
A classical model of discourse analysis that describes relations among segments of 
discourse is that of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). The linguistic paradigm behind 
RST is that of Pragmatics, as “it considers analyses of texts to crucially involve an 
account of the interaction between writers and readers” (Thompson & Mann, 1987; 79). 
The focal concept in RST is that of relational structure, in contrast to other types of 
rhetorical structures such as the “holistic” or the “syntactic” (Mann, Matthiessen, & 
Thompson, 1989). Such relational structure is defined on the basis of three kinds of 
information: a characterization of the nucleus, a characterization of the satellite, and a 
characterization of the rhetorical interactions between the nucleus and the satellite 
(Thompson & Mann, 1987).  
In RST, most of the hitherto identified relations are of the type nucleus-satellite; this 
means that one part of the text (satellite) needs the other (nucleus) in order to be 
understood, whereas the contrary is not the case. This relation can also be of the 
reversed version (satellite-nucleus), meaning that the “dependent” part comes before the 
“independent”. Finally, it is also possible that no-satellite or multi-nuclear relations exist. 
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This classification is essential for the identification of the type of a relation. In addition, 
other classifications and/or modifications are possible according to the use of the 
relations and the focus of the analysis. A well-known classification is the distinction 
among subject matter and presentational relations, proposed by Mann & Thompson 
(1988). As they state: 
Subject matter relations are those whose intended effect is that the reader recognizes the 
relation in question; presentational relations are those whose intended effect is to increase 
some inclination in the reader, such as the desire to act or the degree of positive regard for, 
belief in, or acceptance of the nucleus (p. 257). 
Table 4 presents a relation classification on the subject matter/presentational basis. 
TABLE 4.  SUBJECT MATTER AND PRESENTATIONAL RELATIONS 
(MANN & THOMPSON, 1988) 
Subject	  matter	   Presentational	  
Elaboration	   Otherwise	   Motivation	  
Circumstance	   Interpretation	   Antithesis	  
Solutionhood	   Evaluation	   Background	  
Volitional	  cause/result	   Restatement	   Enablement	  
Non-­‐volitional	  cause/result	   Summary	   Evidence	  
Purpose	   Sequence	   Justify	  
Condition	   Contrast	   Concession	  
 
This distinction has formed the basis of criticism against RST for Moore & Pollack 
(1992), who claim that “discourse elements are related simultaneously on multiple levels” 
(p. 537). The informational (subject matter) and intentional (presentational) levels are two 
possibilities. However, the exclusive classification of a relation to only one of these levels, 
as Mann & Thompson (1988) propose, is impossible because “the purpose of all 
discourse is, ultimately, to affect a change in the mental state of the hearer” (Moore & 
Pollack, 1992; p. 539). In this sense, all discourse relations are finally presentational. 
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On the other hand, a recent discourse relational model, with many references to RST, 
has been proposed by Renkema (2009). The so-called Connectivity model consists of 
three levels of relations, namely Conjunction, linking form to form, Adjunction, linking 
information to information, and Interjunction, linking addresser to addressee. These levels are 
hierarchical, in the sense that relations belonging to one type also belong to the previous 
type(s). As a consequence, all interjunction relations are also of the adjunction type, but 
the contrary is not the case. Thus, an idea of clearly separated types of relations is also 
present in Renkema (2009) as in Mann & Thompson (1988). However, adjunction 
relations do not directly correspond to the subject matter relations, neither interjunction 
to presentational relations. 
In fact, another contribution of Connectivity model lies on the classification of relations 
according to their communicative function. In this sense, Connectivity model is a 
functional, discourse analysis model, applicable to every communicative situation, 
including oral discourse. The communicative function of discourse relations was also 
intrinsic in RST. Mann, Mathiessen, & Thompson (1989) state that “in our research in 
discourse analysis, we aim to contribute to an account of how language can be used to 
communicate, i.e. a detailed description of how it contributes to the outcomes of 
interaction” (p. 1). However, RST has not yet been adapted to study oral interaction, 
apart from some isolated, but remarkable, efforts (e.g. Taboada, 2004). It seems that 
such application might be more possible with the Connectivity model of discourse 
relations. We will briefly explain our reasons for this statement. 
First of all, all discourse relations included in the Connectivity models answer the 
questions of an imagined (in the case of written text) or physical (in the case of oral) 
addressee. These questions not only define the type of relations, but also their 
segmentation: a new segment-relation begins at the time a new question is possible to be 
done. This defines some kind of functional propositional content as the nature of 
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discourse relations, which is very related to a communication approach. Secondly, 
adjunction relations are classified into three big categories (elaboration, extension, and 
enhancement), which also correspond to the conversational acts of “elaborate”, 
“extend”, and “enhance” (Eggins & Slade, 2004). This makes us think that even the 
more informational relations also have some communicative function (as Moore and 
Pollack had suggested). Finally, the interjunction relations are not only characterized as 
the more intentional ones, but they are also divided into three levels, according to their 
communicative function. Following Bühler’s (1934/1990) tripartite “Organon” model of 
communication, interjunction relations are classified into: expressing, or symptom-based, 
processing, or symbol-based, and impressing, or signal-based.  
Table 5 presents the adjunction and interjunction levels and types of discourse relations 
proposed by the Connectivity model. 
 
TABLE 5.  ADJUNCTION AND INTERJUNCTION DISCOURSE RELATIONS 
(RENKEMA, 2009) 
Adjunction	  
	  
Interjunction	  
Elaboration	   Expressing	  
	   Presentation	  
Quality/	  quantity	  specification	  
	  
	  
Comment	  
Extension	   Processing	  
Sequence	   Explanation	  
Contrast	   Metatext	  
Disjunction	   Attribution	  
Enhancement	   Impressing	  
Place	   Attention	  
Time	   Acceptance	  (Justification)	  
Manner	   Action	  (Motivation)	  
Causation	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Apart from its clear communicative functionality, the Connectivity model also provides a 
more evident relation to the identification of arguments. Previously, few studies have 
been proposed regarding the connection of RST to argumentation. Azar (1999), for 
example, claims that five of the RST’s rhetorical relations (Evidence, Justify, Motivation, 
Antithesis and Concession) can be characterized as argument relations. He defines 
argument relations as “the relationship that exists between two parts of a monologue, 
one being an argument (i.e., a supportive or a persuader), the other a conclusion (i.e., a 
prescribed action or an assertion)” (p. 99). He also further identifies antithesis and 
concession as argument relations of “the persuader type”. More recent work (Green, 2010) 
further enlightens the connection of rhetorical relations to argumentation, by proposing 
RST as a tool for reconstructing enthymematic arguments.  
In our point of view, discourse relations provide a useful framework for the analysis of 
interaction from a discursive point of view, due to the flexibility of analysis, as it is a 
bottom-up approach, and to the possibility of relating discourse segments at various 
levels, which is also a “must” for Interaction analysis. At the same time, argument 
identification in naturally emergent discourse is not an easy job, as most of the 
arguments are enthymematic (Walton, 1983; Hitchcock, 1985), and “jumping” from one 
topic to another, very common in team design as we saw in Chapter 2, also implies 
jumping from one argument to another, or leaving an argument incomplete and return 
to it later on. Thus, we believe that the identification and analysis of discourse relations 
can be a useful tool for both discourse analysis (e.g. Taboada & Mann, 2006) and 
argument analysis (e.g. Azar, 1999; Green, 2010).  
In this section, some basic methodological aspects regarding two discourse relations 
models, RST and Connectivity model, were presented. Without pretending to do a 
	  100 
discourse analysis ourselves – something like that would be out of our competences – we 
will use some of the relations’ characteristics for the analysis of team design 
communication, and more precisely, for the identification of the emergent arguments. 
These issues will be further explained in Chapter 5, where our whole methodological 
proposal is presented. Before that, some main ideas regarding the “father” of modern 
Argumentation theories, Informal Logic, will be presented in the following section. 
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4.5 INFORMAL LOGIC 
 
“This  log ic  doesn ’ t  rea l ly  he lp  me much in  my da i ly  l i fe” .  
 I  sa id ,  “ that ’ s  r ight ,  nor  was  i t  meant  to” .   
They  sa id ,  “ so ,  where  do  we go?”   
I  sa id ,  “ I  don’ t  know”.  
 
—RALPH JOHNSON, 2000 
Informal Logic emerged as a response to the Formal Deductive Logic (FDL) in the early 
70’s with Kahane’s famous text “Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric” (1971). In the 
beginning lines of this text, the main problem regarding FDL as taught in Universities is 
stated: “Today’s students demand a marriage of theory and practice. That is why so 
many of them judge introductory courses on logic, fallacy, and even rhetoric not relevant 
to their interests” (quoted by Johnson, 2000; p. 3). 
The main distinction between Informal Logic and FDL regards the arguments that are 
considered valid. For FDL, there is only one type of (good) argument: the one that is 
deductively valid, i.e. whose premises entail the conclusion. However, in Informal Logic 
at least three types of arguments can be valid, or, better said, sound, namely: deductive, 
inductive, and plausible or abductive arguments (Walton, 1989; Walton, 2011b). Table 6 
presents an everyday reasoning example for each one of those, as first provided by 
Walton (1989, p. 14-15). 
Given the fact that most of the everyday arguments belong to one of these three macro-
types, and more frequently to the inductive or plausible argument type, Informal Logic 
seems the most appropriate paradigm at the time of identifying and evaluating them.  
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TABLE 6. MAIN TYPES OF VALID INFORMAL LOGIC ARGUMENTS 
(IN WALTON, 1989, P. 14-15) 
Deductively	  valid	  argument	  
Every	  person	  who	  does	  a	  good	  job	  should	  get	  regular	  pay	  that	  reflects	  the	  value	  of	  his	  work.	  
Alice	  is	  a	  person	  who	  does	  a	  good	  job.	  
Therefore,	  Alice	  should	  get	  regular	  pay	  that	  reflects	  the	  value	  of	  her	  work.	  
Inductively	  valid	  argument	  
Most	  people	  who	  do	  a	  good	  job	  should	  get	  regular	  pay	  that	  reflects	  the	  value	  of	  their	  work.	  
Alice	  is	  a	  person	  who	  does	  a	  good	  job.	  
Therefore,	  Alice	  should	  get	  regular	  pay	  that	  reflects	  the	  value	  of	  her	  work.	  
Plausible	  argument	  
It	   is	  widely	  accepted	   that	  people	  who	  do	  a	  good	   job	   should	  get	   regular	  pay	   that	   reflects	   the	  
value	  of	  their	  work.	  
Alice	  is	  a	  person	  who	  does	  a	  good	  job.	  
Therefore,	  Alice	  should	  get	  regular	  pay	  that	  reflects	  the	  value	  of	  her	  work.	  
 
In addition to that, Govier (1987) underlines another reason for the adoption of Informal 
Logic perspective. In her words, 
real arguments in natural language are not amenable to fully precise treatment. They deal 
with topics of controversy, disputed facts, plausible hypotheses, approximately correct 
analogies. To evaluate them, we must sort out ambiguities, see how diverse factors fit 
together, weigh pros and cons, consider the credibility of those on whom we may depend 
for credibility and expertise (p. 5). 
Thus, for Informal Logicians, a Theory of argument is subdivided into a Theory of 
analysis, concerning the discursive elements that become the components of the 
argument, and a Theory of appraisal, regarding the task of coming up with standards, 
criteria, and type of argument evaluation (Johnson, 2000).  
Given the lack of “one and for all” univocal theory of argument, a difficulty in defining 
what an argument is, is more than evident in the relevant literature. Nonetheless, a place 
of consensus among the different scholars seems to be the distinction between 
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“arguments-as-products” and “arguments-as-processes” (Habermas, 1984; Johnson, 
2000; Reed & Walton, 2003) based on the primary distinction proposed by O’Keefe 
(1977) between type1 and type2 arguments. Also, many authors refer to the former as 
arguments, and to the latter as argumentation. However put, the main idea is basically 
the same; that arguments can and should be defined both semantically, as propositional 
structures, and pragmatically, as dialogical practices. However, this distinction is not as 
straightforward, as structural and pragmatic elements interweave. In Freeman’s (1991) 
words, 
Argument is the attempt to convince a skeptical but rational judge of the rightness or 
rational acceptability of a claim (…) Surely, not all arguments as a matter of fact originate 
in dialogues between a proponent and a challenger playing just the roles assigned to them 
in a basic dialectical situation. Many arguments may simply be conceived as monologues, 
as developing a series of reasons supporting some conclusions (p. 21). 
As we already said, one of the major issues in the study of informal arguments is their 
identification and analysis. Regarding arguments as sets of propositions (Walton, 1982; 
Plantin, 1996), the existence and relation of at least two premises with at least one 
conclusion is necessary. Of the two premises, usually one has the function of supporting 
evidence, datum in Toulmin’s terms (1958), and the other is a defeasible inference law 
between the datum and the claim-conclusion, warrant in Toulmin’s terms. In everyday 
argument, it is possible that only one premise is made explicit and the other is not, what 
is also the case for enthymematic arguments, as we already explained in the previous section. 
It is also possible that both premises are missing or even the conclusion (Walton & Reed, 
2005). In this case, a restructuration of the argument is necessary in order to decide for 
its soundness – the Informal logic correspondent for FDL validity. This latter is always 
decided upon the relevance of the premise(s), following the macro-rule expressed by 
Freeman (1993) as following: 
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If either the truth of a premise increases the likelihood that the conclusion will be true  or 
the falsity of the premise increases the likelihood that the conclusion is false, then the 
premise is relevant to the conclusion. If neither of these conditions holds, then the premise 
is not relevant (p. 199). 
Yet, relevance is not the only criterion for deciding upon an argument’s soundness. 
Sufficiency and acceptability are also necessary (Johnson & Blair, 1996). In fact, another 
“problem” in identifying and evaluating arguments has to do with their sufficiency. This 
problem is mostly encountered in relation to the so-called defeasible arguments, which 
include abductive and plausible types of inference. According to Walton, Reed, & 
Macagno (2008), “a defeasible argument is the one in which the conclusion can be 
accepted tentatively in relation to the evidence known so far in a case, but may need to 
be retracted as new evidence comes in” (p. 2).  And they continue:  
The reason that the notion of sufficiency is up for debate is that the main types of schemes 
important for the study of everyday argumentation are nonmonotonic. This means that 
the argument fitting the scheme always needs to be seen as subject to defeat as new 
premises are added by new information that becomes relevant (…) In other words, such 
an argument is cogent only in the sense that it provides sufficient evidence to accept the 
conclusion at some particular point in an investigation that may later lead to the rejection 
of this conclusion (p. 34). 
In other words, the identification of argumentation schemes, i.e. structures of inference 
that represent common types of arguments in everyday conversation, is an important 
aspect of argument analysis and evaluation, even though their appearance in dialogue 
may be instantaneous, in the sense that they are sufficient only at the time of their 
structure expression. Based on this assumption, in this dissertation we speak of argument 
structures in order to refer to these discourse products that fit the structure of at least one 
known argumentation scheme.  
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Last but not least, acceptability of both the premises and the conclusion is a very 
important aspect of argument identification and evaluation, especially in a dialogical 
context. We could grossly say that from an argument identification perspective, at least 
one of the premises or conclusions or both should be questionable, e.g. akin to be 
submitted to critical questioning. On the other hand, the degree to which the arguer is 
able to respond to the critical questions defines the degree to which her argument should 
be more or less accepted. In a dialogue context, each time an argument is opened to be 
questioned, it shifts the burden of proof to the opponent. The way critical questions are 
treated is decisive on whether the burden of proof “stays” with the opponent or “goes 
back” to the proponent. An argument is good when it is accepted as “proof-burdened”. 
For an extensive discussion on burden of proof see Walton (1988).  
However, as a dialectical analysis and evaluation of arguments’ acceptability goes 
beyond the needs of this research, we will be limited to identifying whether an argument 
is “dialectically tiered” (Johnson, 2000) to at least another argument, put forward by 
another speaker, in order to form a (dialogical) argumentation sequence. The study of 
argument as a process of putting forward arguments on the same issue in order to get to 
a consensus regarding this issue is mainly expressed though the pragma-dialectical 
approach, a brief account of which is given by Houtlosser (2002): 
A pragma-dialectical analysis starts from the assumption that argumentative discourse is 
basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. The pragma-dialectical model of 
critical discussion, which serves as a theoretical point of departure, specifies the course of 
the resolution process, its stages, and the types of speech acts instrumental in the various 
stages. The model is a heuristic tool for the analytic reconstruction of the speech acts that 
are relevant to the resolution of the difference; it is also an evaluative tool for a critical 
assessment of the discourse. The analysis results in an analytic overview that sums up 
which points of view are –explicitly or implicitly– put forward, which arguments are 
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advanced, what kinds of argument schemes are employed, and what the structure of the 
argumentation is (p. 169). 
The main focus of a pragma-dialectical analysis is the critical discussion type of 
persuasion dialogue. During this dialogue, four stages of discussion are possible to occur 
(or better said should normatively occur): a) the confrontation stage, in which a dispute is 
externalized; b) the opening stage, in which the parties decide to conduct an argumentative 
discussion; c) the argumentation stage, i.e. the advancing of argumentation and the 
reaction(s) to it; and d) the closing stage, determining how the discussion ends. Throughout 
these stages, participants express their commitments through “points of view” or 
“standpoints”, and by establishing their dialectical roles, as there should always be a 
protagonist and an antagonist (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). 
Pragma-dialectical analysis, however useful for many contexts, appears to be insufficient, 
or even irrelevant, regarding our research goal and context. The reasons for that are 
several. First of all, we believe, together with other scholars from various fields (e.g. 
Canary et al., 1995, in Communication; Baker, 2003, in Computer Supported 
Collaborative Learning; Sampson & Clark, 2008, in Science Education) that 
argumentation exists also in a co-operative manner. This means that although conflicts 
may prompt argument (Trapp, 1989), they are not necessary for an argumentation 
dialogue to occur. As it was already implied in the Introduction, argumentation in task-
oriented interactions can have other functions rather than persuasion, such as 
negotiation of meanings, objects, and tasks. Secondly, a dialectical analysis of 
argumentation offers information only regarding the dialectical level of interaction; 
however, as we already explained in section 4.2, interaction has at least other six levels 
other than the dialectical. Thirdly, we believe that a discursive approach of interaction 
analysis, and subsequently of argumentation analysis, can lead to a more detailed and 
descriptive account of how argumentation sequences actually occur. As Brashers, Adkins 
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& Meyers (1994) put it, group argumentation is an interactional practice “constructed 
and maintained in interaction, and guided perhaps by different rules and norms than 
those that govern the practice of ideal or rational argument” (p. 267). 
In the present study, we only treat arguments-as-products, keeping in mind, though, that 
these arguments are dialectical manifestations of an on-going practice (Johnson, 2000). 
Sequences will only be defined at a dialogical level, without getting in detail into the 
dialectical dimension of interaction. Our focus, as we already said in Section 1.3, is on 
talk-in-interaction, thus the communicative functions of discourse have the predominant 
place in our analysis. Our complete methodological approach and its connections to the 
theoretical baselines presented in this Chapter will be presented in continuation. 
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5 .  METHOD 
 
As it can be concluded from the previous chapters, task-oriented interaction is a 
“special” type of inter-personal communication, because of the double importance of 
both the task and the communication about the task. Comparing to other forms of 
group communication, e.g. family communication, interaction oriented towards 
complex tasks, such as problem solving, calls for an analysis approach akin to grasp 
both the object and content of communication, and their inter-dependence. As 
Nonnon (1996) puts is: 
we should thus come up with a double analysis: an analysis in terms of logical-discursive 
operations on the elaboration of objects of discourse, viewpoints, epistemic modalities and 
their transformation, and another one in terms of procedures and regulations, which get 
established during this work on the contents of discourse (p.85; original in French, 
translated by the author) 
To build such a method, we use the following “lessons learnt” from theoretical 
approaches and empirical studies: 
• Communication structures are dual structures: they are both formed by and 
influence on group processes. 
• The nature of the task highly determines the type of interaction, but why and 
how specific processes arise is context-dependent. 
• Institutional roles are important, but in combination to the specific 
interaction-related emerging behaviors of the team members. 
Having these assumptions in mind, our general research questions made explicit in 
Chapter 3 become more specific, as following: 
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1. Is there a relationship between the design and the communication process, 
during eLearning team design, in terms of: 
a) pre-defined activities? 
b) the structure of the manifestation of these activities? 
 
2. What is the structure of an eLearning design meeting? 
a) Are there any patterns of design and communication activities serving the 
same team design goal?  
b) Are these patterns case-dependent, or can we speak of some generic 
activities characterizing eLearning team design? 
3. What type of content is produced? 
a) in terms of  task-oriented acts and conceptual viewpoints? 
b) in terms of  constraints, requirements, and proposals? 
c) in terms of design-related arguments? 
4. What task-oriented roles do emerge? 
a) in terms of participants performing certain design acts? 
b) in terms of participants performing certain communication acts? 
c) in terms of participants performing certain argument acts? 
 
Depending on the nature of these questions, the method applied is qualitative, and 
the approach followed is that of Interaction analysis, as described in Section 4.2, 
mixed with methodological proposals coming from the fields of Cognitive 
Ergonomics, Discourse Analysis, and Informal Logic. More precisely, we analyze the 
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verbal taking place during eLearning design meetings, trying to understand its double 
relation with the task of design and the task of communication.  
Our methodological design is that of a multiple case study, following an exploratory-
descriptive approach, rather than an explanatory, as it will be further explained later 
on this chapter. Moreover, the lack of studies in the particular context (eLearning 
team design) renders the formulations of hypotheses difficult, if not impossible. As an 
alternative, we followed two main guidelines, at the time of fine-graining the research 
questions previously mentioned. Firstly, the inclusion of all four main components of 
any observational analysis, namely (McGrath & Altermatt (2001): what, how, who, and 
where (in the case of interaction analysis where can also refer to the structure of it, i.e. 
where in the process). And secondly, the consideration of the main team design 
communication components as emerged from the literature review (Chapter 2), 
namely: patterns-structure, strategic content, and emerging roles. 
At this point, a clarification is necessary regarding the first research question. In our 
research, process is treated as the manifestation of a number of pre-defined 
dimensions, which reflect certain theoretical constructs considered relevant for our 
main research goal (to inform back the design practice-practitioners). Each one of 
these dimensions has a pre-defined number of coding categories, on the basis of 
which we describe what is happening at both a design and a communication level. In 
order to describe either the design or the communication process, we are interested 
in the relation of the different manifestations of the various design or communication 
categories among them in space (meaning following one another) and in relation to a 
specific goal (in order for any task-oriented activity to be meaningful, goal is a necessary 
component, as we already expressed several times throughout this dissertation). Time 
itself in terms of meeting minutes or ID number of meeting (first, second, third. etc.) 
is not relevant for our research, because the observed process is not linear, giving 
each meeting a degree of independency, and also because of the several and different 
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types of issues discussed in a meeting, giving each team design episode (a term 
explained later on) a degree of independency. 
The construction of a coding scheme to treat interaction data is an essential part of 
most interaction analysis studies (see Chapter 4), as it allows for taking into 
consideration of several dimensions for one interaction unit. This approach is very 
relevant when no specific research hypotheses are formulated a priori, because it 
allows for the emergence of various elements or events, the type of which was not 
pre-conceived by the analyst at the time of constructing the coding scheme. In other 
words, the same codified data can serve to answer different research questions, not 
necessarily the ones upon which the scheme was initially constructed.  
Having said that, a great part of this chapter is dedicated to explain the theoretical 
constructs (section 5.1), coding dimensions and categories (section 5.2) used in this 
research. Right after, data collection and their preparation for analysis are described 
(section 5.3), to be followed by further explanations regarding the function(ality) of 
the coding process proposed (section 5.4). 
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5.1 THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS 
 
A concept  i s  a  word  that  expres ses  an  abs trac t ion  
formed by  genera l iza t ion  f rom par t icu lars .  A  cons truc t  
i s  a  concept .  I t  has  the  added meaning ,  however ,  o f  
hav ing  been  de l iberate ly  and consc ious ly  invented  or  
adopted  for  a  spec ia l  sc ient i f i c  purpose .   
 
—KERLINGER, 1973 
In this section, the role of theoretical constructs in this research will be shortly 
explained. In general, theoretical constructs are very relevant for our understanding 
of important phenomena (Wortman, 1994). However, their distinction from variables 
is not always evident. Hull (1943), for example, does not differentiate them at all. He 
defines the term “intervening variables” as equal to the ones of “symbolic constructs” 
and “hypothetical entities”. On the other hand, authors such as MacCorquodale & 
Meehl (1948) do make the distinction between intervening variables and constructs, 
and they further define the notion of “hypothetical constructs”.  This term applies for 
those theoretical concepts “which do not meet the requirements for intervening 
variables in the strict sense. That is to say, these constructs involve terms which are 
not wholly reducible to empirical terms; they refer to processes or entities that are not 
directly observed” (p. 104).  
In the present research, we opt for the term theoretical constructs instead of intervening 
variables, for the reason described above. On the other hand, we do not define our 
constructs as hypothetical, because we assume that they are constructed on the basis 
of the coding dimensions proposed later on. Said differently, the variables we chose 
to describe and analyze interaction form part of our coding scheme, and their 
interpretation forms the base of the theoretical constructs, most adequate to respond 
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to our research questions. Before we go on with describing the theoretical constructs 
of this research, some general considerations regarding the reliability and validity of a 
coding scheme will be now presented. 
Generally speaking, “reliability is the extent to which a measurement procedure yields 
the same answer however and whenever it is carried out” (Kirk & Miller, 1986; p. 
19). According to Krippendorff (1980), there are three types of reliability in 
qualitative research: a) stability, which can be tested by having a single coder code the 
same data at different times; b) reproducibility, which can be tested by comparing the 
results obtained by several coders; and c) accuracy, which can be tested by comparing 
the codings obtained by several coders to an existing standard, if such standard exists. 
As Carletta et al. (1997) remark, “where the standard is the coding of the scheme's 
‘expert’ developer, the test simply shows how well the coding instructions fit the 
developer's intention” (p. 24). Nonetheless, in dialogue coding, this “simple” fitting 
between the developer’s intention and other “blind” coders’ interpretations is the 
only way of judging if a coding category “really” corresponds to what it is supposed 
to correspond. The most known measure of inter-rater reliability for category 
classifications is Cohen’s Kappa (K) coefficient (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). K 
measures pairwise agreement among a set of coders making category judgments, 
correcting for chance expected agreement.  
On the other hand, validity refers to “the extent to which it [measurement procedure] 
gives the correct answer” (Kirk & Miller, 1986; p. 19). In qualitative research, this is 
loosely interpreted as whether the measurement “truly” measures what it is supposed 
to measure. Regarding coding procedures, the type of validity that interests the most 
is the so-called construct validity, meaning “the quality of the relationships between an 
observation and the element of a model that represents such observations” (Kirk & 
Miller, 1986; p. 80). The issue of construct validity, and subsequently, coding 
validation, is quite problematic, regarding various aspects. Some of them, applicable 
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to small group interaction coding systems, are (Trujillo, 1986): the philosophical 
focus, the conceptual focus, and the operational focus. 
The philosophical focus refers to the researcher’s view on the theoretical and 
methodological status of a coding system. According to Poole & Folger (1978), three 
philosophical perspectives can be adopted in studying interaction: a) the experienced 
perspective, in which constructs “are concerned solely with explaining interaction in 
terms of categories as they are specified by the observer and the observer’s theory” (p. 
6). This approach is consistent to the more recent interaction analysis applications, in 
which the role of a coding scheme is that of interpreting rather than analyzing 
(Baker, 2010); b) the experiencing perspective, in which “theoretical terms are social 
constructs that are either part of a culturally shared set of meanings or established 
through implicit or explicit negotiations among interactants” (Poole & Folger, 1978; 
p. 8). This idea is more applicable regarding the nature of categories, as we will 
explain in Section 5.4; and c) the experiencer perspective, in which interaction is a 
product of individual interpretations of given utterances (Trujillo, 1986); this again is 
applied to the coding categories, rather than the theoretical constructs behind them. 
In the present research, the experienced perspective is applied in order to define 
theoretical constructs, whereas all three perspectives are mutually taken into 
consideration at the time of defining the conceptual quality of the coding categories 
and their units of analysis. 
As far as the conceptual and ontological focus is concerned, the former refers to the 
conceptual quality of the definition of the categories, whereas the latter to the 
(multi)functionality of the coding system. But we will return to these issues later on in 
this chapter. 
What follows in this section focuses on the theoretical constructs, which emerge, 
through both the literature and our dataset, as relevant to the quality of team design 
communication. We define six of them: design co-construction, dialogicality, deliberativeness, 
design-related arguments, user experience, and intermediary representations. The first three refer 
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to qualities, or processional aspects of interaction, whereas the latter three refer to 
manifestations, or interactional outputs. Both types share the following characteristic 
that renders them theoretical constructs in this research: they cannot be directly 
identified in relation to one interaction unit; their manifestation is result of the co-
action of more than one actors, and even so, their ontological entity cannot be 
limited to any (combination of) coding category (-ies). However, their strong relation 
to the coding dimensions is necessary to, at least theoretically, validate their proposal.  
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5.1.1 DESIGN CO-CONSTRUCTION 
As we already touched in Chapter 1, an interaction is constructive either when it 
serves a communication goal, or when it leads to the construction of a concrete 
(cognitive) object (Baker, 1999). With the term design construction, we mean those 
processes that fulfill some type of design (thinking) function, either as acts or as 
activities (see Section 2.4). Both acts and activities are focused on a design object, 
which as we already saw, can be one of the following (Newell & Simon, 1972; Darses 
et al., 2001): problem, solution, goal, method, domain object, rule, or task. Acts’ focus is more 
objective, usually derived from certain linguistic forms or common sense inferences, 
whereas activities’ focus needs a greater degree of observer inference, as it is based on 
several acts, not always focusing on the same object. 
From a Cognitive Psychology point of view, both acts and activities are 
representational. Moreover, seeing design as process of (co-)construction of 
representations (Visser, 2006), the following types of acts and activities are possible: 
generation, transformation, and evaluation (see Section 4.3). It is worth noting here that the 
distinction between acts and activities is not made explicit in the original proposal by 
Visser (2006b); instead, the term “activity” is used to refer to both the individual and 
the team levels. However, in our adaptation of Visser’s proposal, we do make the 
distinction between “act” level and “activity” level, the first referring to an 
elementary dialogue act unit (as we shall explain later on in this chapter), and the 
second to a set of at least two different types of acts on the same object. Acts follow 
one another in a continuous and dynamic way and whether they form activities or 
not depends either on their power to provoke some kind of reaction onto another 
speaker (in this case activities are inter-personal), either on their performer’s insistence 
on going on with enrolling her representations. We use the term “insistence” to 
anticipate the fact that in-interaction representation construction acts, from now on 
“representational acts”, always express some type of intention. However, such 
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intention can be either limited to the semantic-cognitive level, or form part of a 
dialogue act (addresser-addresse level). 
Before going on explaining what co-construction is, let us first explain what design 
construction refers to in an interaction context. In other words, when can we say that 
design knowledge is constructed? In his article “Connectivism: a learning theory for 
the Digital Age”, and also later on, George Siemens (2005) argues that an 
information becomes knowledge when it connects to other information. Expanding 
his definition, information is represented into knowledge elements, meaning concepts 
or relations (Akin, 1986), which connect to each other as part of the same cognitive 
object. Such connections are reflected in discourse and they are mainly expressed 
through transformation acts, meaning that the representational content of an act 
connects to the representational content of another act, in one of the following ways 
(Visser, 2006; p. 194): a) duplicate, that is, replicate or reformulate ri; b) add, that is, 
introduce new information or “small alterations” into ri; c) detail, that is, break up ri 
into components ri1 to rin; d) concretize, that is, transform ri  into ri’ which represents ri  
from a more concrete perspective; e) modify, that is, transform ri  into another version 
ri’, neither detailing, nor concretizing it; f) revolutionize, that is, replace ri by an 
alternative representation rj , neither detailing, nor concretizing it.  
Of course these acts, being situated in a collaborative design setting, do not only have 
a cognitive function. Communicative functions are also inherent in most cases. 
However, treating them only at a representation level, the main assumption we can 
make regarding these acts’ implicit or implied (depending on whether the message or 
its expression comes first) communicative function is whether the representational 
content expressed in one speaker’s act is directly connected to that of another’s. By directly 
connected, we mean something different than simply referred to, even if this reference 
is oriented towards mutual understanding and acceptance (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986). Also, it is more than what it can be generally defined as speech coherence, 
which, in our view, refers to internal connections at a semantic or metaphor level. 
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Being directly connected at a cognitive level, means that a representation is 
constructed upon another, previously made explicit, representation. Such 
“construction upon” is quite easy, yet not evident, to understand in the case of 
transformation acts, as we previously described. It is far less evident to decide 
whether a generation or evaluation act is product of co-construction. 
From a socio-cognitive interaction analysis point of view, cognitions and 
representations emerge through and from interaction (Gilly, 1995). Based on Trognon 
(1991), Sorsana & Musiol (2005) claim that: 
Nowadays, two versions of the thesis that ‘interaction constitutes the matrix of cognitions’ 
can be pointed out:  
- the ‘weak’ version, which considers interaction as ‘a medium’ from which cognitions 
emerge. Interaction here is a catalyst or a mediator between individuals and the 
knowledge they have to obtain or internalize (…) 
 - the ‘strong’ version, which assumes that the emergence of cognitions is realized within 
the unfolding of interaction. Here again, there are two possible ways to account for the 
way in which the unfolding of interaction actually works:  
- sometimes, the unfolding of interaction Is said to play its role statically: this refers to 
conceptions in which interaction is perceived as (a) partners’ ‘content of processes of 
thought’ or (b) ‘material for these processes of thought’ or (c) ‘models of these processes 
which can be internalized by individuals’ 
- the other point of view consists in arguing that the unfolding of interaction plays its role 
dynamically, when the researcher considers that individuals who are interacting actually 
co-produce cognitions: each partner helps the other to ‘deliver’ his (her) own cognition; or 
they fully co-produce cognitions, so that the new cognitions become irreducible to the 
mere sum of individual ones (p. 170). 
In our research, we treat knowledge construction in this last sense, in which cognition 
is either “helped” to be made explicit, or it is “co-produced”. Taking for granted that 
all content being expressed in interaction is in one way or another elicited through 
the act of interacting, by design co-construction we mean only the explicit ways in 
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which design knowledge expressed by one person is transformed, re-used, or assessed 
by another person. Of course, such transformation can also take place at an 
individual level, within a short or –sometimes– longer sequence of acts, as part of a 
knowledge-oriented monologue. In this case, whereas there is design construction, we 
cannot speak of co-construction, according to the meaning of the term adopted in 
this dissertation.  
To conclude, design co-construction refers to the process of transforming or 
evaluating the design content made explicit for the first time by another participant 
in the interaction. Note that co-construction and our use of the term is narrower than 
that of co-elaboration (Baker, 1994; Mephu-Nguifo, Baker, & Dillenbourg, 1999; 
Baker, 2010), which includes the communicative process going along content co-
construction. Here we limit this theoretical construct at a representational level. 
However, there is (at least) one case in which the communicative component is “part 
and parcel” of the representational co-construction: the case in which a dialogue act 
evokes the generation of a representation in another speaker. In this case, a 
generation act is also possible (in addition to the transformation and evaluation acts) 
to be considered as a manifestation of co-construction. 
But why co-construction matters for team design communication? Because it is an 
expression of “jointness”. According to Clark (1996), a joint action is based on “the 
co-ordination of individual actions by two or more people. There is co-ordination of 
both content, what the participants intend to do, and processes, the physical and mental 
systems they recruit in carrying out those intentions” (p. 59). We could further say 
that co-construction regards jointness at the content level. It is also important to note 
here that jointness does not necessarily imply sharedness, meaning mainly the degree of 
conceptual convergence between communicants (Kreckel, 1981), but it is an essential 
component of the participants’ common ground (Roschelle & Teasley, 1999), at least 
as it is manifested through discourse. What we mean here is that the fact, for 
example, that a participant re-uses (duplicates) the solution concept idea previously 
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manifested by another participant does not automatically imply neither that the same 
concept is conceived in the same way by both speakers, nor that the second 
conceptualizer attributes to the re-used solution concept the same (proposal) value 
that it was given in its initial generation. To avoid such misunderstandings, and 
because it exceeds our goals, in this research we are not interested in whether 
interaction products are more or less consensual. 
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5.1.2 DIALOGICALITY 
In Chapter 4, we defined dialogicality as an intra-personal or inter-personal 
phenomenon, which describes the taking into account of “other voices” in one’s own 
speech. Based on this definition, dialogicality can be manifested through discourse, 
either as a type of dialogue act, or through the enunciation of other persons or 
entities, different than the speaker herself. Before we continue with defining which 
dialogue acts are more dialogical than others, we shall first define what a dialogue act 
is. 
The option for dialogue acts rather than speech acts – also discussed in Section 4.2 – 
is well justified by Bunt (2000). According to this author, there are at least four 
reasons in favor of an effort to define dialogue acts: 
1. In speech act theory, a central goal of utterance interpretation is taken to be the 
assignment of an illocutionary force and a propositional content. But there is a 
considerable unclarity as to exactly which illocutionary forces should be distinguished, 
and why. We therefore question whether illocutionary forces are a satisfactory end point 
in the analysis of utterance meaning (…) 
2. (…) We believe that communication has many ‘dimensions’ that a speaker can address 
simultaneously, and that utterances should often be considered to have several functions 
at the same time. We think it is therefore also more fruitful, in many cases, to consider an 
utterance as multifunctional rather than as (functionally) ambiguous. 
3. (…) Pervasive phenomena in spoken dialogue, such as the use of feedback utterances 
(OK, Quite so, Yes, Hm, You think so?, …), hesitations, self-corrections, greetings, 
contact and attention signals, and apologies have not been analyzed in a speech act 
theoretical way to any great depth (…) 
4. Finally, for application in the design of dialogue systems, we need a formalized theory 
taking into account precisely those types of communicative acts that are relevant in the 
situation where the system is to be used (p. 83-84). 
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Accepting this critique towards the adequacy of speech acts to analyze dialogues, the 
need to define communicative, and subsequently, dialogue acts emerges. Communicative 
acts take into consideration the communicative function of an utterance, in other 
words, “the ways in which dialogue participants use information to change the 
context” (Bunt, 2000; p. 89). Kreckel (1981) adds that “from a developmental 
perspective, functions are said to be identical with uses of language (…) The adult 
system seems to lose the direct function-use relationship” (p. 61). In task-oriented 
interaction, communication is vastly guided by the task, making its functions less 
ambiguous. When communicative function is added to a task-relevant semantic 
content, we can speak of dialogue acts (Bunt, 2000). 
However, although all dialogue acts are communicative acts, not all communicative 
acts are also dialogue acts. Two main factors can be used to distinguish between 
these two, when considered separately: task-orientation and rationality. Dialogue acts 
always serve some other task motivating the dialogue, rather than the task of 
communication per se. Moreover, during a dialogue “communicative agents strive 
for rationality, both in their choice of communicative actions in relation to their 
communicative goals, and in the choice of their communicative (sub)goals depending 
on the goals of the underlying task” (Bunt, 1999; p. 140). These two conditions are 
considered to be as more generalizable regarding task-oriented interactions than 
other communicative behaviors such as greetings, apologies, or expressions of 
gratitude, which are often motivated by social, culture-binded norms and 
conventions. 
Regarding dialogue acts, a distinction can also be made between those that directly 
contribute to the task, known as task-oriented dialogue acts, and those that are concerned 
with the interaction itself, also known as dialogue control acts (Bunt, 1999; Beun, 1999). 
The main functions of dialogue control acts are: turn-taking, timing, perceptual and 
mental contact, dialogue structuring, and the utterance formulation process. Even 
though these acts have been studied, together with the task-oriented dialogue acts, by 
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a number of scholars (e.g. Traum & Allen, 1992; Baker & Lund, 1997), we consider 
them irrelevant to our research goal, for the same reason described above regarding 
communication acts: their manifestation and replicability does not (as much) depend 
on the type of the task. 
Various types of task-oriented dialogue acts have been hitherto proposed, and they 
will be exposed later on. The point that we would like to make here is that not all 
dialogue acts are also similarly dialogical. In other words, their inter-personal context 
does not necessarily imply their interactive context. For a dialogue act to be 
considered as ‘truly’ dialogical, (at least one of) the following conditions need(s) to be 
satisfied: a) that it responds to a previous contribution, by accepting or impeding its 
content, understanding, or application. This behavior most of the times takes place at 
an inter-personal level, but it is also possible that a person “counter-argues” to herself 
(Billig, 1987). Any other case of cancelling one’s own content is not considered 
dialogical, but rather a monological attempt of self-correction (within-agent feedback); b) 
that it “carries” the voice of a relevant “Other”. Relevant people in professional 
design are: the stakeholders, who in the case of an institution correspond to teams 
superior to the design team in the organizational hierarchy, other institutional 
teams/departments whose co-operation is necessary for the design decisions to be made, 
and internal (team members) or external experts, whose point of view is considered 
relevant for the specific issue. We consider acts as dialogical when these “other 
voices” are literally enounced in one’s discourse, e.g. not only referred to, but quoting 
what was (imagined to be) said. The enounced content is necessary for all cases of 
quotation, except for when it refers to something someone of the team said before 
during that meeting (in these cases, just “as x said” is sufficient, as long as it is implied 
that everyone understands to what the speaker is referring to). 
Both dialogue and dialogical acts can be further distinguished regarding their 
communicative “power”, as it will be further explained in the ‘Dialogue acts’ 
paragraph (5.3.5). One of the types of communicative power, very relevant to team 
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design communication as we already saw, is what can be called as “argumentativity”. 
This term is used here to describe the quality of some dialogue and dialogical acts to 
also serve an argumentation function. When such function is also combined with 
dialogicality, we can speak of an inter-personal argumentation structure. Given the 
extensively discussed relation between argumentation and collaboration, we can 
assume that such inter-personal structures are high-level manifestations of jointness, 
thus they are important indicators of team design collaboration. In case dialogicality 
is manifested though the use of an enunciative subject, such as an institutional expert 
or a user tester, the identification of the role and/or knowledge of such subject is 
important for the identification of the type of the argumentation scheme emerged 
(later explained in this chapter). 
	  126	  
5.1.3 DELIBERATIVENESS 
Deliberation is defined as: a) discussion of all sides of a question; b) careful 
consideration; c) planning something carefully and intentionally; d) a rate 
demonstrating an absence of haste or hurry; and e) the trait of thoughtfulness in 
action or decision (Wordnet, http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=word-
you-want). In one mode or another, it can be said that deliberation is the principal 
communicative function of a meeting activity, which is “by nature” oriented towards 
delegation (Allwood, 2000; see also Figure 8 in Chapter 3), or, broadly said, towards 
decision-making. However, we should always bear in mind that decision-making is 
not always action-oriented, and, especially in the cases of highly complex tasks, such 
as design, decisions can also be knowledge-oriented. 
Before defining deliberativeness, a first distinction to be made is between goal-
oriented and non-goal-oriented discourse during interaction. Of course here we do 
not include the basic communication goal of meaning understanding and 
negotiation, necessary to any interaction as we already said in Chapter 1. An 
interaction becomes non-goal-oriented when it satisfies the criteria of a free 
discussion, but not those of a task-oriented dialogue. Free discussions can be 
deliberative in the sense of “thoughtful”, but they are not taken into account in the 
present study if they do not contribute somehow1 to the construction of the design 
object. On the other hand, it is also possible that certain types of goal-oriented 
interaction are not supposed to be deliberative. This is mostly the case of action co-
ordination activities, when the object of interaction –usually task assignment or time-
place decisions– does not also form an issue. Another example of non-deliberative 
goal-oriented interaction is that of cognitive synchronization activities (Darses et al., 2001; 
Visser, 2001), very often in team design as we saw in Chapter 2.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Somehow” here refers only to the socio-cognitive level, as it is possible that free discussions 
contribute to the socio-emotional level, e.g. through creating a relaxed atmosphere.	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A further observation is that not all deliberative interaction guides to the taking of a 
decision.  This statement implies two main assumptions. First of all, that deliberation 
is an issue-dependent activity, and as such, some task-oriented activities are more 
deliberative than others. Issue is a topic that becomes the object of discussion, and its 
treatment through discourse defines types of task-oriented activities, embedded into 
the macro-activity of design deliberation. Secondly, not all design-oriented activities 
lead to decisions, even if those are conceived in a broad sense, including both action-
oriented and knowledge-oriented “make-ups of mind”. Examining what type of 
deliberative process is also productive in the sense of a final proposal or evaluation 
becomes interesting if one considers the uncertainty and ambiguity of the design 
process (Stacey & Eckert, 2003; McDonnell, 2010). 
Having said that, deliberativeness in the present study is mainly defined by 
distinguishing among design deliberative episodes that lead to some type of concrete 
action or conceptualization (action-oriented vs knowledge-oriented deliberation), and 
those that stay at a reflecting or free discussion level without arriving at a mind 
“make-up”. It is worth noting here that, again, consensus is not taken into account, 
for the decision on deliberativeness or not. An argument from authority, for example, 
can mark the end of a team deliberation episode, without the approval of the rest of 
the team. Other guidelines regarding episode segmentation come into play that will 
be discussed later on (Section 5.3.3). However, what is important to state clearly here, 
is that in order for a piece of interaction to be considered as deliberative, thus 
contributing to the team’s macro-goal, at least one final action or knowledge 
statement is necessary, by at least one person. 
In the case of action-based decision making, such “final” statement is relatively easy 
to identify: it usually contains a “let’s do” element relative to the initial issue, which 
can be either expressed in the form of a strategy, meaning an individual, synthetic 
(based on co-construction), or dialogically joint (with many people’s participation) 
plan, regarding team’s behavior. In the case of knowledge-based decision making, the 
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“final” statement takes the form of an intermediary representation, discussed in the 
following paragraph. “Final” is relative in both cases. Firstly, because it is not said 
that the decisions taken will also be the ones actually followed; and secondly, because 
participants can return to the same representations representing decisions later on in 
the interaction. 
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5.1.4 INTERMEDIARY REPRESENTATIONS 
Intermediary objects (Jeantet, 1998), also known as boundary objects (Star, 1989) or 
mediating objects (Vinck, 1999) play a major role in design. In team design, they can 
refer either to physical objects, meaning tools and artifacts with a specific 
communicative function, or to virtual objects, meaning representations that serve as 
reference point for thoughts’ externalization (Eckert & Boujut, 2003). The present 
research focuses on the second type of objects, and more precisely, on those discourse 
products that can be considered as relevant intermediary representations (Visser, 2006).  
Three of the most important intermediary representations in team design are the 
design constraints, the design requirements, and the design proposals. A design constraint  
refers to some limitation on the conditions under which a system is developed, or on the 
requirements of the system. The design constraint could be on the systems form, fit or 
function or could be in the technology to be used, materials to be incorporated, time 
taken to develop the system, overall budget, and so on (Systems Engineering Glossary, 
http://www.argospress.com/Resources/systems-engineering/designconstr.htm). 
Constraints are distinguished between: a) internal and external constraints (Savage, Miles, 
Moore, & Miles, 1998; Chevalier & Bonnardel, 2003), depending on whether the 
source of knowledge on which they are based is personal memory-expertise, or 
aspects linked to the problem itself (also called “problem requirements”); b) preference 
and validity constraints (Jannsen, Jègou, Nouguier, & Vilaem, 1989), depending on 
whether they are personally or generally important; and c) prescribed and derived 
constraints (Détienne, Martin, & Lavigne, 2005), depending on whether they are 
context-independent or emerging during interaction through specific viewpoints. In 
one way or another, design constraints form an essential part of the design problem 
space, as they guide solution search and selection. Moreover, in team design, they 
can reveal different types of expertise (Chevalier & Bonnardel, 2003), by composing 
different types of viewpoints on the same issue (Détienne et al., 2005).  
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At this point, a difference between the nature of constraints and their manifestation 
through discourse in team design should be made. In design thinking, constraints 
form part of the problem space but, at the same time, they define the design solution. 
As Chevalier & Bonnardel (2007) explain: 
design activities have been described as based on an iterative dialectic between problem-
framing and problem-solving. To solve the problem, designers have to improve their 
mental representations so that they can satisfy a constraint condition, effectively 
transforming an ill-defined problem into a better defined one. To solve any design 
problem, designers have to generate and introduce new constraints that contribute to 
satisfy the original constraint condition (p. 2458). 
In this sense, constraints and requirements are the two sides of the same coin. This is, 
generally, the case in which constraints and requirements are defined a priori, in the 
sense of external prescribed constraints. Nonetheless, these types of constraints are rare in 
eLearning design, mainly for two reasons: because stakeholders form part of the same 
educational institution, and because user experience, on the basis of which most 
constraints are produced, is not a priori defined itself; both design constraints and 
user experience consideration emerge as viewpoints during team design interaction 
(Détienne et al., 2005). 
Another consideration, relevant to our dataset, is the differentiation between design 
constraints and design requirements. Although in individual design thinking, these 
two refer to the same entity, in team design, their distinction through discourse is 
possible, and sometimes necessary. As it was previously explained, constraints in 
eLearning design cannot be taken for granted, neither there is a list of them a priori 
to guide the design practice (unless past experience with the same course is used, but 
again, in this dissertation, we refer to design or re-design of innovative courses). Their 
consideration exists only at a general level before their explicitation through specific 
judgments regarding their nature, type, and force. Seen that way, it is an important 
step to make design relevant constraints explicit. A second step refers to making 
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explicit the requirements deriving from such constraints.  As we already discussed in 
Chapter 2, design problems are ill-defined, in the sense that more than one solutions 
exist for the same problem. In team design, we should add that also design 
constraints are ill-defined, in the sense that different requirements can derive from 
the same constraint, regarding the perspective adopted at the moment of interaction. 
Take, for example, a usability constraint, e.g. “learners do not like reading much text 
on-line”, based on the speaker’s personal experience and/or pedagogical knowledge. 
A number of possible requirements, or needs for action, derive from it, such as: we 
need to have as less text as possible, we need to use more interactive activities, we 
need to have PDF as an option, etc.  
A third step towards a design decision is to “translate” both the constraints and 
requirements made explicit into concrete design proposals. From a cognitive point of 
view, such proposals are not limited to a solution proposal, but to any object being 
presented as a catalyst for the design process. From a communication point of view, 
proposals can refer either at a micro or at a macro level. At a micro level, proposal 
corresponds to the interjunction relation-act of presentation in Renkema’s (2009) 
model, in which the notion of solutionhood is relevant for its identification. At a 
macro level, proposal refers to a complex speech act, as defined by Walton (2006), or 
to the activity of proposing as defined by Aakhus (2006). We refer to the same 
phenomenon, as expressed in team collaborative situations, through the term of a 
dialogue macro-act: dialogue, because it is a rational, task-oriented communicative act; 
and macro, because other acts can be embedded on it, as we will explain later in this 
chapter.  
Constraints, requirements, and proposals are essential components of design 
thinking, this is why their appearance is also frequent and relevant in design 
discourse. In this research, they are moreover treated as intermediary 
representations, emphasizing their role in shaping the final decision regarding the 
design artifact, i.e. the course. 
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5.1.5 DESIGN-RELATED ARGUMENTS 
As we already said, design deliberation refers to the process of thoughtfully weighing 
options, before getting to a design decision. This process is strongly related to 
argumentation, not only because of the general relation between argumentation and 
deliberation (Walton, 1998), but also due to characteristics specific to the design 
process.  
First of all, as a reasoning process, design is a form of practical reasoning, focusing on 
“that-which-is-not-yet” (Nelson & Stolterman, 2003), with the aim of its realization. 
Maximizing this process (Simon, 1969/1996) forms the base of deliberative 
reasoning, as it implies a selection among possible solutions, according to criteria 
(Walton, 1990). Secondly, the ill-structured or wicked nature (Rittel & Webber, 1973) 
of most design problems renders the design solutions highly ill-defined, meaning that 
there is not pre-determined way that leads to the (best) solution (Darses et al., 2001).  
Last but not least, design is a social process (Bucciarelli, 1988), meaning that design 
representations are negotiated. This aspect is very important, given that most of the 
complex design is nowadays done in teams.  
Having said that, the emergence of arguments during design interaction is very much 
expected. As arguments, here, we refer to the argument1 type (O’ Keefe, 1977/1992), 
which by rule is “something one person makes”, although there are exceptional cases 
in which “two or more persons had jointly made an argument1” (p. 79). In order to 
identify “arguments1” in oral interaction, two types of structure need to be taken into 
account: the arguments’ logic structure, and the arguments’ manifested structure. 
With arguments’ logic structure, we refer to the informal logic macro-criterion of 
cogency. Cogency includes all three criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and 
acceptability we mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5). It is based on formal 
deductive validity, but it is not directly assigned from it. This is mainly because most 
of the everyday arguments are plausible, meaning that the premises plausibly lead to 
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the conclusion. In other words, if the premises are true, it does not necessarily mean 
that the conclusion is also true. A well-known example is the “Tweety” case (Walton, 
2011b). The premises “All birds can fly” and “Tweety is a bird” are true; however 
the conclusion “Tweety can fly” is not necessarily true, as for example in the case 
Tweety is a penguin.  
The same “problem” can also be described as defeasibility of the argument structure, 
“meaning that even after the argument has been accepted, it might later be defeated 
as new evidence enters into consideration” (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008; p. 7). 
This is very much the case for knowledge-based and practical arguments, which are 
the core of design reasoning (Brown & Chandrasekaran, 1986). For the description of 
the everyday use of these informal reasoning structures, we opt for using Walton and 
others’ (2008) “argumentation schemes”. These schemes are distinguished from other 
inference structures regarding their function of shifting the burden the proof. Said 
otherwise, each time an argument fitting one of the schemes is put forward, “it shifts 
the burden of proof to the side of the respondent in a dialogue (…) The respondent 
might attack the argument, by putting forward counterarguments, or may simply 
express doubts about the conclusion based on the evidence that he has” (Walton et 
al., 2008; p. 35). 
Knowledge-based reasoning is “the type of reasoning built into an expert system (…) 
meaning that it draws its premises from a set of facts and rules (or frames) called a 
knowledge base” (Walton, 1989; p. 193). The main type of knowledge-based 
argument is the argument from expert opinion or position to know. This argument has the 
following form (Walton, et al., 2008): 
Major Premise: Source a is an expert/in position to know about things in a 
certain domain S containing proposition A. 
 Minor Premise: a asserts that A is true (false). 
 Conclusion: A is true/false. 
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In institutional, task-oriented interaction, the “expert’s voice” can be either one 
member of the team or an external subject matter expert. Let’s take the second case 
first, which is the less problematic. In everyday language, argument from expert 
opinion when referring to an external expert usually takes one of the following forms: 
“I know x because E, who is an expert, said so” or “E, who is an expert, says that we 
should do x; therefore, let’s do x”. The first sub-case is similar to argument from 
position to know, because it refers to some type of expert testimony: the person who 
asserts so is not an expert himself, but she has met, read, listened to, dreamt of, etc. 
the expert who she refers to as a source of knowledge. On the other hand, the second 
sub-case reflects an action-oriented argument based on expert opinion, thus it is a 
combination of practical and knowledge-based reasoning. Both cases, in our dataset, 
are identified as arguments from expertise. 
However, in cross-disciplinary teams such as the eLearning design teams, expertise is 
very usually sought for and/or made explicit inside the team. This does not, of course, 
mean that any assertion made by the participant designers is argument from expert 
opinion, just because each one of the designers is an expert herself! Indeed, there are 
cases where expertise is made explicit in the form of arguments based on some type 
of experience, which renders the arguer in a position to know. Such experience, in the 
team design context, can be either domain-dependent or domain-independent. We 
call the argumentative inferences based on the first type of position to know “rule-
based” arguments, referring to domain rules serving as support for the statement, and 
those based on the second type “person-based”, referring to the personal experience 
argumentative component. Both types, can be considered as sub-types of arguments 
from position to know, and they are expected to be manifested in any task-oriented 
cross-disciplinary context, such as professional team design.  
Practical reasoning can be seen “as a kind of communicative problem solving which 
concludes in directives for an action” (Walton, 1990; p. 13). Thus, it is the basis of 
joint deliberation. As far as its (informal) logic structure is concerned, it refers to the 
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argumentation scheme used in deliberation to solve a practical problem (Walton et 
al., 2008; p. 85): 
 Major premise: A is the goal. 
 Minor premise: B is necessary to bring about A. 
 Conclusion: Therefore, it is required to bring about B. 
 
Transferring this scheme to the team design context, some considerations need to be 
made. First of all, in a collaborative setting the goal can also sometimes be the object 
of deliberative practical reasoning. As we saw in Chapter 1, what distinguishes 
collaboration from other communication flows is the continuous re-conceptualization 
of both the object and the objective of interaction. In this sense, the Aristotelian 
assumption that “we deliberate not about ends but about means” (Walton, 1990; p. 
12) does not seem to be the case. To cover every possibility, instead of “goal” we 
should understand “practical problem”.  
A second consideration has to do with the notion of “necessary condition” contained 
in the second premise. A broadly accepted fact in the design context is the distinction 
made by Herbert Simon (1969/1996) between two methods of problem solving he 
calls satisficing and maximizing. This statement is interpreted by Walton (1990) as 
following: 
What is suggested by Simon’s remarks is that there are two standards of burden of 
proof within practical inference, depending on how ambitious the practical reasoner is: 
(1) looking for the best available way to carry out an objective, that is, by maximizing 
(comparing all the available procedures and selecting the best); (2) setting an 
acceptable (but less than ideal) standard in the first place, and then selecting the first, 
or any available procedure that meets the standard. What works to solve a problem is 
not always the best solution (p. 46). 
In other words, the necessary-optimizing solution many times is replaced by the 
sufficiently satisficing alternative. 
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A last consideration is related to the (final) conclusion of a practical inference, which 
“always is a statement that the inferrer has to do something (a statement of 
necessity)” (Walton, 1990; p. 9). However, “the subjectivity of the practical inference 
affects the formulation of both premises and the conclusion” (p. 24). In team design, 
it is the team intention rather than the personal intention that is expressed in terms of 
a team goal. This assumption makes the practical inference less “psychologically” 
and more “epistemically” relevant, in Walton’s (1990, p. 25) terms.  
In sum, adapting the practical argumentation scheme to team design context, the 
following considerations need to be taken into account: a) the amplification of the 
goal premise to include any type of practical problem to be solved; b) the relation of 
necessity and sufficiency between the premises and the conclusion; and c) the 
epistemic relevance of the inference. It can be already assumed that the intermediary 
representations defined in the previous paragraph are main (potential) components of 
practical arguments. However, the exact relations between them and the distinction 
between arguments and non-arguments will form part of our results. 
According to Walton (1990), the problem of closure for practical inference needs to 
be considered together with two factors: a) the question of side effects, and b) the 
question of alternative means. Correspondingly, two types of arguments emerge, in 
strong relation to the practical argument: the argument from positive/negative 
consequences, and the argument from alternatives.   
The main form of argument from positive/negative consequences is the following 
(Walton, 1998; Walton et al., 2008): 
Major premise: If A is brought about, then, as a consequence, B will come 
about. 
Minor premise: B is a positive/negative state of affairs. 
Conclusion: Therefore, A should (not) be brought about. 
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As Walton et al. (2008) observe, “practical reasoning and argument from 
consequences represent two directions of the same kind of reasoning” (p. 101). We 
expand this observation by claiming that “practical inference is always proposing 
some type of action, whereas arguments from positive or negative consequences are 
more near to a value judgment” (Rapanta, forthcoming). In one way or another, 
both types of inferences are strongly design-related and their emergence in team 
design interaction is important to be identified. 
As far as argument from alternatives is concerned, it can be considered as a 
“reversed” practical argument. The arguer knows the consequences of the alternative 
to the action she proposes, and based on them, she assumes the contrary 
consequences for the proposed action. Argument from alternatives is also applicable 
in truth-seeking argumentation, as the example taken from Aristoteles presented by 
Walton et al. (2008): “If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair 
them with the aid of peace”. In this argument, it is well-known that “war” is the 
opposite of “peace”, thus a property of the former is inferred to be a non-property of 
the latter. However, in deliberative task-oriented interaction, the above inference 
takes a more concrete, solution-based form: 
Major premise: Solution a, which is proposed as alternative to 
solution b, has a positive/negative consequence c. 
 Minor premise: Solution b does not have consequence c. 
Conclusion: Therefore, we should (not) chose solution b. 
 
Argument from alternatives, in the form just described above, is very related to team 
design. According to D’Astous et al. (2004), elaboration of alternative developments 
or solutions occupies the 21% of the total time spent in design review meetings.  
Another form of argument very close to the design process is the argument from 
analogy. The general scheme proposed for this type of argument is (Walton et al., 
2008): 
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 Major premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
 Minor premise: A is true (false) in case C1. 
 Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2. 
A slightly different version, more applicable to objects rather than cases, is proposed 
by Guarini (2004): 
 Premise 1: a has features f1, f2,…,fn. 
 Premise 2: b has features f1, f2,…,fn. 
Conclusion: a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with respect 
to f1, f2,…,fn. 
 
This scheme’s focus on features (i.e. factors, aspects, characteristics) is important for 
the parallelization of argument from analogy to argument from precedent, another 
type of case-based reasoning. According to Walton (2010), the argumentation scheme 
appropriate for this type of argument is the following one: 
Premise 1: C1 is a previously decided case. 
Premise 2: In case C1, rule R was applied and produced finding F. 
Premise 3: C2 is a new case that has not yet been decided. 
Premise 4: C2 is similar to C1 in relevant respects. 
Conclusion: Rule R should be applied to C2 and produce finding F. 
 
Because of its relation to creativity, which always refers to a “building-on” rather 
than a “from zero” creation, design process is frequently based on analogical 
reasoning, as an expression of case-based reasoning (Maher, 1990). In fact, the role of 
analogies in creative design has been extensively shown regarding the construction of 
new artifacts, re-constructing existing ones (e.g. Cross, 1997; Bonnardel, 1999). The 
cognitive mechanism behind this type of reasoning has been defined as “reuse of past 
design” (Détienne, 2003), and it applies to both individual and collective design 
situations. In this sense, argument from analogy is a very explicit case where a 
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designer communicates his past or relevant experience with other artifacts, which can 
serve as a model or example for the design-at-hand. 
Of course other arguments are possible to occur in team design interaction, but we 
consider the above mentioned as the most related to the design thinking and process.  
Also, our analysis will be limited to the identification of type1 argument structures 
(O’Keefe, 1977), but seen as sequences of discourse acts. This choice facilitates the 
process of argument identification in an extensive, everyday discussion protocol, as it 
allows for the following operations: a) the connection between certain types of 
discourse relations and argument types; b) flexibility at the time of searching for 
arguments as the components can be situated in various locations in the interaction; 
and c) the possibility to identify connections also between arguments, by applying the 
same rules as for one argument identification, as long as same or similar discourse 
relations are expressed. 
However, a limitation of considering only type1 argument structures is that other level  
argument relations, such as those between interaction sequences, cannot be 
identified. An argument situated in sequence number 4 of a deliberation episode can 
be dialectically “tiered” (Johnson, 2000) to an argument situated in sequence number 
1. If the design issues were univocal, in the sense of one topic treated at a time with 
certain “pro” and “con” positions, such dialectical analysis would be possible. 
However, as we already implied in Chapter 1, what distinguishes team design 
argumentation from other contexts is that it is object-oriented and not issue-oriented. 
Thus, the cognitive and discursive dimensions can also shed some light on the 
identification of potential type2 argument structures in team design. 
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5.1.5 USER EXPERIENCE 
User experience is an amplified version of usability, which “encompasses all aspects 
of the end-user's interaction with the company, its services, and its products” (Nielsen 
Norman Group, http://www.nngroup.com/about/userexperience.html). Regarding 
our research, it can further be said that usability criteria make themselves explicit 
during interaction through the reflection on the expected user experience. 
 The gap between who designers and developers imagine their users are and who those 
users really are can be the biggest problem with product development (Kuniavsky, 
2003). This problem is resolved by taking the user into account along with product 
development, what is also known as “user-centered design” (Garrett, 2003). Defining 
the elements of user-centered design depends on the specific type of design object. If 
an on-line course is mainly considered as part of web-site design –at least considering 
its “material” components– the following elements of user experience are primordial 
(Garrett, 2003): contents, function, structure, and visuals. Also, regarding strategy, a 
differentiation needs to be made between user needs and site objectives (Garrett, 2003), 
which are linked to institutional or business goals.  
However much has been said about user experience related to the design process, it is 
not known how, why, and when users are taken into account during team design. 
One possibility is that users are considered as stakeholders, i.e. the ones who 
“mandate”, and that their voice is being enounced in the same way as we described 
in paragraph 5.1.2.  In eLearning design, there are two main types of users: the 
intermediary users, i.e. the tutors responsible to “give” the course on-line (in both our 
cases, tutors are different than the designers), and the final users, i.e. the students of 
the specific course. In some cases, a team also uses user testers before the launch of 
the course. What makes eLearning design special in comparison to other types of 
design is that users can never be considered to react “in the same way as”, because 
learning experience always depends on the other users (eLearning nowadays is 
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strongly interactive) and the tutors themselves. Thus, even if the “material” 
components of an eLearning course are the same, user experience can never be 
defined a priori. 
This characteristic leads designers to understand unknown users, through two main 
behaviors: by themselves doing what users are supposed to do as part of the course 
activities, and by putting themselves in the “users’ shoes”, through making 
hypotheses regarding how users would behave (Rapanta, Schadewitz, & Holden, 
2010). During design meetings, we are exclusively confronted with the second case, 
even though designers may refer to their “do it by yourself” experiences. 
Although user experience cannot be considered as a design knowledge domain for 
the reasons we mentioned above, it is possible that eLearning designers have 
developed a special type of meta-experience, meaning their own experience with user 
experience. In this sense, such type of “sensibility” or, even, facts-based knowledge 
can be considered as a separate design domain. 
In sum, there are many ways that users can be taken into account during non-
participatory eLearning design. The identification of these ways is necessary in order 
to shed light on the user experience consideration during design. Such a priori 
consideration can save time and money, compared to a posteriori corrections, e.g. 
after a user-test, or even render itself a factor of efficiency when there is no way back.  
More precisely, and in relation to our dataset, we are interested in how “users´ voice” 
is made explicit through designers’ discourse. As we already said in relation to 
dialogicality (paragraph 5.1.2), one way for it to be possible is through users’ 
enunciation, either directly, by quoting a user’s words, or indirectly, by imagining 
what she would say in a specific situation.  However, other ways to make explicit 
one’s experience on users’ experience should be possible and call for investigation. 
To sum up this section, six types of theoretical constructs have been defined in 
relation to our research context: design co-construction, dialogicality, deliberativeness, 
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intermediary representations, design-related arguments, and user experience. Although these 
constructs should be seen as conceptual representations, their manifestation in the 
coding process is possible and desirable. In some cases, some analysis hints were 
already given, in order to anticipate the relation between these constructs and the 
coding categories, which forms a main part of the coding scheme’s functionality to be 
in detail discussed later on (Section 5.4).  
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5.2 DATA COLLECTION-PREPARATION 
 
The es sence  o f  a  case  s tudy ,  the  centra l  tendency  among 
a l l  types  o f  case  s tud ies ,  i s  that  i t  t r ie s  to  i l luminate  a  
dec i s ion  or  se t  o f  dec i s ions .  
  
—SCHRAMM, 1971 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003). Moreover, case study is the preferred 
research strategy when “why”, “what”, and “how” questions are posed with 
explanatory, exploratory, or descriptive aims. Regarding our research questions and 
hypotheses, the present study is more exploratory and descriptive, rather than 
explanatory. However, the multiple-case design of it can allow for the inference of 
some causal explanations, if pattern matching among cases is successful. 
One of the strongest critiques that case study research has accepted is its weak base 
for generalization to other settings. Multiple case-study strategy gives a response to 
this problem, by optimizing description and generalizability (Herriot & Firestone, 
1983). The “case” refers to the unit of analysis of the study that can be the individual, 
the dyad, the group, the organization, but also more abstract entities, such as an 
event (Yin, 2003). In our study, we use this latter sense of case, by identifying them 
with any emerging “deliberative episode” (see paragraph 5.2.3 for segmentation). At 
the same time, the selection of two different organizational contexts (see paragraph 
5.2.1) allows for a multiplicity at a macro level, even if it is at a limited range (just two 
cases).  
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These two choices allow for both intra-group and inter-group comparisons. 
Regarding the first level of analysis, context is defined by the specific design activity 
context, which can be defined in the same way for both institutional cases, as their 
focus task is of the same type (eLearning design). However, differences in the 
emergence and type of such sub-cases can be attributed to differences between the 
two groups. On the other hand, if patterns identified at the intra-group level repeat 
themselves at the inter-group level, such replication may imply that institutional 
factors are not as important or they are equalized, regarding certain phenomena.  
Certainly, in order for such replication to be reliable, the same data collection and 
analysis process has to be followed, as it will be described in this section. First, an 
overview of the two teams will be given (paragraph 5.2.1), together with the 
description of those team-based aspects that are considered relevant for any 
subsequent interpretation of the acquired results. Right after (paragraph 5.2.2), our 
data collection method is presented, together with considerations to be taken into 
account regarding questions of reliability. The corpus of the collected interaction 
data –from now on dataset– is presented in paragraph 5.2.3, together with the rules 
and types of segmentation, according to pre-defined levels of analysis. Finally 
(paragraph 5.2.4), some initial considerations regarding the construction and 
functionality of coding schemes in general conclude this section. 
5.2.1 THE TEAMS 
Two teams participated in this study, both of them belonging to well-established 
Distance Education institutions, also known as “open universities” (Peters, 
1988/2004). The selection of the institutions has been based on criteria of quality 
and innovation. The first institutional case refers to one of the oldest European open 
universities, with a long success history, thus, experience in “openness” and 
implementation of innovative methods. The second one, although it has much less 
life than the first, has been considered since its beginning as being very much 
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connected with lifelong learning in a personalized and systematized way. The well-
founded educational model of this young –also European– institution has also 
rendered it very successful in the recent years. For research ethical reasons, we will 
limit ourselves to these general presentations of the institutions, in order to better 
protect participants’ privacy, and also to avoid any result of this research as being 
considered as part of the institutional policy. 
Instead, we will give more details regarding the two specific participant teams, 
focusing on both their common and distinct characteristics. First of all, both teams 
meet at a regular base (avg. once per month) during a pre-defined period of time 
(keeping schedule is very important), whereas the time duration of each project 
varies: for the first team –from now on, Team A– the duration of the project is quite 
long (about one and a half year), whereas for the second team –from now on, Team 
B– the project is shorter (a little more than half year). Project duration can only be 
estimated approximately as it does not necessarily correspond to the duration 
between the first and the last meeting observed. The calculation of time is based on 
communication with the participants in both cases.  
As far as the meetings observed is concerned, the duration slightly varies among the 
two Cases: in Team A the average is 1.8 hours, whereas the average of Team B is 1.4 
hours. This difference is justified taking into consideration the number of participants 
per meeting. In Team A, the usual number of active participants is 6, whereas there 
are cases (meetings) in which up to ten people are present, of course not all of them 
participating at the same range. This is a usual characteristic of formal institutional 
meetings, in which some participants are there just because of their institutional role 
(e.g. secretary), and not because they actually contribute to the task. We consider that 
for such cases, a distinction should be made between actual “authors” –referring to 
the eLearning design context– and “non-authors”. Moreover, the explicitation of the 
specific institutional role of the non-authors is also considered relevant, for the mere 
reason that a project manager, for example, is expected to have her say in a meeting, 
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whereas a secretary not as much. In Team B, an analogous distinction should be 
made between “academics” and “non-academics”, regarding the institutional model 
that corresponds to this team. In terms of formality of the meeting, we consider the 
existence of an agenda as a relevant aspect for the meeting’s organization. Team A’s 
meetings are based on a pre-defined agenda, produced by the Course Chair and sent 
to the team members before the meeting, so that everyone knows what it is to be 
discussed. Team B’s meetings are more informal, in this aspect; team members, being 
only three, are expected to follow very closely the process of course production, thus 
the existence of an agenda is not considered necessary. Also, the role of a Course 
Chair is not made explicit, as the two academics of the team share this responsibility.  
Other characteristics regarding participants of both teams should be taken into 
account, regarding our research questions. Participants in both teams are very 
experienced in eLearning design; the average of experience in course design is 5 
years for Team A, whereas in Team B the minimum of the participants’ experience is 
3, and the maximum 17 years. Also, cross-disciplinarity, as we defined it in Chapter 
3, plays a major role in both teams. In Team A, participants share different 
disciplines, varying from Product Design, Industrial Design, and Interactive media, 
to Management and Pedagogy. In Team A, a similar situation is observed (although 
at a lower level, due to the lower number of participants): each member has a 
different background, including Communication sciences, Philology, and History. 
Another aspect to be mentioned here is the previous collaboration between the 
participants. In Team A, half of the most active participants have never collaborated 
with the team before, whereas in Team B, only one of the three members is a 
newcomer, and the coalition between the other two is very strong (also at a friendship 
level). An extensive knowledge regarding the socio-affective aspects of participants’ 
relations exceeds the goals of the present dissertation. 
On the other hand, the main characteristic of any task-oriented interaction, i.e. the 
object of interaction, is considered very relevant for our research. In fact, there are 
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three main object-related aspects to take into account at the time of interpreting the 
results. First of all, the course’s subject itself is about Design in both Cases. In Team 
A, it refers to Design thinking in general, and in Team B, it is focused on 
Instructional Design. Both teams design a course about design, thus aspects of meta-
design thinking are present in both processes. In other words, designers’ subject 
matter expertise is identified with their course production skills. This characteristic is 
relevant to our research goals because it gives meetings a more design-based and a 
less managerial character: we have to do with designers who design about design. 
Apart from this similarity regarding the course’s subject, the characteristics of the task 
that the two teams are assigned are quite different. Team A is asked to design “from 
scratch” a 60-credit bachelor course, having a duration of one year in the institution’s 
bachelor program. This is a first-appearing, innovative course in the institution, and, 
as such, it has gathered a lot of expectations regarding its success and 
implementation. Team B’s task is easier, in terms of amount of work, as their job 
consists in re-designing two credits of an existing 6-credit “asignatura”, which is a 
didactic unit of a 60-credit master program. However, it can be said that their task is 
equally exigent, given the fact that they have to re-design a piece of a program, 
taking into consideration not only the didactic plan to-be-redesigned, but also the 
didactic plan of the whole program. Innovation is also a requisite for this case, as it 
forms part of an Innovation design project.  
TABLE 7. A COMPARATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE PARTICIPANT TEAMS 
Characteristic	   Team	  A	   Team	  B	  
Geographical	  context	   Europe	   Europe	  
Type	  of	  institution	   Distance	  University	   Distance	  University	  
Project	  duration	   approx.	  18	  months	  	   approx.	  7	  months	  
Participants	  per	  meeting	   6-­‐11	   3	  
Meeting	  duration	   avg.	  1.8	  hours	  	   avg.	  1.4	  hours	  	  
Prescribed	  agenda	   Yes	   No	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Course’s	  subject	   Design	  thinking	   Foundations	  of	  techno-­‐
pedagogical	  design	  
Course’s	  duration+level	   One-­‐year	  bachelor	  course	  
(60	  credits)	  
One-­‐year	  master	  course	  
(60	  credits)	  
Type	  of	  task	   Design	  of	  the	  whole	  
program	  
Re-­‐design	  of	  a	  6-­‐credit	  
“asignatura”	  
Roles	   1	  Course	  Chair-­‐Author,	  4	  
Authors,	  1	  Course	  
manager,	  2	  Media	  Project	  
managers,	  2	  external	  
collaborators,	  1	  secretary	  
2	  academics	  (authors),	  1	  
non-­‐academic	  (support)	  
Level	  of	  experience	   Strong	  	   Strong	  	  
Cross-­‐disciplinarity	   Strong	  (Product	  Design,	  
Industrial	  Design,	  
Interactive	  media,	  
Management,	  Pedagogy)	  
Medium	  
(Communication	  
sciences,	  Philology,	  
History)	  
Previous	  collaboration	   Medium	  (one	  author	  and	  
the	  media	  project	  
managers	  have	  never	  
collaborated	  with	  the	  team	  
before)	  
Strong	  between	  the	  two	  
academics;	  the	  non-­‐
academic	  member	  is	  a	  
newcomer	  in	  the	  
institution	  
 
Based on Table 7, it can be said that the two participant teams can be considered as 
representative of eLearning design teams, because they both share characteristics that 
are considered relevant for high-quality eLearning design projects, such as: 
innovation, cross-disciplinarity, relatively long production, and working experience. 
However, there also some differences between the two Cases, which could not be 
controlled, given the empirical, in-situ character of our research. 	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5.2.2 DATA COLLECTION 
There are many way of data collection in qualitative research. As McGrath & 
Altermatt (2001) summarize, the main general strategies for obtaining information 
about group interaction are: inferring interaction form input-output relations 
(without record of interaction behavior obtained), obtaining group member reports 
retrospectively (members rate and/or decide what went on in the groups), using 
online human observers (one or more observers record, code, or summarize group 
interaction), using mechanical or electronic recording systems (one or more cameras, 
tape recorders, or video cameras record group interaction for later coding). 
We chose the audiovisual registration for several reasons. First of all, as we are 
interested in the meeting activity type as the main data source, registering the team 
meetings is the most complete way of having access to what actually happened 
during them. Secondly, the use of recording devices allows the analyst to hear and 
watch the tape many times, and to focus on a specific action sequence. This way, 
understanding of the situation is enhanced. Thirdly, this data collection method also 
offers significant advantages for the subsequent coding stage, compared to other 
methods such as the use of human observers. According to McGrath & Altermatt 
(2001), “it [the video registration] allows the use of much more complex coding 
schemes, based on much more complex distinctions among categories” (p. 530). 
Finally, compared to mere audio recording, audiovisual registration allows for easier 
and deeper interpretations of multi-modal dialogues, as gestures, especially those 
implying addressing, use of tools, and spatial awareness are, sometimes, only possible 
through the image.  
On the other hand, the use of video in situated professional interaction has its own 
peculiarities and limitations. Mondada (2006), describing her praxeological approach to 
video practices, she makes clear that “not only the practices and methods by which 
video records are produced, but also the practices by which they are then edited (…) as 
well as the practices by which they are viewed” (p. 52). In other words, video is not a 
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mere resource, but an embedded practice itself. Subsequently, the researcher’s 
approach of treating the data is reflected throughout the video interaction practice, 
from the time of collecting the data till the time of analyzing and interpreting them. 
In the present research, the main ethnomethodological conversational inquiry 
shooting techniques were respected, regarding time, participation framework and 
interactional space, and multimodal details (Mondada, 2006). More precisely, we 
were interested in capturing the whole interaction from its beginning till its 
(announced) end; all participants were sufficiently visible; and previewed use of space 
and tools allowed for capturing any movement and object manipulation related to 
the task. 
 Regarding analysis and interpretation, we are totally aware that capture of reality is 
not the same as reality itself. However, video offers a quite transparent account of it. 
Moreover, the whole logic of shooting is based on capturing moments of a social 
reality. This is very important to bear in mind, as in no way can it be assumed that a 
small part of the activity of team decision-making accounts for the whole process. 
Shots of life, even if they refer to institutional life, are just shots of life; representative, 
but not exclusive. Last but not least, a question often arises about the degree to which 
people are influenced by the use of the camera. However, as Jordan & Henderson 
(1995) claim, “experience shows that people habituate to the camera surprisingly 
quickly (…) Where people are intensely involved in what they are doing, the presence 
of the camera is likely to fade out of awareness quite rapidly” (p. 55). 
A lot can be said about the camera setting and the rationale behind it. However, we 
will limit ourselves to a general description regarding each team setting, considering 
that a more detailed account is far from interest for the specific research. Regarding 
Team A, all the meetings were held in a room equipped with four hidden cameras, as 
part of the institutional setting. However, the decision to record the meeting or not 
was up to the team members. All team members were used to register themselves, as 
this formed part of their strategy in case a member was absent. After the researcher’s 
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involvement in the project –a little bit after its beginning– most of the meetings were 
registered for the aims of the present research. All team members gave their consent, 
and they were aware of the general aims of the research. 
As far as team B is concerned, an especially equipped room was not available. Thus, 
the recording was realized by the researcher herself. The use of one camera was 
considered sufficient, as both room and team size were limited. The participants’ 
personal relation with the researcher created a relaxed atmosphere, since the 
beginning. On the other hand, the same reason sometimes led the participants to 
“speak to the camera”. When this happened, the researcher maintained a neutral 
position and spoke back shortly and without influencing on the task flow. Moreover, 
as these instances were few and not directly related to the design process, they were 
not taken into consideration for the analysis. 
As it can be implied, a main difference in the treatment of the two teams lies in the 
fact that in the first case the researcher was not present, whereas in the second case 
she was physically there in every meeting. We assume that this difference has not 
influenced on the participants’ behavior (in the second case, it only influenced 
positively, as we said). As far as the researcher’s understanding of the context is 
concerned, someone could oppose by saying that the combination of human observer 
with use of recording machine could be considered as “stronger” ethnographically 
speaking. In fact, this possible limitation was taken into consideration for the first 
case. The researcher may have not been present in the meetings, but she was 
continuously in contact with one of the members of the team. Thus, any question 
regarding contextual information was answered thanks to this contact. Moreover, a 
3-week research visit in the department in which Team A is situated has been very 
enlightening regarding the researcher’s understanding of organizational issues, both 
at an institutional and at a team level. This was also done for the second case, for 
which a 6-month research visit was possible (during which all the registered meetings 
took place).  
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As a conclusion, it can be said that data collection followed a more or less similar 
process for both teams, apart from negotiable differences. Following identically the 
same process for two different teams in two different institutional contexts and with 
varying research limitations is almost never possible. Considering that, no difference 
in the results obtained by the two teams can be assumed to be attributed to the data 
collection process. 
5.2.3 THE DATASET (SEGMENTATION) 
In total, 25.7 hours of interaction were registered corresponding to 15 meetings, ten 
of team A and five of team B. Team A’ s interaction was in English, whereas team B’s 
in Spanish. The whole meetings were transcribed by native or fluent speakers. 
Transcription was checked twice by the researcher, and corrections regarding 
contextual information were made. 
A first issue to be considered regarding the dataset corpus construction is the type of 
transcription conventions to be used. The most used proposal is the one by Jefferson 
(1984). This system addresses a quite deep level of detail, considering various aspects 
such as the speech rhythm and tone, sound elongation, pause duration in seconds, 
and overlapping speech. Although such detailed conventions have served different 
types of conversational and discourse analysis, we consider that not all of them need 
to be addressed regarding our research. We agree with Edwards (2003), who claims 
that “the best choice of conventions in a given instance depends on the nature of the 
interaction, the theoretical framework, and the research question” (p. 321). Thus, a 
more simplified version of transcription conventions is rather applied, as the one 
presented on Table 8. 
TABLE 8. MAIN TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS USED IN THE DATASET 
Symbol	   Explanation	  
WORD	   A	  word	  put	  in	  emphasis	  by	  the	  speaker	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()	   An	  omitted	  inaudible	  part	  of	  the	  speech	  
(word)	   Transcriber’s	  best	  guess	  regarding	  a	  part	  of	  the	  speech	  
[information]	   Relevant	  paralinguistic	  information	  [gestures,	  pauses,	  
movements]	  
{interpretation}	   Analyst’s	  interpretation	  of	  part	  of	  the	  speech	  when	  
necessary	  for	  its	  understanding	  
 
The choice of these conventions and the omission of others are based on their 
meaningfulness for the utterances’ segmentation and codification in the present 
study. 
Segmentation is another issue that deserves a special attention in any dataset 
construction, as it influences on the whole process of analysis and interpretation. 
Various systems of segmentation of interaction data have been hitherto proposed, 
most of them considering as main unit of analysis: a) the sentence (Polanyi, 1988); b) 
the utterance, in the sense of turn of talk (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 1974); c) the 
message, in Bakhtin’s (1986) sense of utterance, i.e. a minimal unit of communicated 
content. More precisely, Bakhtin (1986) defines utterance as following: “its beginning is 
preceded by the utterances of others, and its end is followed by the responsive 
utterances of others, although it may be silent, other’s active responsive 
understanding (…)” (p. 71). In other words, an utterance can be composed of other 
utterances, in the sense of messages communicated to an active or passive addressee. 
Although the message generally is the most intuitively obvious unit of analysis for 
communication researchers (Poole et al., 1999), it requires a high degree of observer 
inference, regarding the start and end of a new message. This problem could be 
solved with the identification of the unit act with one of the coding categories, as 
Bales (1950) did, but “this affects assessments of reliability of both the unitizing of 
interaction and its category coding” (McGrath & Altermatt, 2001; p. 533). On the 
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other hand, a similar solution is applied –not explicitly, though– by one of the most 
known RST coding manuals (Carlson & Marcu, 2001). These authors, although they 
consider clause as their minimal unit of analysis, a series of exceptions is proposed, all 
having as a common base the following assumption: a segment is defined by whether 
a rhetorical relation between itself and a previous one can be identified. 
The problem considering the elementary unit of analysis can be summarized as such: 
on one side, it has to be functional, meaning that its relation to the coding categories 
needs to be clear; on the other side, it has to be self-contained, meaning that it cannot 
be defined with reference to the categories. To solve this problem, we define 
functionality in a double sense, so that no identification to one dimension is possible. 
More precisely, a new act is defined each time either a change in the propositional 
content is made, or a communicative intention is fulfilled. In both cases, a minimal 
inferred level of understanding from the other party is necessary. Simpler said, the 
analyst should be able to imagine that an utterance can be segmented in several sub-
utterances according to whether the “right” content is communicated and/or the 
“intended” function is fulfilled. This duality implies two functional levels of 
communication: one concentrated on the design task and its representation(s), and 
another focused on the communication task and its fulfillment. These two levels 
correspond to two of our coding dimensions, namely “representational act” and 
“dialogue act”, but they are not defined by them. Considering that each unit act can be 
either representational or dialogue or even both, the decision for each segmentation 
cannot be based on its pre-classification to one or both of these dimensions. Instead, 
once identified, it should by force be codable to at least one of these dimensions, and 
to exactly one of the pre-defined categories of each dimension. An exception is made 
for one-act-utterances that are characterized as non-codable because of their 
irrelevance to any of the coding dimensions. A complete list of the segmentation rules 
applied to the dataset can be found in Appendix 2.   
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A second level of segmentation refers to the sequence of acts. A sequence is a group 
of acts referring to the same goal. In our dataset, this goal is both communication and 
task-oriented, as we already said several times. However, an assumption in favor of 
the predominance of the task is adopted, because of its importance in guiding 
communication in the specific context. A task is defined by its object and the main 
design activity at a team level. Thus a task is changed when either its object or the 
main activity is changed. With object we refer to the cognitive focus of discussion at a 
specific moment of interaction. It is possible that a new object is introduced during 
another object’s discussion, without initiating a new sequence itself. Given the fact 
that this can occur at any time of a sequence, the possibility to define sequences 
based only on the object of interaction is limited. At the same time, it is also possible 
that the object remains the same, but the activity around this object changes. As we 
said, we opt for the predominance of the design activity rather than the 
communication activity at the time of segmenting sequences. However, being the 
design activity dependent on its object, the task of deciding when one activity, e.g. a 
generation activity, stops and another one, e.g. transformation, initiates, becomes 
difficult when both activities are focused on the same object, e.g. solution. 
To deal with these problems, we apply three main rules that define the succession of 
a sequence by another sequence in the same episode (Schegloff, 2007):  
One kind of relationship is another sequence of the same type but with reversed 
participatory alignment; the second kind of relationship is another sequence of the 
same type, with the same participatory alignment but a different item/target/topic. A 
third way in which a next sequence following a sequence close can be related yet 
separate is that it implements a next step or stage in a course of action, for which the 
just-closed sequence implemented a prior stage (p. 213). 
Adapting these sequence relationships for segmentation purposes in our dataset, the 
second relationship-rule applies for the case of object change, as we previously 
described. However, for the cases in which the object stays the same, the other two 
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relationships are to be taken into consideration. The first one is very relevant to our 
dataset, especially to the one of Team A, because of the greater number of 
participants. The main reason for this relevance is that the formation of coalitions of 
2-3 people is very usual in team design (e.g. Détienne & Visser, 2006; Visser, 2009) as 
in other cases of group communication (Mills, 1954). Thus, it is very frequent that a 
shift of sequence is accompanied by a shift in the consistence of coalition. Consider, 
for example, the case in which two participants have a discussion on an object, and 
then, “suddenly” the object is opened again to the rest of the team. These two 
instances, marked by different participatory alignments, are very possibly alleged to 
two different sequences. Although this relationship can serve as a potential indicator 
for sequence shift, it is not mandatory that this is true. The third relationship 
expressed by Schegloff (2007) comes in to fill this gap: in order for a new sequence to 
be initiated, some type of function differentiation is necessary. He refers to stages of 
action, for which the precedent is necessary to the subsequent. If a solution is 
generated, in one sequence, for example, it can be expected that it will be 
transformed or evaluated in another sequence. In this case, different functions 
operated on the same topic mark different sequences. However, as we already said 
previously, activity shift is not always easy to detect: communicative functions-
activities are also necessary. 
To identify and separate communicative functions at a sequence level, we are based 
on the notion of contribution, as defined by Clark & Brennan (1991): 
Most contributions to conversation begin with the potential contributor presenting an 
utterance to his or her partner (…So) contributing to conversation generally divides 
into two phases:  
Presentation phase: A presents utterance u for B to consider. He does so on the 
assumption that, if B gives evidence e or stronger, he can believe that she understands 
what he means by u.  
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Acceptance phase:  B accepts utterance u by giving evidence e that she believes she 
understands what A means by u. She does so on the assumption that, once A registers 
that evidence, he will also believe that she understands. 
It takes both phases for a contribution to be complete (p. 130). 
In the above excerpt, Clark & Brennan’s (1991) account of contribution, also 
followed in other studies (e.g. Clark & Schaefer, 1989) is presented. It is clear that for 
these authors the main communication goal is that of grounding, which leads to a 
mutual understanding between the participants. Such meaning co-ordination is the 
basis for any communicative interaction to occur, as we already made explicit in 
Section 1.3. However, in task-oriented communication, the task goal is predominant, 
thus co-ordination and collaboration on the task is the case in most interactions of 
this type. Still, the notion of contribution and its double construction of both a 
presentation and an acceptance phase are relevant also for task-oriented interactions. 
Nevertheless, some considerations need to be made. 
The first has to do with the complexity of the presentation phase. A major 
complication is that of embedding. As Clark and Brennan (1991) put it, “the 
presentation itself can contain distinct contributions each with its own presentation 
and acceptance phases” (p. 130). This becomes very common in team interaction, 
where a contribution is very usually made by different participants. The second 
major consideration is related to the complexity of the acceptance phase and, more 
precisely, to the phenomenon of sequence “post-expansion” (Schegloff, 2007). This 
refers to the non-completion of a communicative sequence after the second pair part, 
which is also very usual in team interaction. Whether a post-expansion is limited to 
the acceptance phase of a contribution or it initiates a new contribution cannot be 
decided considering only the communicative function. Think, for example, of a case 
in which the assessment phase of a contribution is followed by an evaluation-oriented 
contribution. 
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To solve these two problems described above, topic consideration is necessary, not 
only at a sequence level, but also at an episode level, as episodes are defined as a 
series of sequences on the same topic (e.g. Mcdonnell, 2009). However, again, the 
identification of topic shift can be problematic. At an episode level, this is mainly 
because: a) even if there is an agenda to follow (in Team A), an agenda issue can 
include several topics, or, on the contrary, the topic introduced by an agenda issue is 
not sufficient to sustain an episode itself; b) topics refer to object components, object-
related issues, or object-oriented actions, which all inter-relate to each other under 
the same object “umbrella”; deciding which sub-topic or related topic initiates a new 
episode is not always evident. This latter also applies at a sequence level.  
To solve the problem of new topic identification, we are based on the concepts 
generated, transformed, and evaluated by the participants. In each of these acts, and 
their sub-acts, there are two possibilities (except for the ‘generation’ acts in which 
there is only one): either a new concept is introduced or a previously introduced 
concept is re-taken into consideration. Transformation and evaluation acts 
necessarily refer to a concept previously introduced. However, it is also possible that 
a new concept is generated through an act of transformation or evaluation. To 
decide whether a transformation or evaluation act introduces a new concept or not, 
we are based on characteristics of the concept, basically answering two questions:  a) 
Is the thematic content of the act related to a concept which is further treated later 
on at least one more time by the same or other participant(s)? ; b) Does the act 
contain a concept which can be considered as highly relevant for the specific design 
object, either because it forms part of it (e.g. course elements, activities, 
characteristics, etc.), or because it influences in a way the design production/process? 
In both cases a new concept is introduced. How a new concept marks the initiation 
of a new sequence and a new episode is explained later on. 
As we already said, not all interaction taking place during the meetings observed 
interests for our research goals: some episodes are irrelevant, or not directly 
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contribute to the design task. These episodes, once identified, are not taken into 
consideration at the time of further segmentation and analysis. Among the discarded 
episodes, we identified the following types: a) free discussion episodes, usually at the 
beginning and at the end of a meeting, focusing mainly on issues related to the 
institution and/or its members, creating (if in the beginning) or confirming (if in the 
end) a relaxed, common-grounding atmosphere; b) action co-ordination episodes, 
focusing on task assignment/controlling, scheduling, or process management; c) 
cognitive synchronization episodes, aiming at confirming a same level of knowledge on an 
issue before going on; d) emotional synchronization episodes, aiming at sharing emotions 
somehow related to the task (e.g. expressing dissatisfaction about the collaboration 
with another institutional team); and e) non-design deliberative episodes. With the latter, 
our discourse on the deliberativeness construct (Section 5.1.3) is applied. Non-design 
deliberative episodes refer to episodes of interaction in which some type of team 
thoughtfulness or reflection is present, but without concrete production of relevant 
design intermediary representations, such as constraints, requirements, and design 
proposals.  
All design episodes of the types described above have been omitted from the dataset, 
as their analysis is considered irrelevant to the team design communication task. A 
special exception has been made for the cases of action co-ordination and cognitive 
synchronization, not in the form of episodes, though, but in the form of embedded 
sequences. Finally, only episodes identified as team design deliberative episodes have 
been considered as data for this research. The final dataset consists of 7625 
interaction units, grouped into 436 sequences, grouped into 51 episodes for the total 
of 15 meetings. The vast majority of data and the different dimensions to be 
described call for the application of an interaction coding process, rather than other 
methodological tool. The next section presents some of the main general 
characteristics of any coding scheme. 
 
	  160	  
5.2.4 THE CODING SCHEME 
The main rationale behind the use of coding schemes in group interaction analysis is 
well explained by Poole, Keyton, & Frey (1999): 
In this procedure, trained observers identify segments of group interaction as codable 
units and then classify these units within the categories of a predetermined 
observational scheme. Such schemes provide information used to determine the 
interactive structure of a group, the distributional structure of interaction, and/or the 
sequential structure among the categorized units (p. 103). 
The use of observational coding schemes as main Interaction analysis method has its 
share of critics, the most relevant of which is that it is somehow over-simplified 
(Bochner, 1978). Also, in coding systems where only one coding is true (or “more” 
true compared to other coding options), the question of multiple communication 
functions of the same message unit arises. Another issue regards the reliability of the 
chosen categories, as we already discussed in Section 5.1. Finally, the system’s 
internal validity in relation to the pre-defined research questions is another issue to 
be resolved. Such problems can be successfully confronted if the issues of 
exhaustiveness, mutual exclusivity, and level of categorization are taken into 
consideration (Trujillo, 1986). Subsequently, we define each one of them and, 
additionally, we explain how exactly they are treated regarding our coding scheme. 
Bales’ (1950) classic IPA system is an exhaustive coding scheme, because a unit act is 
defined as an utterance that fits one and only one category of the system. This is 
feasible with classificatory coding schemes (Fischer, 1978), in which a communicative 
event is coded as an act of a certain kind or class. However, in complex coding 
schemes, it is very common that an act is coded to several dimensions, all contained 
in each act to some degree. In this case, it is also possible that an act is “non-codable” 
to none of the pre-defined categories (the more dimensions are used, the less 
categories for each dimension are expected to exist) for one or more dimensions. 
Also, the selection of dimensional instead of classificatory scheme implies than only 
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certain dimensions of a communicative phenomenon are object of observation; thus, 
again, it is possible that some communicative events do not give any information 
regarding the specific dimensions. Certainly, this has to be the exception and not the 
rule, as a coding scheme is supposed to cover the phenomenon it analyzes as much as 
possible. 
Our coding system is composed of six dimensions, each one of them consisting of 3 to 
18 mutually exhaustive categories. As we already implied, the possibility of non-
codable acts exists, for the simple reason that there are events that do not directly 
interest our research questions. For example, utterances of possible signs of 
understanding form non-codable acts for our research, not because they are not 
meaningful from a communication point of view, but simply because their 
codification is not relevant to the theoretical constructs behind the coding 
dimensions. Instead, if “consensus” formed one of the constructs under analysis, the 
same acts could be considered as relevant, thus codable. 
The second issue, mutual exclusivity, refers to the univocality of each act, meaning 
that assigning a single code to each act should be possible. Applying a 
multifunctional, dimensional scheme partly resolves this problem, as the multi-
valence of an act can be treated separately, in different dimensions. However, still 
each dimension has various categories, which again should be mutually exclusive. 
This is not at all easy and coding decisions are sometimes ambiguous. This difficulty 
is resolved with fine-grained conceptual quality definitions, as exposed in the 
following section. Moreover, rules of distinction among categories, where it is 
considered necessary, are provided, supported with dataset based examples. 
The third issue, levels of categorization, is used in this research as a reply to those 
critiques against coding schemes, regarding the violation of the constructive nature of 
communication (Hawes, 1978). Viewing communication as a dynamic process, 
several levels of coding are taken into consideration. In this research, the following 
levels of categorization are applied: an act coded in relation to a previous act, an act 
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coded together with a previously (in the whole interaction) made act, an act coded in 
relation to the whole interaction, a sequence of acts forming one coding category, 
and a whole episode being coded as one type or another. Moreover, two procedural 
levels of coding are applied: a first level, concerning coding of acts in relation to their 
precedent acts, sequences of acts, and episodes; and a second level, concerning the 
categories of design-related arguments, user experience, and intermediary 
representations.  
The following section refers to the first level of coding, describing all the dimensions 
and categories that consist the coding scheme used for this research.  
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5.3 THE DROMEAS RUBRIC 
 
Al l  cod ing  sys tems  were  a t  one  t ime “new” and 
“cus tomizab le” .   
 
—MCGRATH & ALTERMATT, 2001 
One issue always faced by researchers contemplating the observation and analysis of 
group interaction data is: “should I select an existing coding system, or should I 
design my own coding system for this study?” (McGrath & Altermatt, 2001). Here is 
the response these authors give: 
To the extent that you are working from a different theoretical perspective than 
researchers who have developed earlier coding systems, and to the extent that you are 
examining different questions and/or studying different operating conditions, you may 
be well served by developing your own coding system. Particularly to the extent that 
you want to apply the system to micro-level features of the interaction of certain sets of 
groups that you plan to study, you may need to include coding categories, unitizing 
rules, and recording methods that suit your unique purpose and study plans (p. 540). 
Undoubtedly, the construction of a new coding scheme arises questions of validity 
and reliability as we already discussed. The reduction of the level of inference at the 
time of selecting among the pre-defined categories is considered as a main strategy to 
gain validity and reliability. However, the exploratory nature of the present research 
calls for the consideration of different dimensions and categories. We consider such 
complexity necessary, in order to give as concrete answers as possible regarding our 
research questions. Moreover, not being limited to a mere description of what is 
happening regarding one dimension, the constructed coding scheme searches for 
relations between dimensions and categories, giving an assessing power to the coding 
process and instrument. For this reason, we consider DROMEAS to be a “rubric”, 
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rather than a coding scheme, to put emphasis on its dynamic and distinctive 
characteristics. 
More precisely, the DROMEAS rubric (the name emerges from the initials of the 
dimensions applied) consists of six dimensions: (1) Design activity, (2) 
Representational act, (3) Object, (4) Meta-Epistemic reference, (5) dialogue Act, and 
(6) dialogue Sequence. The first three belong to the design task-process, whereas the 
second three to the communication task-process. Representational and dialogue acts 
are expressed at a unit act level; objects and meta-epistemic references are only 
marked when a perspective shift is made explicit through a unit act; design activities 
and dialogue sequences refer to a sequence of at least two acts joint together in a 
meaningful (representational or dialogical) way. 
None of our rubric categories corresponds directly to the theoretical constructs 
described in Section 5.1. This is not surprising, as it is an expected inconsistency in 
qualitative research. As Venkatraman & Grant (1986) put it: 
In most cases, the linkage between theoretical constructs and their measures are left 
unspecified or else described in loose unverifiable ways. In striving for a stronger 
degree of correspondence between constructs and their measures, a set of criteria is 
needed against which these measures can be evaluated (p. 81). 
Having said that, we divide the presentation of DROMEAS –meaning runner in 
Greek– in two parts: one explaining the coding categories (this section) and another 
explaining the functional relation of these categories with the pre-defined theoretical 
constructs (Section 5.4). In sum, a main contribution of the present dissertation 
consists in making explicit as clearly as possible the different perspectives and 
functionalities DROMEAS can support. 
 
 
	   165	  
  5.3.1 DESIGN ACTIVITY  
As we already said in the ‘Segmentation’ paragraph (5.2.3), the main criterion 
applied for sequence segmentation in our dataset is the design activity shift. Design 
activity refers to the team design goal expressed in a sequence of interaction. As it can be 
expected, a collective goal is not made explicit as such, unless someone –e.g. the 
Course chair– states it in order to guide interaction. In most of the cases, the decision 
on how the design object is treated by the team –which corresponds to what we 
consider as a team design goal– is based on the general impression of the analyst 
regarding what participants actually do at a specific moment of interaction in terms 
of design. 
Given the high level of inference regarding this dimension, the question of reliability 
is very important. However, two conditions are necessary in order to “correctly” infer 
the situated collective intention. Firstly, a very good knowledge of the context of 
interaction, in order for the analyst to situate herself in the team’s communication 
flow, and thus, be able to detect any change in this flow. Secondly, given the first 
condition, someone could argue that the best knower of the team’s goal is the team 
itself, thus the most adequate analyst would be a participant in the interaction. 
However, we consider this assumption not appropriate, for the reason that team 
participants are very much “inside” the interaction, and their personal involvement 
in the task can hinder their perception of what is happening at a team level. 
Therefore, we consider an external, but very much aware of the team situation, 
analyst as the most adequate option, even though this renders the reliability checking 
a more difficult task. 
On the other hand, speaking of team goal at a sequence level is not the same as 
speaking of team goal at an episode or at a meeting level, where some “internal” 
institutional knowledge is maybe necessary. We consider that the definition of team 
design goal as interaction proceeds is possible having as a basis the inter-personal and 
interactional context. Inter-personal context defines any shift at a team 
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communication level, whereas interactional context can reveal any shift of the object 
of interaction and the acts performed regarding this object. Considering these two 
context dimensions, design activity shift identification is possible and replicable (at 
least at an intra-rater reliability level). 
The categories describing team design activity in our dataset are few –only three– 
and quite different the one from the other. Adopting a Cognitive Psychology 
perspective of design, the following categories proposed by Visser (2006b) are used: 
generation, transformation, and evaluation. In the following paragraphs we present 
each one of them regarding team design activity at a sequence level. 
Generation/Presentation (pres). The goal of the team is to “make known” any 
relevant facts, possibilities, ideas, considerations, or plans of action regarding a 
specific design issue-topic, without getting into details, and without assessing their 
truth, feasibility, or quality. 
Transformation (trans). The goal of the team is to “make understand” a relevant 
fact, idea, or consideration regarding a specific design issue-topic, by getting into 
details regarding its acquaintance, adequacy, or need for taking into account, without 
implying, imposing or asking for any decision regarding its acceptance. 
Evaluation (eval). The goal of the team is to “make believe, accept, or discard” a 
relevant fact, idea, consideration, or plan of action, considered crucial or influencing 
for the design task/process. It is oriented towards decision-making, either at a 
conceptual or at an action level. 
It is interesting to note here that the goal of each team design activity is expressed as 
being a communication goal (this is why we also propose to use the alternative term 
“presentation” instead of “generation”, which is a more individual thinking concept). 
Three main goals are identified: make known, make understand, and make 
believe/accept/discard. The definition of team design activity with communication 
terms is necessary, because designing in team presupposes communication, in 
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contrast to individual design activity. In other words, what interests in team design is 
how the cognitive functions are communicated, and how communication influences 
on these cognitive functions.  
On the other hand, the fact that team design activity is always situated in a 
communication context, renders it difficult for an outsider to identify it. For this 
reason, we will not provide any separate example to demonstrate coding with each 
one of the dimensions. Instead, we will provide a coded excerpt of the dataset after 
the three design-based dimensions are presented, namely design activity, design act, 
and design object. In this way, the relations between them at a sequence level can 
also be taken into consideration. Subsequently, the same coded excerpt used for the 
design dimensions is used in respect to the communication dimensions, namely 
dialogue sequence, dialogue act, and meta-epistemic reference. In this way, the 
mutual exhaustivity between the design and the communication process is reserved.  
5.3.2 REPRESENTATIONAL ACT 
As said in several ways throughout this dissertation, socio-cognitive interaction 
consists of a double process, the one focusing on the social task, and the other 
focusing on the cognitive task. Moreover, a distinction between these two modes is 
possible, according to the socio-cognitive interaction analysis mode. Trognon (1999), 
for example, makes the distinction between illocutionary and cognitive aspects of the 
same act. Similarly, we make the distinction between ‘representational acts’ and 
‘dialogue acts’, adding the assumption that it is possible that an act is made only at 
the design content level, or at the dialogical interaction level.  
The term ‘representational act’ describes the nature of any verbal act that changes 
somehow the semantic-cognitive content of the object under discussion. Based on 
Visser (2006b), we propose the following list of design representational acts: generate, 
specify (concretize in Visser’s original proposal), detail, add, duplicate, modify, 
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revolutionize, merge (added to Visser’s original proposal), and evaluate. Table 9 
presents the code and definition of each one of those, as used in the specific dataset.  
The calculated inter-rater reliability for this coding dimension is considered satisfying 
(Cohen’s Kappa=0,72, Krippendorff’s Alpha= 0,7428). For the inter-rater checking 
process, two raters were used (the author and a “blind” rater). No previous training 
was given to the second rater, in order to facilitate enhancement of the coding 
categories’ definitions, on the basis of the rater’s questions for clarification, 
comments, and externalized thoughts. As a result, a list of details concerning their 
further distinction emerged (Appendix 3). 
 
TABLE 9. DROMEAS REPRESENTATIONAL ACTS 
Category	   Definition	  
Generate	  
<gen>	  
Introduce	   a	   first-­‐appearing	   main	   relevant	   element.	   The	   notion	   of	   main	   is	  
defined	   by	   whether	   this	   element	   forms	   part	   of	   an	   intermediary	  
representation	  (proposal,	  constraint,	  requirement)	  or	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  new	  task	  
or	  object	  introduced.	  
Specify	  
<spe>	  
Concretize	   a	   previously	   presented	   element,	   either	   by	   defining	   it	   or	   by	  
making	   explicit	   (aspects	   of)	   its	   qualitative	   or	   quantitative	   nature,	   without	  
expressing	  an	  evaluation	  towards	  them.	  	  	  
Detail	  
<det>	  
Expand	  a	  concept	  or	  event	  by	  listing	  its	  component	  concepts	  and/or	  events,	  
answering	   one	   or	   more	   “what	   else”	   question(s).	   The	   new	   information	  
provided	  is	  usually	  presented	  in	  an	  “and”,	  “or”,	  “but”	  relation.	  
Add	  
<add>	  
Add	  new	  information,	  such	  as	  time,	  place,	  means/tools,	  manner,	  or	  a	  whole	  
idea	  or	   event	   to	   a	   previously	   stated	   idea	  or	   event.	   In	   the	   second	   case	   the	  
new	  idea/event	  is	  added	  either	  because	  it	  is	  considered	  relevant	  or	  because	  
of	   some	   type	   of	   “logical”	   relation,	   such	   as	   cause-­‐effect,	   reason-­‐result,	  
means-­‐purpose,	   condition-­‐outcome.	   The	   goal	   is	   always	   to	   better	  
contextualize	  an	  idea/event.	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Duplicate	  
<dup>	  
Reproduce	   an	   already	   generated	   element	   by	   shifting	   the	   focus	   again	   to	   it.	  
Such	   reproduction	   can	  be	  either	   an	  exact	   repetition	  of	   a	   previously	   stated	  
element	   e	   or	   a	   clear	   reference	   to	   it	   as	   the	  main	   focus	   of	   discussion	   for	   a	  
second	  time.	  
Modify	  
<mod>	  
Transform	   an	   element	   e	   into	   another	   version	   e’,	   neither	   detailing	   it	   nor	  
concretizing	   it.	   Such	   transformation	   can	   either	   refer	   to	   a	   re-­‐
contextualization	  of	   the	  element	   (e.g.	  when	  a	  problem	  becomes	  a	  solution	  
or	  when	  a	  solution	  becomes	  a	  requirement),	  or	  to	  a	  change	  in	  its	  epistemic	  
status	   (e.g.	   seen	   from	  other	  perspective	  or	   replaced	  by	   a	   slightly	  modified	  
alternative).	  At	  any	  case	  a	  conceptual	  modification	  needs	  to	  be	  explicit,	  and	  
not	  only	  inferred	  
Revolutionize	  
<rev>	  
Replace	  an	  element	  e	  by	   its	  opposite	  or	  by	  a	  totally	  different	  alternative	  e’	  
that	   serves	   the	   same	   function	   as	   e.	   Revolutionization	   can	   also	   “stop”	   at	   a	  
level	  of	   revision	  or	   cancelling,	  without	  exactly	   getting	   to	  an	  alternative.	   Its	  
goal	  is	  to	  doubt	  or	  negate	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  concept	  in	  a	  specific	  context.	  	  
Merge	  
<mer>	  
In	  design	  made	  explicit	  visually,	  disjunctions	  and	  adjunctions	  of	  elements	  are	  
very	   common	   and	   are	   often	   combined	   with	   divergent	   and	   convergent	  
modes	  of	   reasoning.	   In	   the	  present	   research,	   the	   term	   “merge”	   is	   used	   to	  
describe	  each	  time	  two	  (at	  least)	  concepts,	  previously	  made	  explicit,	  are	  put	  
together	  in	  an	  effort	  of	  distinction,	  comparison,	  or	  jointness.	  	  
Evaluate	  
<ev>	  
Assess	  an	  element	  e	  by	  attributing	  it	  a	  value	  or	  by	  expressing	  an	  attitude	  of	  
towards	  it.	  Such	  attitude	  is	  usually	  related	  to	  expression	  of	  preference/non-­‐
preference,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   express	   doubt,	   reflection,	   insistence	   of	  
importance,	  etc.	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5.3.3 OBJECT 
As we already implied since the beginning of this dissertation, any act or activity is 
object-oriented. This object refers to a cognitive entity (group of concepts expressing 
the same value), towards which the representation is directed (or derived from, 
depending on what cognitive theory perspective is applied). When made explicit in 
discourse, object refers to a type of generic cognitive perspective that orients 
discourse for a certain period of time. In interaction, this can last from one unit act to 
a shorter or longer sequence of acts. In task-oriented interaction, it is very rare that 
the same object “occupies” discussion throughout a whole episode. Rather, it is very 
common that continuous attention shifts at the representational level take place, 
making thus explicit the versatility of the design object. 
Being treated as a discourse-based dimension, ‘object’ categories can also be 
accompanied by frequent discourse markers that indicate a representational shift 
towards a specific object category. Table 10 presents the main design object 
categories used in this research, adapted from Darses et al. (2001) and Newell & 
Simon (1972). Subsequently, Figure 14 presents a dataset excerpt coded with the 
three dimensions presented so far (design activity, representational act, and object). 
The excerpt coded and presented above is selected for being self-contained, in the 
sense that almost all its representational acts are related among them, and not with 
other acts encountered in different sequences, which is also very usual. 
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TABLE	  10.	  DROMEAS	  DESIGN	  OBJECTS	  
Category	   Definition	  
Problem	  
<P>	  
Any	   explicit	   reference	   to	   a	   concept	   or	   state	   of	   affairs	   considered	  
problematic	  for	  the	  design	  process/product	  
Solution	  
<S>	  
An	   explicit	   idea	   referring	   either	   to	   an	   artifact	   that	   can	   potentially	  
form	  part	  of	  the	  design	  object,	  or	  to	  a	  design	  action	  presented	  as	  a	  
solution	  
Goal	  
<G>	  
Any	   explicit	   reference	   either	   to	   a	   specific,	   team/course-­‐related	  
prescribed	  objective,	  or	  to	  a	  general	  idea	  of	  how	  the	  course	  should	  
be,	  without	  getting	  concretized	  into	  specific	  solutions	  or	  strategies	  	  
Method	  
<M>	  
Any	   explicit	   problem-­‐oriented	   strategy.	   It	   is	   distinguished	   from	  
solution	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   method	   is	   not	   a	   potential	   part	   of	   the	  
design	  object,	  but	  rather	  an	  action	  that	  guides	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  
process	  
Domain	  
object	  
<O>	  
Any	  explicit	  use	  of	  an	  existing	   tools,	  artifact,	  or	   resource,	  as	  guide,	  
model	   or	   help	   for	   the	   design	   object-­‐at-­‐hand.	   Also,	   any	   use	   of	   a	  
disciplinary	   concept	   as	   intermediary	   representation,	   without	  
“embodying”	  it	  in	  a	  concrete	  solution	  
Domain	  
rule	  
<R>	  
Any	   explicit	   reference	   to	   an	   existing	   institutional	   or	   disciplinary	  
procedure	  as	  relevant	  for	  the	  design	  process-­‐at-­‐hand	  	  
Task	  
<T>	  
Any	   explicit	   task	   co-­‐ordination	   or	   assignment	   between	   the	   team	  
members	  at	   the	  present	  meeting	   time.	  Also	   it	   is	  used	   to	   code	  any	  
design	   relevant	   past	   behavior	   of	   one	   or	   more	   agents	   (not	  
necessarily	  team	  members)	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The above episode excerpt consists of two design activity sequences, namely: solution 
transformation (lines 1-11), and solution evaluation (lines 12-35). The problem and 
task generation acts that take place at lines 12 and 34 correspondingly do not mark 
the initiation of a new activity-sequence, as they are focused only on one unit action. 
Thus, the main team object for the whole excerpt has been considered to be one: 
solution. Beginning with the first exchange between speakers G and A in lines 1-2, 
the reader-analyst can immediately understand that the object treated is a solution, 
mainly because of the linguistic indicators “can” in line 1, and “idea” in line 2. Also, 
knowing the context, Elluminate session refers to one of the tools used as resources in 
the under-design course, which was some lines before presented as a proposal for a 
specific block of activities. Knowing that, and also looking at the continuation of the 
sequence, we can further assume that the main concept treated in the first sequence 
is not the element “Elluminate session”, but one of its qualities. The quality 
specification starts in line 1 (“on their own”, “without a tutor”), but neither of these 
elements is further treated, at least not at a representational level. The main concept, 
“access”, is only generated in line 5 and being detailed later on in lines 9-11. Line 12 
indicates a shift to “problem”, marked with the words “difficult” (line 12) and “not 
natural” (line 13).  In line 15, the “Elluminate” solution is duplicated by speaker E, 
and in line 18 speaker A slightly resists to it. A new element of the course activity, 
namely “decision”, is introduced in line 19, and two functions (“icon”, “caption”) are 
added to it (lines 22, 27). Finally, a new task concept, “meeting”, is introduced in line 
34.  
The inter-rater reliability for this dimension is considered satisfying (K= 0.72). 
5.3.4 META-EPISTEMIC REFERENCE 
As we already said several times, the use of other voices in design is a relevant and 
desired process aspect. Such multi-voicedness can be expressed: a) at an inter-personal 
level, by making reference to something previously stated by another physically 
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present participant; b) at a dialogical level, by enouncing other discursive subjects, e.g. 
relevant persons or entities, not physically present; and c) at an intra-personal level, 
when the same participant changes her perspective, through using a different 
knowledge domain as her epistemic source at that moment. We consider all these 
three expressions of inter(intra)subjectivity of equal importance, and they are 
represented in our rubric in the dimension called “meta-epistemic reference”. 
Having said that, the “meta-epistemic reference” dimension entails three different 
concepts that are considered as functionally equal: the perspective, the conceptual 
viewpoint source, and the type of other voice. The perspective can refer either to an 
object-related or to a design-related cognitive orientation. Based on both the 
elements of the user experience (Garrett, 2003) and the ontology of design content 
(Gero & McNeill, 1998), the following possible perspectives are identified: content, 
function, structure, visuals, behavior. As far as viewpoints is concerned, these can be 
based on one of the following knowledge sources: Technology, Pedagogy, 
Management, Design, or personal experience, if no domain knowledge is used. 
Finally, the most relevant other voices are represented by the users, external (teams 
of) experts, and other physically present participants. Discourse markers help to 
distinguish between categories, but as they usually belong to a community’s 
specialized lexicon (Clark, 1996), some context knowledge is necessary for their 
identification. Thus, we did not conduct any reliability test. We consider these 
definitions and the complete coded dataset (see Annex) sufficient for their replication. 
Table 11 presents all the categories of meta-epistemic reference dimension.  
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TABLE	  11.	  TYPES	  OF	  META-­‐EPISTEMIC	  REFERENCE	  
Perspective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Content	  <C>	   when	  the	  object	  is	  perceived	  as	  its	  material	  components,	  resources,	  or/and	  their	  relations	  
Content	   function	  
<Cf>	  
when	  the	  object	   is	  perceived	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  technological	  or	  pedagogical	  function	  of	  one	  of	   its	  
material	  components	  or	  resources	  
Function	  <F>	   when	   the	   object	   is	   perceived	   as	   the	  way	   its	   elements	  work,	   as	   a	  whole,	   satisfying	   technological	  
requirements	  
Structure	  <S>	   when	  the	  object	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  put-­‐together	  of	  elements	  in	  specific	  positions	  
Visuals	  <V>	   when	  the	  object	  is	  perceived	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  graphic	  aspects	  	  
Behavior	  <B>	   when	  the	  object	  is	  perceived	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  actions	  (to	  be)	  taken	  by	  the	  team	  or	  other	  relevant	  
others	  (rather	  than	  the	  users)	  
Conceptual	  viewpoint	  source	  
Technology	  <T>	   when	   the	   knowledge	   domain	   where	   a	   viewpoint	   is	   expressed	   is	   related	   to	   technological	  
characteristics	  	  
Pedagogy	  <P>	   when	   the	   knowledge	   domain	   where	   a	   viewpoint	   is	   expressed	   is	   related	   to	   pedagogical	  
characteristics	  
Management	  
<M>	  
when	   the	   knowledge	   domain	   where	   a	   viewpoint	   is	   expressed	   is	   related	   to	   management	  
characteristics	  
Design	  <D>	   when	   the	   knowledge	   domain	   where	   a	   viewpoint	   is	   expressed	   is	   related	   to	   the	   design	  
field/perspective	  
Experience	  <E>	   when	  the	  knowledge	  domain	  where	  a	  viewpoint	  is	  expressed	  is	  related	  to	  personal	  experience(s)	  
Other	  voices	  
Users	  <U>	   when	  users’	  perspective	  is	  adopted	  at	  the	  time	  of	  uttering	  a	  point	  of	  view	  or	  when	  their	  reaction	  is	  
explicitly	  assumed	  
Expert(s)-­‐	  
external(s)	  <X>	  
when	   an	   expert	   or	   a	   team	   of	   experts	   is	   enounced	   as	   relevant	   to	   a	   point	   of	   view	   or	  when	   their	  
action(s)	  is	  described	  
Other	  speaker	  
<Sp>	  
when	   another	   present	   participant	   is	   quoted	   or	   explicitly	   addressed	   to	   in	   relation	   to	   an	   explicitly	  
stated	  point	  of	  view	  
Rest	  of	  team	  
<All>	  
when	  the	  speaker	  addresses	  the	  whole	  team	  asking	  for	  them	  to	  react	  regarding	  her	  statement	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5.3.5 DIALOGUE ACT 
Together with Bunt (1999), we define dialogue acts as the “functional units used by 
the speaker to change the context” (p. 141). These context changes can be of the 
following forms: linguistic, semantic, cognitive, physical, and social (Bunt, 1999). We 
consider that in order for a dialogue act to be defined, all its contextual factors need 
to be defined. 
Various lists of dialogue acts have been hitherto proposed according to their 
communicative functions. Table 12 presents four representative proposals of dialogue 
acts in task-oriented contexts. 
 
TABLE 12. FOUR PROPOSALS OF TASK-ORIENTED DIALOGUE ACTS (IN BOLD THOSE 
THAT APPEAR IN AT LEAST TWO PROPOSALS) 
Authors	   Task-­‐oriented	  dialogue	  acts	  proposed	  
Traum	  &	  Hinkelman	  (1992)	   Initiate,	  Continue,	  Acknowledge,	   Repair,	   Request-­‐repair,	  
Request-­‐acknowledgement,	   Cancel,	   Inform,	   Query-­‐W,	  
Query-­‐YN,	   Accept,	   Request,	   Reject,	   Suggest,	   Evaluate,	  
Request-­‐permission,	   Offer,	   Promise,	   Elaborate,	  
Summarize,	   Clarify,	   Question-­‐answer,	   Convince,	   Find-­‐
plan	  
Carletta	  et	  al.	  (1997)	   Ready,	   Acknowledgement,	   Clarify,	   Reply-­‐Y,	   Reply-­‐N,	  
Reply-­‐W,	   Instruct,	   Explain,	   Align,	   Check,	   Query-­‐YN,	  
Query-­‐W	  
Bunt	  (1999)	   Query-­‐YN,	   Query-­‐W,	   Query-­‐ALTS,	   Check,	   Answer-­‐YN,	  
Answer-­‐W,	  Confirm,	  Disconfirm,	  Inform,	  Agree,	  Disagree	  
Allwood	  (2000)	   Statement,	   Specification,	   Request,	   Question,	  
Objection/Hesitation,	   Explanation,	   Conclusion,	   Answer,	  
Acceptance	  
 
	   177	  
As it can be seen on Table 12, there are substantial differences between the various 
proposals of dialogue acts. Considering only the few common acts, it can be said that 
they all perfectly apply to information-seeking dialogues, but not to more 
collaborative types of dialogue, such as negotiative, exploratory, and persuasive 
dialogues. As we already said, the macro-goal of the meetings we observed is team 
design deliberation. Thus, the communicative functions of the task-oriented acts 
performed in this context have the macro-function of thoughtful team action 
planning. Of course, as we said, some decisions are taken less thoughtfully than 
others, and also, sometimes, planning is knowledge-oriented instead of action-
oriented. Nevertheless, the type of interaction we are interested in is always oriented 
towards knowledge-sharing, joint representation, and consensual decision-making. In 
such collaborative context, other communicative functions may interest the most, 
comparing to the ones presented on Table 12.  
Thus, following the general rule that “to the extent that you are examining different 
questions and/or studying different operating conditions, you may be well served by 
developing your own coding system” (McGrath & Altermatt, 2001; p. 540), we 
propose our list of dialogue acts serving the specific joint deliberation context. 
Moreover, these acts are defined with respect to all the five contextual dimensions we 
mentioned above. It is their different functions regarding all of these factors that 
allow the exclusive classification of each unit act to only one or none of the dialogue 
act categories. Table 13 presents the dialogue acts we propose and their definition.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  178	  
TABLE 13. PROPOSAL AND DEFINITION OF TASK-ORIENTED DIALOGUE ACTS 
Propose	  <pro>	   Present	  an	  element	  (concept,	  relation,	  action)	  as	  an	  appropriate	  solution	  at	  a	  given	  moment	  of	  
interaction	  
Explain/	  
expose	  <exp>	  
Enhance	   understanding	   by	   giving	   new	   information	   about	   a	   statement,	   somebody’s	   whole	  
idea/saying,	  or	  a	  new	  concept/tool	  
Narrate	  <nar>	   Inform	  others	  about	  a	  sequence	  of	  relevant	  (to	  the	  design	  task)	  past	  events	  of	  another	  person	  
or	  the	  speaker	  herself	  (the	  focus	  always	  being	  on	  the	  events,	  and	  not	  on	  the	  related	  object,	  if	  
any)	  	  
Instruct	  <ins>	   Show	  how	  to	  operate	  an	  action	  or	  how	  a	  tool	  functions,	  usually	  accompanied	  by	  gesturing	  or	  
manipulating	  objects	  
Verify	  <ver>	   Request	  for	  a	  clarification	  about	  a	  known	  or	  unknown	  (introduced	  as	  new)	  issue	  
Clarify	  <cla>	   Enhance	  understanding	  about	  an	  idea,	  statement,	  or	  state	  of	  affairs,	  either	  by	  reformulating	  it	  
or	  by	  making	  explicit	  information	  that	  was	  previously	  taken	  for	  granted	  
Conclude	  <con>	   Make	  an	  inference	  towards	  a	  statement	  or	  summarize	  previously	  stated	  ideas	  
Justify	  <jus>	   Give	  support	  to	  the	  credibility	  of	  an	  opinion,	  either	   in	  the	  form	  of	  evidence,	  or	  with	  another	  
opinion	  
Comment	  <com>	   Express	   a	   neutral	   opinion	   related	   to	   a	   previous	   idea,	   without	   explaining/clarifying	   it	   or	  
proposing	  something	  new	  	  
Assess	  
negatively	  <neg>	  
Express	  a	  negative	  assessment	  related	  to	  a	  previously	  stated	  idea	  or	  state	  of	  affairs	  	  
Assess	   positively	  
<pos>	  
Express	  a	  positive	  assessment	  related	  to	  a	  previously	  stated	  idea	  or	  state	  of	  affairs	  
Interpret	  <int>	   Exteriorize	  understanding	  of	   another	   speaker’s	   statement	  by	   reformulating	   it	   in	   an	  effort	   to	  
expand	  it	  
Postpone	  <psp>	   Cancel	  or	  delay	  acceptance	  of	  a	  proposal	  or	  plan	  of	  action	  
Agree	  <agr>	   Express	  concordance	  to	  a	  previously	  stated	  opinion,	  by	  repeating	  its	  content	  or	  by	  expressing	  a	  
simple	  (“good”,	  “nice”,	  “interesting”,	  etc.)	  positive	  assessment	  or	  acceptance	  (“OK”,	  “let’s	  do	  
it”)	  
Call	  for	  attention	  
<att>	  
“Alarm”	   the	   other	   speakers	   by	   expressing	   doubt	   about	   the	   truth	   of	   an	   opinion,	   or	   call	   into	  
consideration	  non-­‐discussed	  issues	  
Open	  <ope>	   Introduce	  a	  new	  issue	  as	  object	  of	  discussion	  in	  a	  natural	  way,	  i.e.	  without	  calling	  for	  a	  special	  
attention	  to	  it	  
Present	  
alternative	  <alt>	  
Present	  an	  idea	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  a	  previously	  stated	  one	  
Oppose	  <opp>	   Express	  an	  idea	  as	  an	  opposite	  to	  a	  previously	  stated	  one	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The nature of the above acts is not identical in terms of their (in)dependence in 
discourse. Some of them (propose, oppose, present alternative, open, call for 
attention, verify) are always nucleus acts, in the sense that they are self-contained 
regarding their communicative function. Some others (justify, explain, conclude, 
comment, assess, clarify, agree, postpone, interpret) are satellite acts, in the sense that 
they form functional units together with other acts, e.g. a proposal justification, a 
comment on an opened issue, or a postponement of verification.  Finally, the rest of 
the acts (expose, instruct, narrate) are neither nucleus nor satellite, but they serve to 
change the discursive genre, thus the whole flow of communication, by shifting the 
focus either to a “physically” existing cognitive object, or a series of past or possible 
events, or ideas. The identification of the latter can be done linguistically-
semantically, whereas for the rest the five contextual dimensions-shifts need to be 
described. Table 14 presents some basic linguistic-semantic indicators for the hereby-
called “genre-shifting” acts. Table 15 presents all five contextual factors for each one of 
the nucleus acts. Satellite acts, given that they are the most difficult to be 
distinguished, will be explained in detail right after. 
 
TABLE 14. DEFINITION OF GENRE-SHIFTING ACTS 
Expose	  <exp>	   Sequence	  of	  acts	  presenting	  a	  knowledge	  domain	  object	   (tool,	  
artifact)	  or	  an	  already	  performed	  solution	  
Instruct	  <ins>	   Sequence	   of	   commands,	   “if-­‐steps”,	   and	   deictics,	   used	   to	   shed	  
more	  light	  on	  the	  performative	  aspects	  of	  a	  solution	  or	  object	  	  
	  
	  
Narrate	  <nar>	   Sequence	  of	  events	  that	  have	  taken	  place	   in	  the	  past,	  but	  that	  
they	  still	  influence	  in	  a	  way	  the	  present	  task	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TABLE 15. DEFINITION OF NUCLEUS DIALOGUE ACTS 
Open	  <ope>	  
Ling.	   Indicators	  meaning	  “issue”,	  “subject”,	  “topic”,	  etc.	  
Sem.	   Present	  a	  new	  issue	  to	  be	  discussed	  
Cogn.	   Invite	  others	   to	   focus	  on	  a	  specific	  object,	   solution,	  or	  problem	  as	   the	  
main	  topic	  of	  discussion	  
Phys	   Read	  agenda	  and/or	  address	  everyone	   (or	  at	   least	   the	  meeting	  chair),	  
or	  express	  an	  intention	  to	  be	  heard	  by	  everyone	  
Soc.	   The	  introduced	  topic	  is	  followed	  until	  another	  one	  is	  introduced	  
Propose	  
<pro>	  
Ling.	   Indicators	  meaning	  “should”,	  “would”,	  “could”,	  …	  
Sem.	   Put	  forward	  an	  action-­‐oriented	  statement	  
Cogn.	   Introduce	  a	  method,	  task,	  or	  solution	  
Phys.	   The	   tone	  of	   the	  voice	  and/or	  overall	   attitude	   indicating	   that	   the	   team	  
should	  consider	  what	  is	  said	  as	  a	  proposal	  
Soc.	   Reaction	  at	  least	  by	  one	  participant	  other	  than	  the	  speaker	  
Present	  
alternative	  
<alt>	  
Ling.	   Indicators	   meaning	   “whereas”,	   “otherwise”,	   “the	   other	   thing	   would	  
be”,	  etc.	  
Sem.	   Present	  a	  “different	  than”	  opinion	  or	  an	  idea	  	  
Cogn.	   Focus	  on	   a	   solution	   conceived	   as	   alternative,	   or	   to	   aspects	   of	   an	   idea	  
different	  or	  opposite	  of	  the	  one	  discussed	  
Phys.	   Address	   the	   person	   who	   had	   previously	   presented	   the	   idea	   towards	  
which	  the	  alternative	  is	  proposed,	  point	  at/show	  objects	  related	  to	  the	  
alternative	  solution	  
Soc.	   Evidence	   of	   understanding	   by	   at	   least	   one	   participant	   other	   than	   the	  
speaker	  
Call	  for	  
attention	  
<att>	  
Ling.	   Indicators	  meaning	  “(yes)	  but”,	  “what	  matters”,	  “anyway”,	  	  …	  
Sem.	   Present	  an	  opinion	  that	  is	  worth	  being	  considered	  
Cogn.	   Shift	   attention	   to	   problematic	   or	   unexpected	   aspects	   of	   the	   object	  
under	  discussion	  
Phys.	   Put	  emphasis	  on	  the	  element	  that	  calls	  for	  attention	  
Soc.	   Reaction	  by	  the	  same	  (in	  a	  rhetorical	  way)	  or	  other	  speaker	  
Verify	  <ver>	  
Ling.	   Any	  indicator	  of	  request	  or	  question	  
Sem.	   Search	  to	  clarify	  an	  ambiguous	  object	  or	  idea	  or	  to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  
Cogn.	   Ask	  for	  revealing	  (more)	  information	  about	  an	  object	  	  
Phys.	   Make	   explicit	   the	   desire	   to	   know,	   e.g.	   by	   addressing	   the	   supposed	  
expert	  or	  by	  insisting	  until	  an	  answer	  is	  given	  by	  someone	  
Soc.	   Followed	   by	   a	   clarification	   or	   other	   response,	   in	   case	   of	   successful	  
verification	  act	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As far as the satellite acts is concerned, a main distinction should be first of all made: 
some (justify, assess, conclude) are potentially argumentative, while the rest of them 
(explain, comment, clarify, agree, postpone, interpret) are not. In a joint, deliberative, 
socio-cognitive interaction, two are the most important nucleus acts: the proposal(s), 
and the alternative proposal(s), where applicable. The condition that such proposals 
are justified, opposed to, or accepted as such is necessary for any public deliberation 
to take place. Of course, as we saw, other discourse genres are possible during design 
deliberation, either because of its strongly cognitive character, or because of it also 
being a natural communication (human cannot only be considered as decision-
making agents). So, similarly, acts other than argumentative are possible to take 
place, and also to be expanded in more than one unit acts, without forming a new 
genre-sequence.  
The notion of “macro-act” needs to be introduced here, in the sense it was first 
treated by Van Dijk (1977). According to this author, the same discourse function is 
possible to be expanded in more than one unit acts, and several micro-functions can 
be assigned to these secondary acts. As the focus of this research is not to analyze the 
totality of discourse functions encountered in the dataset, we will limit ourselves to 
one type of discourse, the argumentative discourse. The rest of discursive-
communicative functions will be just identified, without further analyzing them. It is, 
for example, possible that an explanation macro-act ends up with a summary of the 
concepts presented. The fact that the last act embedded in an explanation macro-act 
is a “summary” does not meet the goals of this research. Instead, the fact that lines x 
to y represent an explanation is relevant.  
Beginning with the non-argumentative satellite acts, a second distinction needs to be 
made: the exclusively acceptance acts and the potentially presentation acts. As we already 
saw, in Clark & Schaefer’s (1989) dyadic system of communication, each verbal 
contribution in a dialogue consists of a presentation and an acceptance phase. 
Correspondingly, acts belonging to the presentation phase of a contribution can be 
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called “presentation acts”, whereas the ones forming part of the acceptance phase 
will be called “acceptance acts”. The latter are also known as “feedback acts” 
(Allwood, 1999), and according to Clark & Schaefer (1989) can also initiate a 
presentation phase, but of another type of contribution (let’s call it a “feedback 
contribution”). For sake of simplicity, we stick to the primary contribution term, 
according to which acceptance acts do not initiate a sequence themselves. In this 
sense, the acts of “agree”, “postpone”, and “assess” can only form part of an 
acceptance phase, meaning that they cannot initiate a contribution –and 
subsequently a sequence, as we will see in the next paragraph– themselves. On the 
other hand, the acts of “explain”, “comment”, and “clarify” can also initiate a 
primary contribution themselves, or be central part of a presentation phase. Less 
frequently, they can also close a sequence, as part of an extended feedback (see 
paragraph 5.3.3). 
A last distinction to be made, regarding the nature of satellite acts, is between the 
content-oriented ones and the addressee-oriented ones. The traditional distinction 
between semantic and pragmatic language functions has been recently put in doubt 
(e.g. Renkema, 2009). This doubt is also confirmed in our dataset, where most 
representational acts are also coded as dialogue acts, and vice versa. However, it is 
possible that a dialogue act only focuses on the addressee, without generating, 
transforming, or evaluating the design content. Acts that are possible to be 
encountered in this form are: verify, call for attention, agree, clarify, postpone, 
oppose, explain, comment, and conclude. 
Having said that, the main characteristics of the satellite dialogue acts will be now 
given.  
Comment. Express an idea or opinion about a previous statement, without 
evaluating it positively or negatively. It can have various functions, such as: a) assess 
the content of a statement; in this case it forms an evaluative comment and is 
accompanied by the “evaluate” representational act; b) add now information to a 
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statement’s content without the intention of explaining or clarifying it; and c) express 
an opinion regarding the status of another speaker or her statement but without 
assessing or transforming its content.  
Assess (positively/negatively). Make a positive or negative assessment as part of 
a judgment. Such judgment can be an argument from positive or negative 
consequences or from alternatives. Sometimes the positive/negative assessment forms 
a judgment itself, what is known as evaluative judgment. Linguistic markers (words, 
phrases) are necessary in order to decide for an assessment (see for example Goodwin 
& Goodwin, 1987).  
Explain. It can have two main functions: a) make a whole idea more 
understandable, in the sense of “explain oneself”; in this case it is an addressee-
oriented ’explain’ act; b) add more information to a content, by extending or 
enhancing it; in this case it is potentially accompanied by corresponding 
representational acts. In all cases, ‘explain’ can also be expanded in more than one 
unit acts, giving itself the definition of a “macro-act”. As we already said, ‘explain’ is 
not argumentative, however, many times it is confused, as it is usually expressed 
through ‘because’ relations. To distinguish it from a ‘justify’ act – defined later on –, 
we can bear in mind that ‘explain’ often answers the question “How do you know?”, 
whereas ‘justify’ has a more sophisticated question: “Why do you say so?”. 
Conclude. The last relation/act/step of a (deductively valid) argumentative or 
explanatory inference. Almost always accompanied by the word “so”, without 
necessarily implying that each time there is “so”, there is also a ‘conclude’ act. 
Clarify. Give to (better) understand a concept or idea, without adding new relevant 
information to it, or by slightly concretizing the information given. Such 
concretization can refer either to conceptual quality information that is added to the 
concept presented, or to “hidden” background information that the speaker is asked 
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to (usually with a `verify` act) or motivated alone to reveal. Usually accompanied by 
positive signals of comprehension or by subsequent ‘verify’ act(s) by the other party. 
Agree. Commit to a viewpoint, by not merely accepting its truth (Allwood, et. al., 
1992). This implies some action-oriented content to which agreement is expressed, 
such as constraints, requirements, and proposals. Positive signals of comprehension 
and acceptance of assessments are not marked as agreements.  
Postpone. Delay action or decision, either because of external factors, such as 
technological problems during the meeting, or because the speaker-postponer does 
not feel ready, or has some good reason to postpone. It can be directed to both 
another speaker or the speaker herself.  
Interpret. Express active understanding towards another party’s statement, either 
by reformulating it or by adding information to it. In any case, the speaker’s goal is 
not to further elaborate the concept of the idea contained in the statement, but to 
show that the communicated message has been completely understood. 
Justify. Support a statement by giving evidence to it or by another statement that is 
considered valid and relevant in the specific context. Evidence refers to any 
numerical or nominal statement of facts, whose presence is considered necessary for 
the supported statement to be true. However, in everyday discourse the use of such 
evidence is quite uncommon. Instead, the use of types of reasons that are considered 
relevant to the specific context is more common. We have already mentioned three 
types of inferences strongly related to design reasoning: rule-based, user-based, and 
from personal opinion. These types of reasons are sufficient to support a design 
reasoning statement, however their necessity also has to be judged before assuming 
the presence of an argument. Replying the question “How do you know?” is a 
primary identification step. Of course, other critical questions need to be applied in 
order to claim about the quality of an argument, especially if it is of the type just 
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described, but evaluation aspects of argumentation exceed the goals of this 
dissertation.  
Oppose. Reject or reduce the truth of other party’s statement, or of oneself in case 
of monological argumentation, by presenting facts that render it impossible, less 
feasible, or less worthy of attention. It corresponds either to a counter-claim or to a 
counter-evidence. 
As we said, some of these acts (justify, assess, conclude) are potentially argumentative, 
meaning that they can support a nucleus act in an “argumentative way” (we will 
explain how exactly in Section 5.5). It is also possible, though, that the rest of the 
satellite acts we just described take the place of the nucleus acts; in this way, they can 
also form part of an argument, if supported by one of the “purely” argumentation 
acts, such as ‘justify’ or ‘conclude’. In one way or another, the search for an 
argument is not as evident, as it will be subsequently explained. 
The inter-rater reliability for this dimension is K= 0.71 (Krippendorff’s Alpha= 
0.725). 
5.3.6 DIALOGUE SEQUENCE 
The last DROMEAS dimension refers to what we defined as Dialogue Sequence. 
The dialogue sequence is a communicative activity, which can be more or less 
dialogical, depending on the number of active participants, and the quality of their 
communicative acts. We preferred the term ‘dialogue sequence’ instead of 
communicative activity, bearing in mind the fact that it can also be “monolectical”, 
meaning by means or through only one person, although the goal always being 
dialogical.  
Returning to what se said in the previous paragraph, a new sequence can be initiated 
either by one of the nucleus acts (open, verify, propose, present alternative, call for 
attention, oppose), or by one of the following satellite acts: explain, clarify, comment, 
	  186	  
interpret. The reason why these satellite acts and not the others can be considered as 
presentation acts is related to the acceptable (communication) distance between 
themselves and the nucleus they support. The acts of ‘agree’, ‘assess’, and ‘postpone’ 
are in strong relation to their nucleus, in a way that even if they are expanded, the 
form part of the same sequence. The case that a sequence has a genre-shifting act as 
a main act is also possible; in this case, we speak more of a monolectical rather than a 
dialogical sequence.  
Having said that, we can expect 13 different types of dialogue sequences, depending 
on their main presentation act, and based on the assumption that a communicative 
contribution cannot have more than one main presentation acts. Of course, as we 
said, it is possible that other presentation phases are embedded in the main 
presentation phase, but there is always one presentation that is predominant. 
Moreover, not considering the genre-shifting acts, there are two main types of 
dialogue sequences, following the same distinction of dialogue acts: the nucleus, and 
the satellite sequences. The satellite sequences are necessarily initiated by a satellite 
dialogue act. We use the term “initiate” to stress on the primary function of a 
sequence’s main presentation act. However, it is not said that this act is necessarily at 
the beginning of the sequence (see also Appendix 3). Another clarification needs to be 
made regarding the nucleus sequences: not all sequences having a nucleus act as a 
main act are also nucleus in their functionality regarding the other sequences.  
In other words, dialogical sequences are also related to each other in a functional 
way, constructing the “glue” of task-oriented communication. Among the five 
nucleus acts we propose, only three, namely ‘propose’, ‘present alternative’, and 
‘open’ are by nature nucleus, meaning that they do not need another act or sequence 
in order to be defined. `Verify’ and ‘call for attention’ can be either “glued” onto a 
previous sequence, or initiate a new flow themselves. Even though we do not enter 
into detail in that part, we consider it very relevant to identify the function of each 
sequence and its relation, if any, to the previous ones. Such macro-discourse analysis 
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is necessary in a context where dynamic communication emerges as such and not 
previously defined dialectical games can be applied. Instead, the function of discourse 
can serve as the basis for an in-depth dialectical or argumentation analysis. 
Before going on to further explain DROMEAS functionality, we present on Figure 
15 the same excerpt coded with the design dimensions categories, this time coded 
with all three communication dimensions. 
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5.4 DROMEAS’ FUNCTIONALITY 
Having presented all six dimensions forming part of the DROMEAS rubric, we will 
now present how DROMEAS is actually used in order to describe and analyze 
design-oriented interaction. We will do that in three parts: first, some general aspects 
of coding with DROMEAS will be presented; then a special focus will be given to the 
identification of intermediary representations, as we defined them in Section 5.1.4; 
and finally, a separate attention will be given to the emergence of arguments. 
a. Coding with DROMEAS 
Before proceeding to any coding, a first step, also discussed previously, is the 
segmentation of the transcribed dataset into functional communication units. A main 
difference between DROMEAS unit acts and other dialogue or communicative acts’ 
lists proposed is the necessity of task-orientedness of the acts to be taken into 
consideration. In any task-oriented interaction, people’s tasks is double: to produce 
meaningful for the task-at-hand contributions, and to co-ordinate such contributions 
in meaningful interaction. An act in order to be coded by DROMEAS needs to be 
either a design task contribution, or a content co-ordination joint action, or both. 
This double identity of DROMEAS acts, from one side, allows for greater 
independency regarding the units, as they cannot be pre-defined beforehand, but 
always on the basis of the specific interactional context. From the other side, once the 
analyst understands if the speaker’s main intention at the time of communicating is 
information-oriented or addressee-oriented or both, DROMEAS guidelines of 
identification for each one of the corresponding acts can also serve as guidelines for 
the better segmentation into representational, dialogue, or double-nature acts.  
A second step right after segmenting into acts is coding of the design object. This 
dimension’s categories, apart from being relatively easy to identify, can also serve as a 
guide for the rest of the dimensions, as they provide us with the very basic 
information of “what is speaker X talking about?”, always from a design point of 
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view. Design object is a representational category and not a topic discussion category, 
for the simple reason that it is individual-based and very colligated to the design 
representational act. This means that object shifts are possible and – it can be said – 
desirable, as they imply that “things are moving” from a design representational 
perspective. Nonetheless, although object shifts are usual, they do not take place as 
often during the same sequence.  
In fact, a sequence is characterized by one main design object, with other objects 
possibly embedded, but not expanded to more than two representational acts; if so, 
they form a new sequence independently. The idea behind this main segmentation 
rule is that a discursive sequence represents an activity, and as such, it is object-
oriented. When the object changes, the activity also changes. At the same time, being 
at a sequence level, a minimum exchange or micro-sequence level “deviation” from 
the main object is allowed and not considered as a separate activity itself. When this 
occurs in the middle of sequence, it is easy to recognize it and identify it as an 
embedded sequence. Instead, when it occurs at the end of a sequence, sometimes, as 
we already discussed in the ‘Segmentation’ paragraph (5.2.3), it is difficult to 
recognize if it belongs to that sequence’s post-expansion, or if the new micro-
sequence forms a sequence itself. 
Once this problem is resolved, coding of design (representational) acts is easier. A 
difficulty here is related to distinguishing the main relevant concept(s) and to “follow” 
it during a sequence. As we saw in the presentation of Figure 14, new concepts 
cannot be defined on the basis of only one sequence, but rather on the basis of a 
whole episode. In DROMEAS, not all conceptual information is interesting; it is 
marked only of it is a relevant for the design course element, and/or if it is treated 
later on in a specific way from at least one of the participants (it can also be the initial 
speaker herself). These two indicators of relevance are strongly context-dependent. 
The first one, for example, refers to the elements-relations relevant for the specific 
course(s) on-line. In Case 1, some main concepts are the following: Blocks, Activities, 
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Tutor-marked assignments (TMA’s), tutors, TLS (referring to the team responsible 
for media applications – the name, and all names referring to people or entities, are 
changed), Elluminate, Compendium (two of the tools used in the course), etc. In Case 
2, correspondingly, some of the main concepts are: competences, lists of competences 
(referring to a priori prepared lists prepared by experts in order to guide the course’s 
re-design), didactic plan (referring to the whole teaching program), EDT (referring to 
the team responsible for technological applications), tutors (in Spanish “consultores”), 
Wiki, Forum (two of the tools used in the course), MISA, MOT, Gibbon’s layers 
(instructional design concepts very relevant to the contents of the course), etc. Of 
course, not each time one of these concepts occurs in interaction, it is also marked as 
relevant. The final decision for these concepts, their components, and other emerging 
intermediary representations is based on the interactional context at the specific 
moment a concept emerges. 
Once the design objects and acts are identified, at an episode level, the design activity 
type can also be decided, on the basis of these two. Being the category with the 
highest level of inference, as we already mentioned, it cannot be inferred directly 
from the type of objects and acts. However, some general relations-rules do apply, at 
least in the specific dataset, such as the following: 1) the acts of ‘generate’, ‘duplicate’, 
and ‘specify’ are more related to the ‘presentation’ activity; the acts of ‘add’, ‘detail’, 
‘merge’ are more related to the ‘transformation’ activity; the acts of ‘evaluate’, 
‘revolutionize’, ‘modify’ are more related to the ‘evaluation’ activity; however, the 
combinations between them are more influencing than the acts themselves, for 
example a ‘present’ act together with an ‘add’ act is more possible to form a 
‘presentation’, whereas an ‘add’ together with a ‘detail’ form a ‘transformation’; 2) 
activities follow their “logical” order, namely present-transform-evaluate, but not for 
all design objects this order in necessary; solutions that do not appear as very 
innovative, in team interaction terms, can directly be transformed, without being 
presented first; also, problems, if they refer to problematic aspects of an already 
presented solution or method, can directly be transformed or evaluated; relations 
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between objects also play a role here, such as the strong relation between solution 
and method, on the basis of which an activity focusing on one can count as 
preparatory for an activity focusing on the other; “secondary” design objects, such as 
domain objects, rules, and tasks, can only be presented or transformed, if they are 
used as interventions regarding the main design process; 3) the intermediary 
representations’ identification is also related to the identification of design activities, 
as proposals are more related to the `presentation’ activity, whereas ‘constraints’ and 
‘requirements’ to the ‘transformation’ and ‘evaluation’ activities; 4) in general, the 
more “rich” a sequence-activity is, in terms of embedded objects and emerging 
intermediary representations, the more possible it is for it to refer to an ‘evaluation’ 
design activity. 
Dialogue acts can be coded together with the meta-epistemic reference. A first step is 
to identify whether the dialogue act addresses directly one, more, or all of the present 
participants, or whether it enounces the voice of a relevant “Other”, such as an 
expert, an external team/collaborator, users, or even one of the team members. In 
these two cases, the dialogue act is also dialogical, as we already explained in 
paragraph 5.1.2. In the cases in which the focus of the dialogue act is not a physically 
or virtually present addressee, but the design object itself, the perspective from which 
the object is viewed through each act is marked as meta-epistemic reference. There 
are two main types of perspectives: the general ones, referring to a whole domain or 
to the speaker’s overall experience, and the specific ones, referring to concrete 
epistemic aspects of the design object-at-hand.  
Deciding which one of a sequence’s dialogue acts will be considered as the main one, 
defining also the sequence type, follows a similar rationale as for the identification of 
main concepts. More precisely, as for the dialogue acts, two conditions need to apply: 
the importance of the act either for the design task or for the team’s communication 
or both; the relation of the act to the rest of sequences. A problem emerges as it is 
possible that more than one acts fulfill these conditions, however, we should only opt 
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for one main act for each sequence. A strategy to do so is to consider each sequence 
as a self-contained goal-oriented interaction composed of three parts: the opening, 
the main, and the closing part. In case the main dialogue act appears in the opening 
part, it should maintain an important place for the rest of the sequence. If not, it is 
possible that it is introduced at the main part, and also “provoke” the emergence of a 
closing part, either as a secondary presentation or as an acceptance embedded 
activity, although not necessarily. In some cases, the main dialogue act of a sequence 
appears only at the end, having the opening and the main parts as preparatory for its 
emergence. In case a sequence contains more than one presentation phases, either by 
the same or by other participant(s), the “winning” presentation act is the one further 
treated in subsequent sequences. 
Figure 16 shows an excerpt of the coded dataset. In bold, the representational acts 
considered as “joint”, regarding our view of co-construction explained in Section 
5.1.1. Regarding dialogue acts, we mark in bold: the act considered as main in each 
sequence; the addressee or enounced subject, when applicable. As far as the dialogue 
sequences is concerned, they take the name of the sequence’s main dialogue act, and 
a number indicating either their order of appearance, in case they are nucleus 
sequences, or the number of the sequence to which they directly connect, in case they 
are satellite. 
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FIGURE 16. AN EXCERPT OF THE CODED INTERACTION DATASET 
 
b. Intermediary representations 
Intermediary representations, referring to design proposals, requirements, and 
constraints, as defined in paragraph 5.1.4, are identified on the same coded excerpt, 
once the first coding with DROMEAS dimensions is completed. Regarding 
proposals, these can be related to any generated, transformed, or evaluated design 
object, introduced through any one of the nucleus dialogue acts. Constraints and 
requirements can also be introduced through one of the satellite dialogue acts. In all 
cases, they allege to representational acts, which are considered as highly relevant for 
the design product either because they form part of it, or because they lead to its 
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further specification. On the dataset, they are marked in different colors: green for 
proposals, red for constraints, and purple for requirements. Given its relevance to the 
eLearning design process, as we already explained in paragraph 5.1.6, we also mark 
those representational acts-instances that refer to the user’s perspective, without 
being alleged to a specific intermediary representation. User’s experience is marked 
in orange color. In the cases in which it is expressed in relation to one of the 
intermediary representations, it is only marked as meta-epistemic reference.  
c. Argument identification 
As we already commented, argument identification in DROMEAS is based on the 
combination of at least two dialogue acts performed on the same concept, that are 
related to each other in an argumentative way. Two things need to clarified here: 
what types of acts can together form an argument, and when we can decide that the 
relation between them is argumentative. 
At a first place, to have an argument, we need to have at least one of the previously 
defined as argumentative dialogue acts. These are: ‘justify’, ‘assess’, and ‘conclude’. 
These acts can serve as argumentative support to either a nucleus act, such as 
‘propose’, ‘oppose’, ‘present alternative’, and ‘call for attention’, or to one of the 
other satellite acts, such as ‘comment’, ‘agree’, or ‘postpone’. Sometimes it is also 
possible to have a design argument composed of only nucleus acts. Subsequently we 
describe the argumentative relations in each one of these cases. 
Possibility 1: ‘Justify’, ‘assess’, ‘conclude’ + nucleus act. This is the most 
potentially valid type of argument, as the dialogue acts of ‘justify’, ‘assess’ and 
‘conclude’ favor the existence of an argumentative relation among them. Such 
relation usually refers to some type of association (nonetheless, dissociation is also very 
usual in team design, see for example Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002), which according 
to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) can be of three types: quasi-logical 
argument, argument based on the structure of reality, and arguments based on 
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establishing the structure of reality. The first type refers to some type of deductively 
valid argument, in which the conclusion seems to derive from the premises as a 
natural and almost undoubted consequence. This, in an ill-defined context such as 
design, mainly happens when the consequence is strongly alleged to a design 
objective, thus, the fact that it naturally derived from the premises imply that the 
premises are the right way to lead to the goal. For example, in practical arguments 
containing a conclusion, this almost always corresponds to a desired reality, which 
emerges as a result from the nucleus act on which it depends. A representative 
example of a ‘propose-conclude’ argument of the quasi-logical type is presented on 
Table 16 (all examples form part of the dataset). 
 
TABLE 16. AN EXAMPLE OF QUASI-LOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Practical	  quasi-­‐logical	  argument	  
propose	   What	   I	   thought	   is	   the	   contribute	   site	   that	   	   I’ve	   set	  
up	  is	  just	  a	  way	  of	  quickly	  getting	  all	  the	  stuff	  online	  
conclude	   so	  everyone	  can	  see	  it	  
 
The second type, argument based on the structure of reality, includes association of 
succession and co-existence. Arguments ‘from expert opinion’ and some ‘arguments 
from analogy’ belong to this type. Table 17 shows one of each. 
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TABLE 17. EXAMPLES OF ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE STRUCTURE OF REALITY 
Argument	  from	  expert	  opinion	   Argument	  from	  analogy	  
propose	   Basically	   we	   need	   a	  
Java	  programmer	  
propose	   I	   mean	   the	   BBC	   has	   as	  
well	   they	   have	   a	   site	  
where	  the	  Podcast	  is	  on	  
justify	   that	  is	  what	  Peter	  said	   conclude	   So	   we	   can	   download	   it	  
from	  the	  server	  to	  iTunes	  
 
However, most arguments in design are neither quasi-logical nor based on the 
structure of reality, but they rather aim at establishing the structure of reality. 
Roozenburg (1993) explains the design reasoning as follows: 
A principal solution is an idealized representation (a scheme) of the structure of a 
system, that defines those characteristics of the system that are essential for its 
functioning (…) The act of conceptualizing the artifact is the determining of the 
variables, such that the conclusion becomes true. In other words, the designer has to 
conceive of the form and actuation of the artifact and, at the same time, to ‘construct’ 
a true conditional that connects this form and actuation to its purpose (p. 12-14) 
Having this double reasoning task of both constructing the reality and its 
conditionals, the designer mainly has two roots to choose from: either go for a 
routine design, meaning an already tried root, so that the level of inference is 
reduced; or go for an innovative design, in which the purpose is defined by its 
conditionals. A mode of reasoning very connected to the association towards 
establishing the structure of reality is abduction. In design, two main types of abductive 
reasoning are possible to be encountered: explanatory abduction and innovative 
abduction. “In explanatory abduction, it is assumed that the rule (of the syllogism) is 
given as a premise; innovative abduction aims at finding new rules” (Roozenburg, 
1993; 17). Table 18 shows, again, one example of each. 
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TABLE 18. TWO EXAMPLES OF DESIGN ABDUCTIVE RESONING 
Explanatory	  abduction	   Innovative	  abduction	  
Requirement	   The	   other	   thing	   that	   needs	  
to	  have	  some	  thinking	  about	  
is	  how	  to	  upload	  
Constraint	   you	   know	   students	   can	   just	  
go	  in	  there	  and	  do	  stuff	  
“Constraint”	   because	   I	   do	   get	   concerned	  
about	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   can	  
just	   like	   throw	   everything	  
out	   at	   the	   kitchen	   sink,	   at	  
their	   Compendium	   map	  
locally	  on	  their	  machine	  
	  
Requirement	   then	   that	   somehow	   is	   going	  
to	   need	   somebody	   to	   have	  
an	  overview	  
 
Regarding DROMEAS functionality, the first case is not coded as an argument, 
whereas the second case it is. Moreover, the constraint in the first case is not a real 
constraint, but the speaker’s worry about a possible users’ behavior. For this reason, 
it is not marked in red, but in orange, to indicate users’ perspective. On the other 
hand, the second case it is based on a constraint presented as real, more precisely a 
usability constraint, which generated a requirement in a practical inference mode. 
Possibility 2: Nucleus act + nucleus act. A special case of the design abductive 
reasoning mentioned above is when a requirement is followed by a proposal. What 
makes this case of reasoning special are mainly two things: first, it cannot be 
identified as a quasi-logical argument, as it is very similar but different than the 
constraint-proposal mode; and second, one has to be careful at the time of deciding 
whether the “derived” proposal is a sufficient or a necessary outcome (Walton, 2007) 
of the requirement, as it is expressed.  
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This type of argument is very common in design. Indeed, it has been identified as a 
pattern of design reasoning, namely “reasoning from purpose to form and 
actuation”, having the following form (Roozenburg, 1993): 
 Premise: q 
 Conclusion: p→q 
 Conclusion: p 
 
Translating this scheme into the design language, it takes the following main form: 
 
 Premise: A is a requirement 
 Conclusion: If action B is taken, A will be satisfied 
 Conclusion: Thus, action B should be taken 
 
Table 19 shows two examples of this type of reasoning. 
 
TABLE 19. EXAMPLES OF REASONING FROM PURPOSE TO FORM AND ACTUATION 
	   Explanatory	  abduction	   Innovative	  abduction	  
Requirement	   if	   you	   haven’t	   actually	  
specified	  that	  you	  wanted	  
they	   may	   want	   to	   link	   to	  
resources	  they	  found	  
Constraint	   that’s	  why	  I	  think	  you’ve	  got	  
the	  marking	  guide	  
and	   so	   the	   idea	   is	   that	   they	  
kind	   of	   do	   a	   kind	   of	   a	   visual	  
representation	  of	  the	  problem	  
 
Again, the explanatory abduction case is not considered as an argument, even 
though it combines a requirement with a constraint, whereas the innovative 
abduction represents an argument, and more precisely a practical inference. 
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Possibility 3: Non-argumentative satellite act + argumentative act. 
Finally, a last possibility of dialogue acts combination refers to the cases in which no 
nucleus act is present in the inference, and more precisely when an argumentative act 
supports another satellite act. In our dataset, this is very common when users-based 
or rule-based comments are justified; thus they form an argument, but not a very 
strong one, considering that such arguments usually do not involve any constraints, 
requirements, or proposals. In these cases, the presence of ‘justify’ act, rather than 
other argumentative act, serves as indicator. Table 20 shows two examples of rule-
based arguments following this form. 
 
TABLE 2O. TWO EXAMPLES OF COMMENT-JUSTIFY ARGUMENTS 
comment	   Yeah	   yeah	   (if	   we)	   want	   to	  
change	   some	   of	   the	   text	   then	  
they	  can’t	  say	  no	  
That’s	  a	  big	  problem	  
justify	   We	  are	  the	  customer	   About	  80%	  of	  our	  work	  is	  done	  
on	  Macs	  
 
In all cases discussed above, a common possibility is that the satellite argumentative 
act anticipates the main act. In these cases, arguments are marked in pink, to indicate 
that the first act appearing in the argument refers to a subsequent, and not to an 
antecedent act, as in all other cases. 
Figure 17 shows a completely coded excerpt from the dataset, with all colors 
corresponding to different intermediary representations (red for constraints, green for 
requirements, green for proposals, and orange for users’ perspective/experience) and 
with the emerged arguments identified in the dialogue sequence column; also marked 
in pink, in case they are “reversed”. 
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FIGURE 17. A COMPLETE EXCERPT OF THE CODED INTERACTION DATASET 
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6 .  RESULTS 
 
What  might  a t  f i r s t  look  l ike  a  s imple  dev ice  in  fac t  
turns  out  to  be  a  complex  o f  media t ions  – that  i s  o f  
coord inat ion  between s t ruc tures .  
  
—D’ ANDRADE, 1984 
The results coming out from the analysis of the coded dataset can be classified into 
two big categories: the exploratory ones, that could potentially lead to the construction 
of conceptual framework working hypotheses, and the descriptive ones, that probably 
apply only to the specific cases studied, but are considered relevant to the research 
questions. In the following paragraphs the most salient observations hitherto 
acquired, regarding both aspects of our research – i.e. exploratory and descriptive – 
will be presented. 
 
A) EXPLORATORY RESULTS 
a. Relation between design and communication processes 
One of our main research questions regards how and whether the design and 
communication process enrolled throughout team design interaction relate one to 
another. Before getting into detail in this relation, let us first look at the nature of 
each process separately. On the basis of DROMEAS dimensions, the design process 
is characterized by three main entities, namely: design activity, design act, and design 
object. Figure 18 shows the frequencies of each one of those for the whole dataset (all 
frequencies tables of both cases are presented in detail in Appendix 4).  
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FIGURE 18. OVERALL FREQUENCIES OF DESIGN ACTIVITIES AND ACTS 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 18, the frequency of ‘evaluation’ and ‘presentation’ design 
activities is almost the same (24.6 and 24.7% correspondingly) considering the whole 
dataset, whereas the activity of ‘transformation’ occupies the half (50.7 %) of the total 
team design activity. Considering the design (representational) act categories, and 
leaving out the unit acts not related to any representational act, a predominance of 
‘detail’ and ‘add’ acts can be identified (16.6 and 12.6% correspondingly), followed 
by ‘evaluate’ and ‘generate’ acts (10.5 and 10% correspondingly), followed by 
‘specify’ and ‘duplicate’ acts (9 and 7.8%). The frequency of ‘modify’, ‘revolutionize’, 
and ‘merge’ acts is considered low (5.8, 5.4, and 2.2%).  
In concordance with the design process, the communication process is composed of 
communication activities (dialogue sequences in DROMEAS), communication acts2 
(dialogue acts in DROMEAS), and communicative perspective (meta-epistemic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  We use the term  ‘communication act’ for the sake of simplicity and coherence with the design 
categories. The difference between ‘communicative acts’ and ‘dialogue acts’ explained in Chapter 5 is 
still valid.	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reference in DROMEAS). The frequencies of each type of those for the whole 
dataset are represented in Figure 19. 
 
FIGURE 19. OVERALL FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES AND ACTS 
	  
Regarding communication activities, the predominance of ‘propose’ is evident, 
occupying almost half of the total team activity (45.9%). The activities of ‘call for 
attention’, ‘explain’, and ‘comment’ follow, with a frequency of 12.9, 12.8, and 
10.8% correspondingly. The rest of activities are much less frequent, except for 
‘open’, ‘verify’, and ‘present alternative’ whose frequency is also low, but at least 
considerable (5.8, 5.5. and 3.5% correspondingly). As far as communication acts are 
concerned, a similar distinction between high, medium, and low frequency acts is 
observed, giving a predominance to the acts of ‘explain’, ‘propose’, ‘comment’, and 
‘clarify’ (17, 16.2, 14.1, and 10.1%), followed by ‘verify’, ‘agree’, ‘justify’, and ‘call for 
attention’ (5.4, 5.2, 4.1, and 3.9%). The rest of the acts appear even less frequently.  
Regarding the relation between design and communication process, a strong 
dependency (Cramer’s V= 0.362) between the design and communication activity is 
found. The precise relations between the different types of activities are presented on 
Table 21 (in grey the ones considered as more relevant). 
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TABLE 21. RELATIONS BETWEEN DESIGN ACTIVTY AND COMMUNICATION 
ACTIVITY TYPE 
 
 
Starting from the less strong relations, the one between ‘open’ and ‘evaluation’ 
appears to be quite weak. Instead, ‘evaluation’ has strong relation with the activities 
of ‘present alternative’ and ‘comment’, and somehow strong with ‘oppose’, which is 
also related to ‘presentation’ activity. Moreover, ‘presentation’ is strongly related to 
the ‘propose’ activity, whereas it has no relation with ‘clarify’, ‘comment’, and 
‘verify’. Regarding the latter, its strong relation to ‘transformation’ also appears to be 
salient. However, the strongest connected communication activity to the one of 
transformation is ‘explain’. It is also interesting that the activities of ‘oppose’ and 
‘present alternative’ have no or weak relation to ‘transformation’. 
Regarding the relation between design and communication acts, again, there is a 
strong dependency (Cramer’s V= 0.437). Table 22 shows the exact relations between 
design and communication acts (only the acts for which some interesting relations – 
in grey –, emerge appear on the Table; Total refers to the total of acts, including also 
the ones missing from the Table). All complete crosstabulation tables appear on 
Appendix 4. 
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TABLE 22. RELATIONS BETWEEN DESIGN AND COMMUNICATION ACTS 
 
 
Beginning with the quite frequent case (842 out of 4200 acts) in which no act takes 
place at a representational level, it can be easily observed that this happens mainly 
when communication acts of ‘clarify’, ‘agree’, and ‘verify’ occur. Other relations 
appear, such as: ‘generate-open’, ‘evaluate-assess positively’, and ‘revolutionize-
oppose’. Regarding the relation between the ‘evaluate’ representational act and the 
‘assess’ communication act, a clarification needs to be made: the first one refers to a 
specific concept expressed in a previous unit, whereas the latter is not necessarily 
alleged to the semantic content of a statement, but to the idea expressed through it. 
Having said that, it is interesting to note that whereas the ‘assess positively’ act is 
almost exclusively related to the ‘evaluate’ design act, the same cannot be said for the 
‘assess negatively’ act, which is also related to the ‘add’ act. Conclusions and 
justifications also have a strong relation to the ‘add’ act. Finally, other relevant 
relations are: ‘explain-detail’, ‘propose-generate’, and ‘comment-evaluate’. Most of 
these relations explained in this paragraph do not only serve as indicators of the 
inter-dependency between the design and communication process, but also, and 
mainly, may serve for the construction of a theoretical model of task-oriented 
communication, as it will be further supported in the next chapter. 
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A last relation we checked considering the dependency between design and 
communication processes regards the dimensions of co-construction and 
dialogicality. As we already explained in Chapter 5, co-construction in our dataset is 
expressed through those representational acts that refer or reply to the content of 
some other participant’s acts; whereas dialogicality refers to whether a 
communicative act focuses on the addressee or the enounced subject more than on 
the content carried in the act. Our question regarding these two constructs is the 
following: Are episodes with high or low co-construction also marked by high or low 
dialogicality, correspondingly? In other words, are these two constructs mutually 
dependent at an episode’s level? The answer is positive only for 11 out of 52 episodes; 
8 of these 11 episodes also appear to be highly argumentative (for the complete 
results see Appendix 4). 
b. Structure of team design deliberative episodes 
Regarding their overall structure and goal, the following macro-types of team design 
deliberative episodes emerge: 1) problem framing, 2) solution finding, 3) solution 
assessment, 4) method finding, and 5) method assessment. Figure 20 shows the 
frequencies of these 5 episode types in the whole dataset. As it can be easily observed, 
‘method finding’ is the most predominant type or expressed goal at a team level. 
 
FIGURE 20. DISTRIBUTION OF EPISODES ACCORDING TO THEIR TYPE 
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Considering the whole dataset, the following structures of design objects emerge at an 
episode level (with the help of and Object-Oriented pattern recognition software): 
‘solution-problem-solution’ (32 occurrences), ‘method-problem-method’ (29), 
‘method-rule-method’ (28), ‘solution-rule-solution’ (22), ‘problem-solution-method’ 
(20), ‘solution-task-solution’ (17), ‘solution-object-solution’ (17), ‘solution-method-
solution’ (14), ‘rule-method-rule’ (14), and ‘method-solution-method’ (14).  
A second level of patterns emerged is that of design and communicative activities. 
Regarding design activities, the following patterns are the most frequent in the whole 
dataset: ‘transform-present-transform’ (33), ‘present-transform-transform’ (30), 
‘transform-evaluate-transform’ (24), ‘transform-transform-transform’ (22), ‘present-
transform-present’ (20), ‘transform-transform-evaluate’ (19), and ‘evaluate-transform-
evaluate’ (19). On the other hand, regarding communication activities, the following 
appear as more frequent: ‘propose-propose-propose’ (20), ‘propose-comment-
propose’ (18), ‘propose-call for attention-propose’ (17), ‘propose-propose-comment’ 
(13), and ‘propose-explain-propose’ (12). 
Regarding the structures composed of at least two design or communicative activities 
focusing on a specific object, the following patterns appear as more frequent: 
‘transform method-transform rule’ (24), ‘transform problem-transform solution’ (22), 
‘transform rule-transform method’ (21), ‘transform method-transform problem’ (20), 
‘transform object-transform solution’ (19), ‘transform solution-transform method’ 
(19); ‘propose problem-propose solution’ (30), ‘propose solution-propose problem’ 
(23), ‘propose solution-propose method’ (22), ‘propose method-propose problem’ (22), 
‘propose problem-propose method’ (20), ‘propose method-propose solution’ (20), 
‘propose method-propose rule’ (20). 
Finally, we were interested in the patterns of acts and objects inside an activity. 
Regarding communication acts patterns, the following appear as more frequent: 
‘propose-explain-propose’ (38), ‘explain-propose-explain’ (37), ‘propose-explain-
comment’ (36), ‘explain-comment-comment’ (29), ‘verify-clarify-explain’ (27). 
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Regarding design acts patterns, we have: ‘detail-detail-detail’ (39), ‘generate-specify-
detail’ (25), ‘specify-detail-add’ (23), ‘detail-add-detail’ (22), ‘generate-detail-add’ (21), 
‘detail-specify-detail’ (20).  
To summarize, we have patterns of objects per episode; patterns of activities per 
episode; patterns of activities per episode together with their objects; and patterns of 
acts per activity. Regarding the first type of patterns, what interests most is the 
sequence of emerging objects, and not as much their number (as no comparison 
between design and communication categories applies). Table 23 shows the passages 
from one object to another in each one of the most frequent patterns. Regarding 
activities and acts, the summary of the patterns emerged is presented on Table 24, 
together with their frequency. 
 
TABLE 23. THE PASSAGE FROM OBJECT TO OBJECT 
IN THE MOST FREQUENT OBJECT PATTERNS	  
DESIGN	  OBJECT	  PATTERNS	   DESIGN	  OBJECT	  PATTERNS	  
P	   S	   M	   T	   R	   O	   P	   S	   M	   T	   R	   O	  
2	   1,	  3	   	   	   	   	   	   1,	  3	   	   2	   	   	  
2	   	   1,	  3	   	   	   	   	   1,	  3	   	   	   	   2	  
	   	   1,	  3	   	   2	   	   	   1,	  3	   2	   	   	   	  
	   1,	  3	   	   	   2	   	   	   	   2	   	   1,	  3	   	  
1	   2	   3	   	   	   	   	   2	   1,	  3	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TABLE 24. THE MOST FREQUENT EMERGED PATTERNS 
DES.	  ACTIVITY	  PATTERNS	   N	   COM.	  ACTIVITY	  PATTERNS	   N	  
transform-­‐present-­‐transform	  	   33	   propose-­‐propose-­‐propose	   20	  
present-­‐transform-­‐transform	  	   30	   propose-­‐comment-­‐propose	   18	  
transform-­‐evaluate-­‐transform	  	   24	   propose-­‐call	  for	  attention-­‐propose	   17	  
transform-­‐transform-­‐transform	   22	   propose-­‐propose-­‐comment	   13	  
present-­‐transform-­‐present	   20	   propose-­‐explain-­‐propose	   12	  
transform-­‐transform-­‐evaluate	   19	   	   	  
evaluate-­‐transform-­‐evaluate	   19	   	   	  
Total	   167	   Total	   80	  
DES.	  ACTIVITY	  +	  OBJECT	   N	   COM.	  ACTIVITY	  +	  OBJECT	   N	  
	  trans.	  method-­‐trans.	  rule	   24	   propose	  problem-­‐propose	  solution	   30	  
	  trans.	  problem-­‐trans.	  solution	   22	   propose	  solution-­‐propose	  problem	   23	  
	  trans.	  rule-­‐trans.	  method	   21	   propose	  solution-­‐propose	  method	   22	  
trans.	  method-­‐trans.	  problem	   20	   propose	  method-­‐propose	  problem	   22	  
trans.	  object-­‐trans.	  solution	   19	   propose	  problem-­‐propose	  method	   20	  
trans.	  solution-­‐trans.	  method	   19	   propose	  method-­‐propose	  solution	   20	  
	   	   propose	  method-­‐propose	  rule	   20	  
Total	   125	   Total	   157	  
DES.	  ACT	  PATTERNS	   N	   COM.	  ACT	  PATTERNS	   N	  
detail-­‐detail-­‐detail	   39	   propose-­‐explain-­‐propose	   38	  
generate-­‐specify-­‐detail	   25	   explain-­‐propose-­‐explain	   37	  
specify-­‐detail-­‐add	   23	   propose-­‐explain-­‐comment	   36	  
detail-­‐add-­‐detail	   22	   explain-­‐comment-­‐comment	   29	  
generate-­‐detail-­‐add	   21	   verify-­‐clarify-­‐explain	   27	  
detail-­‐specify-­‐detail	   20	   	   	  
Total	   150	   Total	   167	  
 
c. Relation between design and communication structures 
One of our first emerging questions was if the design episode type, as it was defined 
regarding the specific dataset, influences on the emergence of the design object 
structures discussed above. In fact, some interesting relations regarding type of object 
pattern and type of episode emerge, as it can be observed on Table 25. 
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TABLE 25. RELATIONS BETWEEN DESIGN OBJECT PATTERNS AND EPISODE TYPE 
 
 
More precisely, the episode type 1, ‘problem framing’ is more related to the 
‘problem-solution-method’ pattern. Episode type 2, ‘solution finding’, is more related 
to ‘solution-problem-solution’, ‘solution-object-solution’, and ‘solution-task-solution’. 
Episode type 3, ‘solution assessment’, is relatively more related to ‘solution-method-
solution’ and ‘solution-rule-solution’. Episode type 4, ‘method finding’, is relatively 
more related to ‘method-problem-method’ and ‘method-solution-method’. Finally, 
episode type 5, ‘method assessment’ has a relatively stronger relation to ‘method-rule-
method’ and ‘rule-method-rule´.  
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Regarding the relation between patterns, a dependency between design and 
communication patterns at an episode level has been found for all most frequent 
patterns. More precisely, some design and communication patterns appear to be 
relatively more related than others, such as ‘present-transform-transform’ with 
‘propose-explain-propose’, and ‘transform-evaluate-transform’ with ‘propose-
propose-propose’ (see Appendix 4 for complete dependency measures). However, 
such relation does not always make itself evident. In fact, there are team design 
episodes that favor the emergence of one type of patterns more than another. 
Moreover, this seems to be more frequent with the communication patterns rather 
than with the design patterns. In fact, a greater dependency between team design 
episode and communication patterns has been found. Table 26 shows the 
distribution of the most frequent design and communication activity patterns per 
episode and the degree of dependency (Cramer’s V) of each type with the team 
design episode ID. The Table shows only the episodes for which some interesting 
observation can be made. For the complete list of episodes see Appendix 4. 
 
TABLE 26. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOST FREQUENT ACTIVITY PATTERNS 
AND EPISODE ID 
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B) DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
a. Content type produced 
In accordance to our third research question, we are interested in three types of 
design content produced by the participants during interaction: task-oriented acts, 
conceptual viewpoints, and intermediary representations (arguments are treated 
separately in the next paragraph).  
With task-oriented acts, we mean both the representational and communicative acts 
that are clearly oriented towards one of the pre-defined design cognitive objects, 
namely: problem, solution, goal, method, domain object, domain rule, and task. 
Regarding their frequency in the whole dataset, solution (34.3%) and method 
(26.4%) are more frequent than the rest, which follow in this order: object (10.2%), 
task (9.4%), problem (9.2%), domain rule (9.2%), and goal (1.3%). Each design object 
is expressed through one of the 13 possible communication perspectives (including all 
types of DROMEAS meta-epistemic reference categories). That of ‘content’ is 
relatively higher (37.8%) regarding the rest, of which ‘behavior’ and ‘users’ 
perspectives stand out (11.9 and 10.1% correspondingly). The other perspectives 
appear even less frequently, with a salience observed regarding ‘content function’, 
‘function’, and ‘experts’ (7.6, 7.4, and 6% correspondingly).  
The frequencies of both design object and communication perspective are shown on 
Figure 21. 
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FIGURE 21. OVERALL FREQUENCIES OF DESIGN OBJECTS 
AND COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES 
The relations between expressed object and perspective (Cramer’s V= 0.254) are 
presented on Table 27. 
 
TABLE 27. RELATIONS BETWEEN DESIGN OBJECT AND COMMUNICATION 
PERSPECTIVE 
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As it can be easily seen above, the most evident relation between object and 
perspective is the ‘solution-content’ relation. This means that most of the solutions 
discussed by the teams are related to types of materials and/or resources to be used 
in the course. Regarding the other object-related perspectives, ‘behavior’ is more 
related to management issues, whereas ‘structure’, ‘content function’, and ‘visuals’, all 
seem to be strongly related to solutions. An interesting exception is ‘function’, which 
is also very related to design problems. As far as the other voices are concerned, the 
only relevant emerging relation is the one between ‘expert opinion’ and ‘task’. 
Focusing on the relation between knowledge domain and design object, 
‘management’, ‘pedagogy’, and ‘technology’ appear to have some clear relation with 
‘domain rules’, ‘methods’, and ‘solutions’ correspondingly.  
Regarding the intermediary representations, i.e. proposals, requirements, and 
constraints, their frequency in the whole dataset has as following: proposals occupy a 
55.35%, whereas requirements arrive at a 29%, and constraints correspond to only a 
15.35%. The exact frequencies of the perspective type in each one of the 
intermediary representations type is shown on Table 28. 
Some interesting observations regarding the relation between perspective and type of 
intermediary representation (in grey on the Table above) are the following: almost 
half of the total ‘proposals’ (49.3%) are based on ‘content’, which is also the most 
frequent perspective regarding ‘requirements’ (33.7%); ‘behavior’ occupies the 
second position in ‘requirements’ (21.2%) and the third in ‘proposals’ (9.7%), 
confirming some type of consistency between these two types of representations; 
however, the image changes regarding ‘constraints’, for which ‘users’ is the most 
predominant perspective (27.9%), followed by ‘management’ (17%). ‘Users’ also 
occupies the third position in ‘requirements’ (10.2%).  
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TABLE 28. FREQUENCIES OF PERSPECTIVES IN PROPOSALS, REQUIREMENTS, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 
perspectiv Frequency
Valid 
Percent Frequency
Valid 
Percent Frequency
Valid 
Percent
B 49 9.7 56 21.2 10 6.1
C 249 49.3 89 33.7 23 13.9
Cf 56 11.1 9 3.4 10 6.1
D 2 .4 3 1.1 1 .6
E 10 2.0 1 .4 1 .6
F 33 6.5 12 4.5 19 11.5
M 19 3.8 26 9.8 28 17.0
P 18 3.6 14 5.3 8 4.8
S 18 3.6 8 3.0 2 1.2
T 10 2.0 8 3.0 5 3.0
U 16 3.2 27 10.2 46 27.9
V 5 1.0 5 1.9 3 1.8
X 20 4.0 6 2.3 9 5.5
Total 505 100.0 264 100.0 165 100.0
proposals constraintsrequirements
 
 
b. Arguments’ type produced 
The total number of arguments produced regarding the whole dataset is 256. Exactly 
half of them are classified as “main” design arguments, because they correspond to 
one of the argumentation schemes described in Section 5.1.5. Among them, 
‘practical arguments’ (32 occurrences) and ‘arguments from alternatives negative’ 
(31) are the most predominant, followed by ‘arguments from negative consequences’ 
(22). Among the arguments classified as ‘others’, the three types of inferences already 
described in Section 5.1.5 appear in a great frequency, with ‘users-based arguments’ 
occupying the 20.7% of the total number of arguments. Also, four “new” types of 
arguments emerge, coded as ‘practical from task assignment’ (practi_task), ‘practical 
from alternative’ (practi_alt), ‘practical based on expert’ (practi_exper), and ‘expert-
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based analogy’ (exper_anal). All of them will be explained and discussed in the next 
chapter. Frequencies of argument types appear on Table 29. 
 
TABLE 29. ARGUMENT TYPES FREQUENCIES 
Main	   Frequency	   Percent	   Others	   Frequency	   Percent	  
practi	   32	   12.5	   rule_based	   40	   15.6	  
neg_cons	   22	   8.6	   person_based	   21	   8.2	  
pos_cons	   9	   3.5	   users_based	   53	   20.7	  
alt_neg	   31	   12.1	   practi_task	   8	   3.1	  
alt_pos	   11	   4.3	   practi_alt	   4	   1.6	  
analog	   13	   5.1	   practi_exper	   1	   .4	  
expert	   10	   3.9	   exper_anal	   1	   .4	  
Total	   128	   50.0	   Total	   128	   50.0	  
	  	   Total_arguments	   256	  
 
Regarding the relation between arguments and conceptual viewpoints, some 
interesting results emerge. First of all, we were interested in identifying the relation 
between communication perspective and arguments, as it can be seen on Table 30.  
 
TABLE 30. RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGUMENT AND PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Two interesting relations emerge (marked in grey). The first one regards the 
‘management’ perspective. Although it occupies only the 7% of the total conceptual 
viewpoints, 10% of it is combined with arguments. A similar relation regards ‘users’ 
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perspective. Although it occupies just the 8% of the total conceptual viewpoints, 11% 
of it is used to form some type of argument. It is also interesting that in total the two 
teams had 1111 viewpoints’ instances (lines), but only 362 of them contained some 
type of argument.  
Secondly, regarding the relation between arguments and intermediary 
representations, the only significant positive correlation is that between constraints 
and arguments, as it can be seen on Table 31.  
 
TABLE 31. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPE OF INTERMEDIARY REPRESENTATIONS 
AND ARGUMENTS 
 proposals constraints requirements
argument
_Y/N
-.228 .174 -.115
Pearson	  correlation,	  s igni ficant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level 	  (1-­‐ta i led)
Correlations
 
 
Finally, the combination of more than one intermediary representations in the same 
argument, where applicable, was investigated. We consider this characteristic as an 
additional indicator of design-relatedness, and thus, of argument relevance. In fact, 
81 out of 256 of the identified arguments are composed of at least two clearly defined 
conceptual viewpoints, referring either to an intermediary representation or to users’ 
perspective. Moreover, in 11 of them there is the participation of two speakers 
instead of one. The complete “argument map” composed of speaker, dialogue act, 
type of conceptual viewpoint, and type of argument is presented in Appendix 5. 
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c. Emerging task-oriented roles 
Different types of participants’ roles can emerge from the combination of specific 
DROMEAS categories with the ‘speaker’ category. However, we will only present 
the relations between speaker and the emergent ‘products’ of interaction, meaning 
arguments, perspective, and viewpoints. Such selection is due to two main reasons: 
first, because it guaranteed some degree of efficiency of the emerging role, and 
second, because of the relation of each one of these interaction outcomes with two 
main person-based task-oriented institutional interaction characteristics, namely power 
and expertise. 
Beginning with arguments, the following relations emerge as presented on Table 32. 
 
TABLE 32. RELATIONS BETWEEN SPEAKER AND ARGUMENT TYPE IN THE TWO 
CASES 
Team 1 Team	  2
Argu_type A B C D E F G I J M A B C
practi 2 5 1 1 4 6 6 1 4 0 30 7 18 2 27
neg_cons 4 9 2 0 1 1 5 0 2 2 26 3 1 2 6
pos_cons 1 0 0 1 1 2 3 0 1 0 9 0 1 0 1
alt_neg 12 11 1 0 0 2 4 0 7 1 38 10 5 1 16
alt_pos 6 4 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 14 3 1 0 4
analog 3 1 1 0 6 2 0 0 1 0 14 3 3 0 6
expert 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 7 0 3 1 4
rule_b 7 9 6 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 27 5 13 2 20
person_b 5 1 1 1 2 0 6 1 0 0 17 3 4 0 7
users_b 15 8 1 2 1 9 12 0 1 0 49 14 8 0 22
practi_tas 0 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
practi_alt 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 4 1 1 0 2
practi_exp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
expert_an 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
Total 58 52 17 5 16 26 43 2 20 3 242 50 62 8 120
Total
speakerspeaker
Total
 
 
Some clear argument-based roles emerge inside both teams, as it can be seen on 
Table 32. First of all, regarding Team A, it is possible to identify a main arguer for at 
least half of the argument types emerged. For ‘arguments from negative 
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consequences’ the main producer is ‘B’, for ‘arguments from analogy’ it is ‘E’, for 
‘rule-based arguments’ it is again ‘B’, for ‘person-based arguments’ it is G, and for 
‘users-based arguments’ it is ‘A’, who is also the main producer of ‘arguments from 
alternatives-negative’, in which speakers ‘B’ and ‘J’ are also active. The mostly 
distributed type of argument is the practical inference. Some clear roles emerge for 
Team B, in which both speakers ‘A’ and ‘B’ have a relatively high predominance for 
two different types of arguments, ‘arguments from alternatives-negative’ and ‘users-
based arguments’ for ‘A’, whereas ‘practical inference’ and ‘rule-based’ for speaker 
‘B’.  
Regarding the perspective through which the conceptual viewpoints are expressed, 
some interesting observations emerge according to Table 33.  
 
TABLE 33. RELATIONS BETWEEN SPEAKER AND CONCEPTUAL VIEWPOINT 
PERSPECTIVE 
Team 1 Team	  2
Perspective A B C D E F G H I J M A B C
B 12 11 4 2 3 12 11 0 0 2 0 57 15 39 3 57
C 30 4 1 3 13 17 18 0 3 8 1 98 119 135 5 259
Cf 17 7 0 0 3 2 12 0 3 8 1 53 10 8 1 19
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 2 1 0 3
E 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 1 7
F 19 16 0 3 8 4 6 0 0 5 0 61 0 0 1 1
M 8 19 8 1 0 1 10 1 0 1 2 51 12 11 0 23
P 6 2 0 2 2 6 3 0 0 1 0 22 4 13 0 17
S 7 3 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 16 11 1 0 12
T 3 6 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 13 2 3 4 9
U 18 8 2 2 1 6 15 0 1 15 1 69 12 8 0 20
V 5 1 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 12 1 0 0 1
X 5 10 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 22 5 8 0 13
Total 130 87 19 14 35 55 84 1 8 42 7 482 197 229 15 441
Speaker
Total
speaker
Total
 
 
As we can see above, Team A has a quite different image than Team B, mostly 
regarding the fact of ‘perspective accumulation’ in one person, ‘A’, who also 
corresponds to the Course Team Chair. Interestingly, though, the leader’s 
‘multiperspectivism’ allows for the emergence of various perspectives also in other 
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participants: it can be easily observed that perspective distribution is high also for 
speakers ‘F’, ‘G’, and somehow for ‘E’. Moreover, speaker ‘F’ shares the 
predominance of ‘Pedagogy’ perspective with speaker ‘A’, and speakers ‘G’ and ‘J’ 
are also relatively high regarding ‘users’ perspective. Finally, two saliences 
characterize speaker ‘B’ of Team A, regarding ‘management’ perspective and 
‘expert’s voice’. It should be noted here that speaker B participates in the meetings as 
representative of another institutional team. Regarding Team B, speaker ‘B’ stands 
out for the ‘content’, ‘behavior’, and ‘pedagogy’ perspectives, whereas speaker ‘A’ 
predominates regarding ‘structure’, shares the ‘content’ perspective viewpoints with 
speaker ‘B’, and shows somehow greater ‘multiperspectivism’, even though he 
participates with less viewpoints. Finally, speaker ‘C’ is the most active participant 
regarding ‘task’ perspective. 
Last but not least, the relations between speaker and viewpoint type were 
investigated. A type of ‘responsibility sharing’ between two participants appears as 
relevant in both teams. In Team A, it regards the division of ‘constraints’ and 
‘requirements’ among speakers ‘A’ and ‘B’, and in Team B, it refers to the division of 
‘proposals’ and ‘constraints’ again between speakers ‘A’ and ‘B’. However, a main 
difference is noted regarding the most remarkable salience of the relation speaker-
viewpoint, as it can be seen on Table 34: in Team A, such salience regards 
‘proposals’ and speaker ‘A’, whereas in Team B, it regards ‘requirements’ and 
speaker ‘B’. Another interesting observation emerges from Team A, and more 
precisely, the very active participation in the production of proposals of two other 
speakers, rather than ‘A’ and ‘B’, namely ‘G’ and ‘F’. The same is not observed for 
Team B, in which proposals’ expression is shared between speakers ‘A’ and ‘B’. 
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TABLE 34. RELATIONS BETWEEN SPEAKER AND VIEWPOINT TYPE  
Team 1 Team	  2
Viewpoints A B C D E F G H I J M A B C
proposals 82 30 7 3 20 33 53 0 3 20 2 253 119 122 8 249
constraints 21 24 5 4 6 5 9 1 2 7 1 85 26 28 3 57
requirements 33 25 4 3 8 16 18 0 1 15 2 125 59 76 3 138
Total 136 79 16 10 34 54 80 1 6 42 5 463 204 226 14 444
speaker speaker
TotalTotal
 
 
C) SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
a. Relation between design and communication processes 
There is a strong relation between the design and the communication process at both 
a macro and micro level.  Table 35 shows the summary of the most interesting 
relation (always in relation to the others). 
TABLE 35. SUMMARY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN DESIGN AND COMMUNICATION 
ACTS AND ACTIVITIES 
Design	  activity	   Communication	  activity	  
Strong	  (+)	   Weak	  (-­‐)	  
evaluation	   present	  alternative,	  comment,	  oppose	   open	  
presentation	   propose,	  oppose	   clarify,	  comment,	  verify	  
transformation	   explain,	  verify	   oppose,	  present	  alternative	  
Design	  act	   Communication	  act	  (+)	  
no	  act	   clarify,	  agree,	  verify	  
generate	   open	  
evaluate	   assess	  positively,	  comment	  
add	   assess	  negatively,	  conclude,	  justify	  
revolutionize	   oppose	  
detail	   explain	  
generate	   propose	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Finally, regarding the design construct of ‘co-construction’ and the communication 
construct of ‘dialogicality’ no strong relation has been found, implying that more co-
constructive episodes are not always the most dialogical ones. However, in the 
episodes where some dependency is identified, the number of arguments is also 
increased. 
b. Structure of team design deliberative episodes 
First of all regarding the structure of the whole dataset, the following types of 
episodes are identified, in order of frequency: method finding, solution finding, 
solution assessment, problem framing, and method assessment. Regarding the 
structure of episodes, independently of their type, interesting patterns emerged 
regarding objects, activities, and acts.  
Nine of the ten of the emerged types of design object patterns are circular, meaning 
that their first and last object is the same. This mostly happens with solutions and 
methods, meaning that most of the patterns are either solution- or method-based. 
The in-between object varies. The only linear pattern is the ‘problem-solution-
method’ pattern. 
Circularity is also the main characteristic regarding design and communication 
activity patterns, as 74.9% (corresponding to 185 out of 247 occurrences) of the total 
patterns are of this type. Moreover, in all of the activity patterns one of the 
components is repeated at least twice. This repetition becomes the rule without 
exception when, together with the activity, we also take into consideration the object. 
The two most predominant activities, the ‘transformation’ design activity and the 
‘propose’ communication activity, systematically follow one another at an episode 
level. It is interesting to observe, though, that however similar they are in their 
repetition, the same does not apply for their accompanying object. The only 
similarities for the ‘transform’ and ‘propose’ patterns regard the following sequences 
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of objects: ‘problem-solution’, ‘solution-method’, ‘method-problem’, and ‘method-
rule’. 
Finally, regarding patterns of acts inside an activity, all phenomena of circularity, 
repetition, and linearity are possible, as it is summarized on Table 36. 
 
TABLE 36. QUALITIES OF DESIGN AND COMMUNICATION ACT PATTERNS 
Qualities	   Design	  patterns	   Communication	  patterns	  
Circularity	   detail-­‐add-­‐detail,	  detail-­‐specify-­‐
detail	  
propose-­‐explain-­‐propose,	  
explain-­‐propose-­‐explain	  
Repetition	   detail-­‐detail-­‐detail	   explain-­‐comment-­‐comment	  
Linearity	   generate-­‐specify-­‐detail,	  specify-­‐
detail-­‐add,	  generate-­‐detail-­‐add	  
propose-­‐explain-­‐comment,	  
verify-­‐clarify-­‐explain	  
 
c. Relation between design and communication structures 
Regarding the relation between design and communication structures, the following 
can be said: a) the team design goal type favors the emergence of certain design 
object patterns than others, b) interdependency between design and communication 
patterns exists, but c) design patterns are more equally distributed throughout the 
episodes, whereas the manifestation of certain communication patterns more than 
others depends on the episode. 
 
d. Content type produced 
Regarding the type of task-oriented acts, as they were expressed in the dataset, 
solution- and method-oriented acts occupy more than the half of the total number, 
whereas ‘problem’ is not so often (only 9.2%) and ‘goal’ is hardly made explicit 
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(1.3%). To speak of ‘conceptual viewpoints’ in our dataset, the manifestation of a 
task-oriented act is not sufficient; some type of intermediary representation or 
argument expressed together with a communication perspective is necessary. Table 
37 shows a summary of the most interesting (in comparison to the rest) relations 
between type of communication perspective and type of content (letters in the vertical 
column correspond to the design objects’ codes, whereas letters in the horizontal line 
refer to perspective codes). The last four lines are also types of conceptual viewpoints. 
 
TABLE 37. TYPES OF CONCEPTUAL VIEWPOINTS PRODUCED 
Content	  
Type	  
	  
Communication	  perspective	  
B	   C	   F	   Cf	   S	   V	   U	   X	   M	   T	   P	  
M	   ✓	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   ✓	  
P	   	   	   ✓	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
R	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   ✓	   	   	  
S	   	   ✓	   	   ✓	   ✓	   ✓	   	   	   	   ✓	   	  
T	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   ✓	   	   	   	  
Propos.	   ✓	   ✓	   	   ✓	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Require.	   ✓	   ✓	   	   	   	   	   ✓	   	   	   	   	  
Constr.	   	   ✓	   	   	   	   	   ✓	   	   ✓	   	   	  
Argum.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   ✓	   	   ✓	   	   	  
 
e. Arguments’ type produced 
Arguments are studied in depth separately due to their relevance to team design 
communication as we already saw in the theoretical part. Two findings are 
considered of interest regarding our research questions: a) the type of emerged 
argument structures, and b) their relation to conceptual viewpoints. Regarding 
their type, the most frequent arguments are: ‘users-based’, ‘rule-based’, 
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‘practical’, ‘from alternatives-negative’, and ‘from negative consequences’. Also, 
distinguishing between “authentic” arguments –the ones for which some pre-
defined form exists– and “emerging” arguments, we observe that they are equally 
distributed. Finally, regarding their proportion in the dataset, they are few 
compared to the total number of unit acts (4.8%), but sufficiently evident 
regarding the total number of conceptual viewpoints (32.6%). More precisely, the 
31.6% of the emerged arguments are composed of at least two conceptual 
viewpoints, including intermediary representations and users’ perspective. Among 
the first, constraints appear to have the strongest relation to arguments’ 
manifestation. 
f. Emerging task-oriented roles 
Clear roles emerged regarding types of arguments, conceptual viewpoints, and 
intermediary representations for both teams (less obviously for Team B due to the 
small number of participants). A common pattern regarding both teams is the 
accumulative production of intermediary representations by co-alitions of 2 to 3 
(in Team A) participants. However, the equality or not of their distribution differs 
between the teams and the type of representation. 
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7 .  DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the dissertation’s main results presented previously, 
through a double perspective, according to our research goals. First, regarding the 
eLearning design context and the support of professional teams involved in it; and 
second, from a point of view of task-oriented interaction analysis methodological 
contribution. 
 
A) eLEARNING DESIGN IN TEAMS 
In general, eLearning design in teams shares many characteristics with team design in 
other professional fields. As we saw in Chapter 2, team design is a non-linear process, 
that can rather be described in terms of activities than pre-defined stages, and in which 
patterns of communication emerge. In fact, our observations of the two eLearning design 
teams confirm all of these characteristics. As far as non-linearity is concerned, most of 
the observed patterns are circular. Linearity is only observed at some micro-level 
patterns, regarding acts inside activities. In general, circularity is the rule in patterns of 
design objects, and of both design and communication activities. Object and activity are 
the main components of any task-oriented system, as we argued in Chapter 1. Our 
results provide strong evidence that team design systems tend to re-produce the same 
objects and activities in order to refine or reach their goals. This has already been 
conceptualized partly through the notions of “co-evolution” (Dorst & Cross, 2001) or 
“cycles of activity” (Cross, 2001) in the Design Research field, and also through the 
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findings about problem-solution cycles (Poole, 1983b) and decision recycles (Poole & 
Roth, 1989) in the Small Group Communication field. Our research provides evidence 
of this phenomenon also at a more fine-grained level of analysis.  
Another aspect of team design activity already discussed in the theoretical part is that it is 
not exclusively based on problem solving. This was confirmed in our research through 
the predominance of ‘solutions’ and ‘methods’ among the possible design objects. These 
are not only the most frequent cognitive orientations, but also are the protagonists in 
most of the patterns emerged. However, an interesting result regarding ‘problems’ also 
emerged. Although their distribution in the dataset is low in comparison to the other 
objects, they form part of the most frequent design object patterns, and of most of the 
object-oriented activity patterns. In addition, the only linear object pattern emerged is 
the ‘problem-solution-method’ pattern. All these results considered together lead to one 
observation: problem solving is one of the most important reasoning patterns in 
eLearning design teams. In fact, all five episode types emerged (i.e. problem framing, 
solution finding, solution assessment, method finding, and method assessment) relate in 
one way or another to problem solving. 
In addition to these re-confirmed observations, this study makes another contribution as 
result of the method of analysis used. As we already discussed in Chapter 5, one of the 
major issues that Interaction analysis has touched is the independent coding of the 
cognitive and the social dimensions (Trognon, 1999). Applying this method to our 
dataset, we were not only able to describe in depth both processes, but also to identify 
the relation between them. In fact, a strong interdependency between the design and 
communication processes at many levels (acts, activities, patterns) has been found. In 
addition, regarding the nature of these processes, it seems that the design structures 
depend on the design goal, but the same cannot be said for the communication 
structures. The latter appear to be more “serendipitous” in terms of their context of 
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manifestation. In fact, some of them appear to be concentrated in certain episodes and 
totally absent in others. The same does not happen with the design patterns, which are 
more distributed throughout the dataset. This result may guide us to assume that most 
relations observed between design and communication structures at an episode level, 
depend on the type of the latter and not on the former. In other words, some 
communication goals favor the emergence of certain design structures more than others. 
At the same time, the fact that most design structures are strongly related to more than 
one communication structures regarding acts and activities may guide us to the 
assumption that design goals favor certain communication strategies to emerge at a meso 
or micro level. To be more precise: 
• when the team goal is: a) to set the problem frames, the linear pattern ‘problem-
solution-method’ is generally followed; b) to find solutions, the circular pattern 
‘solution-problem-solution’ is followed; c) to assess solutions, the circular pattern 
‘solution-method/rule-solution’ is followed; d) to find methods, the circular 
pattern ‘method-problem/solution-method’ is found; e) to assess methods, either 
the one or the other of the circular patterns ‘method-rule-method’ and ‘rule-
method-rule’ is followed 
• when the team goal is to make proposals, the design activity of ‘transformation’ is 
the most common, in one of the following pattern forms: ‘present-transform-
transform’ or ‘transform-evaluate-transform’ 
• when the team goal is to evaluate, the strategies of ‘present alternative’, 
‘comment’ and ‘oppose’ are used, whereas in order to transform design content, 
the strategies of ‘explain’ and ‘verify’ are used 
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• when an individual wants to revolutionize, the strategy of ‘oppose’ is used, 
whereas in order to evaluate, the strategies of ‘assess positively’ and ‘comment’ 
are used; negative assessments are usually followed by adding some information 
The above observations imply a precedence of the communication goal in some cases 
and a precedence of the design goal in some others. However, this assumption cannot be 
fully certified, as we refer to co-emerging processes. As we said in Chapter 1, what is the 
context and what the contextualized is difficult to distinguish. 
Regarding the strategic content produced, two types of observations can be made: the 
ones regarding the team design field in general, and the ones that apply only for the 
eLearning design field. Regarding the first, the important role of constraints (Martin, 
Détienne, & Lavigne, 2002; Détienne, Martin, & Lavigne, 2005) and arguments 
(Stumpfl & McDonnell, 2002; Baker et al., 2009) has been confirmed. First of all, a 
strong relation between them has been found, meaning that most of the arguments 
expressed in team design are constraints-based. It is also interesting to note that the same 
communication perspectives are interestingly related to both of them, namely ‘users’ and 
‘management’ perspective. Considering them separately, it can also be observed the 
abundance of requirements regarding the number of constraints expressed. Something 
similar has not been hitherto observed in the relevant literature. A reason for that may 
be our conceptualization of ‘requirement’ as different than that of ‘constraint’. This 
distinction is considered necessary in the field of eLearning, where both concepts are 
emerging and not defined a priori. In other fields-contexts where requirements are given, 
specification may be only manifested in the form of constraints. In our dataset, 
requirements are not only made explicit, but they appear twice as the constraints. If, to 
this observation, we add the strong relation between arguments and constraints, it can 
further be assumed that it is not the quantity of constraints but their role in design 
communication that matters the most. On the other hand, if they really favor arguments 
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to emerge, the combination of each explicit requirement or proposal with a possible 
constraint could favor team design argumentation, and subsequently, communication. 
As far as the quantity and type of arguments is concerned, we can claim that the total 
number of arguments (256 corresponding to 362 lines) is relatively small regarding the 
total size of the dataset (7625 interaction units), but not so small considering the total 
number of conceptual viewpoints (1111). However, it is true that in an ill-defined context 
such as design, it is expected that designers justify their viewpoints, forming some type of 
argument. This does not appear to be the case. Moreover, only half of these arguments 
are “authentic” in the sense that some pre-defined argumentation scheme can be 
identified. The rest consists of plausible, mainly inductive inferences, which relate in a 
way to the design decisions. In fact, the most frequent argument is one of these 
inferences, named “users-based”, because it refers to users or users’ perspective as a main 
argumentative component. Among the rest, an interesting observation regards the 
predominance of ‘arguments from negative consequences’ and ‘arguments from 
alternatives-negative’, in relation to their positive versions. This result is coherent to the 
studies of small group communication high-lightening the prevalence of negative 
evaluations (e.g. Hirokawa, 1988), as we already saw in Chapter 4.  
Related to the eLearning design field, an interesting observation can be made regarding 
the tripartite nature of eLearning, composed of technological, pedagogical, and 
organizational aspects (Jochems, van Merrienboer, & Koper, 2004; Seufert & Euler, 
2004; Sangrà, Vlachopoulos, Cabrera, in press). Our results confirm this assumption 
adding that the pedagogical perspective is relatively more related to design methods, the 
managerial perspective, that includes institutional procedures, is more related to domain 
rules, and the technological perspective to design solutions. This last can be explained 
taking into consideration that ‘problems’ are relatively more related to ‘function’. If this 
is true, then also the opposite, that most solutions would be technological rather than 
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pedagogical or managerial, is justified. Moreover, regarding ‘Management’ perspective, 
its relation to constraints, as we already commented, is also of interest, as it is confirmed 
by a number of theoretical studies focusing, among other things, on how Institution 
conditions the design and development process in eLearning (e.g. Kessels, 1999; Bates, 
2000; Rothwell & Kazanas, 2008).  
Last but not least, some clear participants’ roles emerged regarding the production of 
some argument types more than others, the adoption of one type of perspective more 
than others, and the expression of some type of conceptual viewpoint more than others. 
Some salient similarities between the emergence of concrete types of roles in both teams 
regard the following categories: ‘arguments from alternatives-negative’, ‘rule-based’ and 
‘users-based’, for the types of arguments; ‘pedagogy’ and ‘structure’, for the perspectives; 
no clear salience is observed for the conceptual viewpoint adoption, as the two teams 
appear to behave quite differently in this respect. These results can be interpreted as 
following: clear task-oriented roles emerge where some type of expertise or ‘big image’ 
vision is necessary, whereas the production of design-relevant representations depends 
more on team organization aspects. Power mechanisms are very strong candidates, given 
the fact that Team A is characterized by clear institutional roles, whereas this is not the 
case for Team B. 
 
B) TASK-ORIENTED INTERACTION METHODOLOGY 
The results described in this section are those that, in our point of view, could be 
considered as contributions in the construction of a theoretical framework regarding 
task-oriented interaction in general.  
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First of all, given the (justified) lack of univocality regarding how to analyze task-oriented 
communication, any methodological contribution regarding this aspect is a potential 
contribution to what can be generally defined as ‘team communication’. As we 
synthesized in Chapter 4, there is a vast number of theories, studies, and models 
regarding small group communication in general, and no one method exists to do 
Interaction analysis in particular. Thus, the construction of new coding interaction 
schemes is both a need and a potential contribution. 
We consider that DROMEAS has both some positive and negative characteristics, when 
being considered as a tool to analyze task-oriented interaction, and more precisely, team 
design interaction. Starting with the positive, the following aspects may be considered as 
‘strong points’, regarding the field-related emergent research needs: a) It is multi-
dimensional. Team interaction nowadays can be very complex, as different expertises, 
demands, and considerations come into play. The more we consider them, the more 
possible it is to “grasp” the real meaning of interaction; b) it is relatively easy to combine 
the coding dimensions with pre-defined theoretical constructs; and c) it allows for 
different types of analysis, not only the ones it was conceived for. Regarding its negative 
aspects, some main issues can be raised, such as: a) its use by a non-expert; some of the 
categories may result difficult for a non-specialized researcher to deal with in the 
expected way. Although inter-coder reliability was relatively high for all the categories 
checked, it should be mentioned that all raters were expert either in Design or in 
Communication; b) its complexity regarding the results. Combination between the 
various dimensions can give many different directions for investigation. An ability to 
select between those dimensions and those types of analysis adequate to answer the 
research questions is necessary; and c) the difficulty of communicating these results to the 
participant designers. Of course, adopting a totally different perspective to see design 
than the people who actually do it does not facilitate its direct communication to the 
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participants. Some kind of “translation” is necessary, for example using the “design 
patterns” language, as proposed by Alexander, Ishikawa, & Silverstein (1977), 
transformed into “workplace patterns”, in the sense proposed by Martin, Rodden, 
Rouncefield, Sommerville, & Viller (2001). Our first attempt in this direction is described 
in Rapanta et al. (2010).  
However, the analysis of the dataset using DROMEAS has offered a number of 
concretizations regarding the categories used to analyze communication. First of all, the 
inter-rater reliability is satisfying (avg. K= 0.72) for all the three categories for which it 
was checked, namely: ‘design object’, ‘representational act’, and ‘dialogue act’. More 
precisely, we will focus on the ‘dialogue acts’ proposal, given the small number of studies 
in this direction. Our main contributions regarding this aspect are: a) the selection of acts 
that are meaningful from a task-oriented point of view. A main difference between 
communicative acts and dialogue acts is that the first can also be ‘task-free’, meaning 
that their emergence in interaction can also depend on other factors, rather than the task 
itself. Focusing only on the ‘dialogue acts’, a greater replicability of such acts in similar 
task settings is favored; b) the adequacy of these acts for the context of interaction, in the 
sense that they always take the addressee into consideration. In comparison to the speech 
acts, which were proposed to analyze language, dialogue acts are more adequate when 
the goal is to analyze interaction; and c) the definition of (some of) these acts on various 
dimensions, such as linguistic, semantic, cognitive, physical, and social, following the line 
of Bunt (1999). 
More precisely, regarding the semantic-cognitive dimension of the dialogue acts 
proposed, some interesting relations emerge between those and what we defined as 
‘representational’ acts. Considering that most of the dialogue acts are also accompanied 
by a representational act, and also that there are some strong relations between some 
categories of one type and another, the assumption that the representational acts can be 
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considered as part of the semantic-cognitive function of the dialogue acts is highly 
reasonable, at least in some cases. This is also in concordance with the interaction 
analysis approach, according to which at least seven dimensions come into play in a 
dialogue (Baker, 1999, 2003), with a strong interdependency between the social and the 
cognitive macro-dimensions (Trognon, 1999). Making explicit how such relation is 
manifested at a dialogue act level could be considered as a theoretical contribution 
regarding this aspect. 
More precisely, the most interesting relations between dialogue and representational acts 
are summarized in Table 38. Only the most frequent representational correspondents 
have been marked for each dialogue act. 
TABLE 38. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL AND THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION  
AT AN ACTS LEVEL 
agr a l t att cla com con exp ins int jus nar neg ope opp pos pro psp ver
rev
spe
Repres
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dup
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Dialogue	  acts
0
add
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Interpreting the Table above, the following semantic-cognitive functions of the dialogue 
acts proposed, emerge:  
• The acts of ‘postpone’, ‘narrate’, and ‘instruct’ most of the times do not change 
the representational flow of the interaction, at least not verbally (regarding 
‘instruct’, for example, it is many times accompanied by a non-verbal 
representational function, such as the use of a tool). 
• The non-representational function is also usual for the acts of ‘agree’, ‘clarify’, 
and ‘verify’; the two latter also often have a specification function regarding 
contents. 
• Regarding the very much discussed, in the field of Informal Logic, relation 
between explanation and justification, a clear distinction emerges regarding their 
cognitive function: the one of ‘explain’ is mainly to ‘detail’ a concept, event, or 
idea; whereas that of ‘justify’ is more related to ‘add’ new information. 
• Regarding the function of ‘generate’ concepts, this does not only belong to the 
‘propose’ and ‘open’ acts, as one would expect, but also to the ‘call for attention’ 
act. Distinguishing between the cases could also be interesting from a dialectical 
point of view, as introducing a concept by calling for attention to is very related 
to the rhetorical functions of discourse. 
• ‘Present alternatives’ can either have a ‘modify’ or a ‘revolutionize’ function. 
Again, this can be interesting from a dialectical point of view, as ‘revolutionize’ is 
also performed by ‘call for attention’ and ‘oppose’ acts. Identifying in which cases 
an idea is slightly modified or replaced by an alternative, in a way that the 
selection of the second renders impossible or more difficult the execution of the 
first, is crucial in multiple choice decision-making. Even more, when various 
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sources of alternatives’ production (e.g. the team’s participants) exist at the same 
time, and ‘following’ a decision is not always easy. 
• ‘Comment’ can either have an adding information or an evaluative function. In 
the latter case, we refer to what is also known as ‘evaluative comments’. 
• ‘Conclude’, ‘interpret’, and ‘justify’ also have an ‘add’ function. This is explained 
considering the numerous function the act of ‘add’ has (see also Appendix 2). 
Further distinguishing between them at the time of coding could be enlightening 
also regarding the distinction between the three dialogue acts, when it is 
necessary. 
• Finally, an interesting observation regards the two types of ‘assess’ act, i.e. the 
positive and the negative form. Although the ‘assess positively’ is mainly related 
to the evaluative function, the ‘assess negatively’ sometimes is connected to the 
‘add’ function. This may imply that people feel the need to add some information 
together with their negative assessments, maybe for making them less ‘heavy’ 
from a socio-relational point of view. In this aspect, it would also be interesting to 
investigate the relation between ‘assess’ and ‘justify’ acts to further check for any 
differences between the positive and negative version. However, this would 
exceed the goals of our research. 
Last but not least, a special interest has been given to the identification of some of the 
Walton and others’ (2008) argumentation schemes in our extended (7625 lines) 
dataset. Doing that, 14 arguments emerged that neither applied to any of the 
schemes, nor could they be classified as other design relevant quasi-logical inferences. 
More precisely, these argument modes are: ‘practical argument from task 
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assignment’3, ‘practical from alternative’, ‘practical based on expert’ and ‘expert-
based analogy’. Table 39 shows representative examples from the dataset for each 
type. 
TABLE 39. THE ‘NEW’ EMERGING ARGUMENT MODES 
Practical	  from	  task	  
assignment	  
Practical	  from	  
alternative	  
Practical	  based	  on	  
expert	  
Expert-­‐based	  
analogy	  
I	  think	  as	  you	  go	  along,	  ()	  
got	  an	  excellent	  CTA,	  Ann	  
Jones.	  So	  if	  we	  do	  it…	  you	  
know	  as	  we	  go	  along	  and	  
she	   can	   do	   this	  
transferring	   thing	  
hopefully.	   She’s	   worked	  
in	  a	   lot	  of	   ()	  courses,	   she	  
knows	   about	   you	   know	  
(trans.	  lines	  166-­‐170)	  
yeah,	   it’s	   simpler	   to	   do	  
that,	   cause	   in	   order	   to	  
write	   that	   Introduction,	  	  	  
we	   are	   going	   to	   have	   a	  
complete	  overview	  of	  the	  
whole	   thing	   anyway	  	  
(trans.	  lines	  3158-­‐3160)	  
How	   the	   editing	   process	  
has	  gone	  along	  after	  that,	  
I	   really	   don’t	   know.	   We	  
should	   ask	   it	   to	   Merce	  
and	   Juan	   (trans.	   lines	  
5388-­‐5389,	   original	   in	  
Spanish)	  
As	   I	   told	   you,	   the	   tutor	  
said	   to	   me	   that	   the	  
module	   was	   very	  
infantile	   and	   de-­‐phased	  
to	   him	   (…)	   I	   think	   that	  
this	   gives	   us	   reasons	   for	  
us	  to	  also	  have	  the	  same	  
perception	   (trans.	   lines	  
6241-­‐6251,	   original	   in	  
Spanish)	  
 
Considering their frequency (8, 4, 1, and 1 times correspondingly) the first could be 
considered as a strong candidate for a new argumentation scheme (Doug Walton, 
personal communication, Windsor, 17/05/2011), and possibly also the second. The 
third and fourth seem to be as variations of ‘argument from expert opinion’ and also 
maybe cultural ones, as they only appear in the Spanish dataset. A further investigation 
of these schemes and also their completion with critical questions, as in Walton et al. 
(2008) would be necessary before going on to any assumptions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  I owe this argument name proposal to Doug Walton (personal communication, Windsor, 17/05/2011).	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8 .  CONCLUSION 
 
Team design is a complex socio-cognitive process. Such complexity becomes greater 
when different disciplines, perspectives, and “unknown” users are involved, as in the case 
of eLearning design and development. Communication plays a major role in this 
process, as it forms the basis of sharedness and jointness of the intermediary representations 
“put on the table”, in other words, it forms the basis of collaborative design. 
In the present dissertation we answered questions regarding the three main components 
of the co-design process in the eLearning field, which are: people, methods/strategies, 
and contents. More precisely, our descriptive results concern the design and 
communication process structure, the task-oriented roles adopted by the participants, 
and the identification of conceptual viewpoints and arguments emerging during 
eLearning project meetings in two different teams.  
Our main observations can be summarized in the following statements: 
• The design and communication processes are highly interdependent. 
• Solutions and methods are “re-visited” in a systematic way, with the 
intermediation of problems, domain rules, objects, and tasks. Goals are hardly 
made explicit. 
• Decisions are taken in a circular rather than a linear mode. 
• Pedagogy, technology, and management are all present in the discussion of 
contents, with the pedagogical perspective being more related to design methods, 
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the managerial perspective more related to domain rules, and the technological 
perspective to design solutions. 
• Requirements are made explicit more than constraints, but the latter are strongly 
related to the emergence of arguments. 
• Management and usability, when discussed, are often related to some type of 
argument. 
• Discussion about users emerges very often, and in the following forms: users 
perspective, usability constraint, or users-based argument. 
• Arguments emerge not as much as expected and half of them do not correspond 
to sound argumentation schemes, as proposed in the field of Informal Logic. 
• The negative aspects of design solutions are more argued rather than the positive. 
• Similar roles emerging for both teams concern some types of arguments 
(arguments from alternatives-negative, rule-based, and users-based), and some 
types of perspectives (pedagogy, and structure). Design-relevant intermediary 
representations (proposals, constraints, and requirements) are produced quite 
differently regarding the two teams’ participants, implying the intermediation of 
power mechanisms in the task-oriented interaction. 
Based on these observations, and on the discussion presented in the previous 
Chapter, the following guidelines can be extracted regarding team design practice in 
the field of eLearning: 
• Recycling methods and solutions is productive as long as it serves a concrete 
design goal. If this is partly or completely served, a communication goal must 
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intervene for the design activity to change. Communication, although it appears 
opportunistic, serves to guide the design thinking.  
• Design is a continuous and dynamic transformation of proposals. During this 
process, constraints and arguments play a major role. Making explicit one of 
them also has positive influence on the other. Institutional rules and users’ 
perspective seem to be the content most related to their emergence. 
• Certain task-relevant roles are related to the clear pre-existence of institutional or 
organizational roles. Apart from multi-perspectivism, which is a characteristic of 
any creative democratic team, specific proposals, constraints, and requirements 
need to be taken into consideration for a design decision to be taken in the “best” 
way possible. On the other hand, as Technology, Pedagogy, and Management 
intervene as possibilities, expertise in one field or another is a relevant criterion 
for the adoption of such roles. The co-existence of organizational roles, such as 
‘agenda-keeper’ or ‘time-keeper’, with expertise-based roles, such as 
‘technological constraints expert’, appears as a possible solution. 
To give more precision to the general guidelines presented above, further work is 
necessary. These are some possible directions: 
• Regarding the role of communication in “guiding” design thinking, the analysis 
of dialogue shifts (as already proposed by Walton & Krabbe, 1995) in relation to 
the content discussed is a possible line of investigation. In this way, it can be 
proven that designers do not just “jump” from one topic to another, but topics 
refer to implicit or explicit communication goals. Deciding between strategic and 
opportunistic dialogue shifts can also add more information to each participant’s 
dialectical profile (Baker et al., 2009). 
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• Regarding the emergence of institutional constraints and users’ perspective in 
designers’ discourse, more analysis focused on this aspect is necessary. Such 
micro-analysis can shed more light in the connection between certain decision 
typologies with certain types of institution and users’ manifestations, such as 
telling personal stories, or putting oneself in the ‘users’ shoes’. 
• Finally, regarding roles, more research is necessary regarding how expertise is 
made explicit through discourse. Given the fact that knowledge management in 
teams, and even more, in cross-disciplinary teams, is a requisite, analyzing 
conceptual viewpoints as expert language manifestations is a valuable source at 
the time of analyzing workplace activity. 
Apart from these main observations regarding eLearning design in teams, some insights 
are provided regarding task-oriented interaction analysis methodology, as discussed in 
Chapter 7. The coding scheme we propose, DROMEAS, appears to be a functional tool 
at the time of analyzing team design interaction in several meaningful dimensions. More 
precisely, we coded a 15 meetings’ interaction dataset (see Annex) into six relevant 
dimensions: design activity, representational act, object, meta-epistemic reference, 
dialogue act, and dialogue sequence. Our main contribution regarding the proposal of 
these dimensions is the list and definition of 18 dialogue acts, to describe participants’ 
task-oriented communication moves.  
As far as the dialogue sequences are concerned, a contribution consists in their 
segmentation, mainly following Schegloff (2007), but also in the search for functional 
relations among them. This means that the way we coded the sequences – putting the 
name but also a number indicating to which previous sequence It refers – can be helpful 
at the time of performing a dialectical analysis, in which a whole sequence serves as a 
‘macro-argument’ to a previous one. Such an analysis, based on discourse relations, 
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could be very useful in the field of collaborative problem solving, in general, as ‘co-
construction’ rather than ‘confrontation’ is the general team dialectical goal.  
Finally, we are aware that our methodological proposal has not touched all aspects 
possible in this complex research situation. However, DROMEAS categories can be 
applicable to other analytical perspectives, such as social network analysis, tools-based 
multimodal communication analysis, affective regulation identification, and so on.  
Some indications for future research regarding the methodological aspects discussed are 
the following: 
• The further investigation, analysis and application of the proposed dialogue acts 
in other task-oriented contexts, not necessarily related to the eLearning design 
field. 
• The identification of argumentation sequences. This can also be done with the 
help of a top-down model, as the ones proposed to analyze joint deliberation in 
the field of Artificial Intelligence (see, for example, McBurney et al., 2007; 
Walton, 2011). We acknowledge that such application may have not been 
possible from the beginning, given the nature of real-time, emerging 
communication in a creative context. However, having identified bottom-up 
structures, such as the goal-oriented sequences and the argumentation schemes, 
the identification of pre-defined phases a posteriori is possible, as we already 
showed in our recent work (Rapanta, forthcoming). We consider that the 
confrontation of top-down with bottom-up approaches is necessary, if we want to 
get into a deeper evaluation of team communication and argumentation. 
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• The combination of DROMEAS with other methods of analysis. Social network 
analysis, for example, can be very enlightening at the moment of comparing pre-
defined, institutional roles, with emerging, task-defined ones. 
In general, in this dissertation we treated team design communication mainly as a 
deliberative type of dialogue, limiting our analysis only to the episodes in which some 
type of decision making was evident. However, we acknowledge that how decisions are 
finally taken in an eLearning team depends on a number of factors, which could not all 
be treated in the margins of one research. The triangulation of the transcripts’ coding 
with other data sources, such as interviews or field notes, can shed more light on other 
aspects of communication, not necessarily related to the socio-cognitive dimension of 
interaction, which is the focus of the present research. We believe that a multi-faceted 
empirical approach is the most adequate way to enhance our understanding of this new, 
still ill-defined research field, called eLearning design in teams.  
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APPENDIX 1. TEAM DESIGN REVIEW RESULTS 
Reading key for summary table 
Domain: the specific field of application; eng for engineering design (comprising industrial, 
mechanical, and electrical design), SW for software design, arch for architectural design, 
oth for other 
Participants: the identity of the study participants; stud for students and prof for 
professionals 
Situation: the specific encounter type in which team design takes place; mee for co-located 
meetings, sess for experimental sessions, dist for in situ meetings with long hearing and/or 
visual distances 
Method: referring to the main data analysis method; quali for open qualitative methods, 
cod for any protocol coding method using pre-defined categories or interaction analysis 
coding, surv for survey techniques, smet for sociometric analysis techniques and other  
Study	  ID	   Domain	   Participants	   Situation	   Method	  
Eng	   SW	   Arch	   Oth	   Stud	   Prof	   mee	   sess	   dist	   quali	   cod	   surv	   smet	   othe	  
1.	   Bucciarelli	  
(1984,	  1988)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	  
2.	   Walz,	   Elam,	  
Krasner	   &	  
Curtis	   (1987),	  
Walz	  (1988)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	  
3.	   Curtis,	  
Krasner	  &	  Iscoe	  
(1988)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	  
4.	   Tang	   &	  
Leifer	  (1988)	  
	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   √	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	  
5.	   Minneman	  
(1991)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	  
6.	   Medland	  
(1992)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	  
7.	  Olson,	  et	  al.	  
(1992)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
8.	   Sonnenwald	  
(1995,	  1996)	  
	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	  
9.	   Peng,	   C.	  
(1994)	  
	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
10.	   Scaife,	  
Curtis	   &	   Hill	  
(1994)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
11.	   Herbsleb,	  
Klein,	   Olson	   et	  
al.	  (1995)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
12.	   Kraut	   &	  
Streeter	  (1995)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	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Study	  ID	   Domain	   Participants	   Situation	   Method	  
Eng	   SW	   Arch	   Oth	   Stud	   Prof	   mee	   sess	   dist	   quali	   cod	   surv	   smet	   othe	  
13.	   Brereton,	  
Cannon,	  
Mabogunje	   &	  
Leifer	  (1996)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
14.	   Cross	   &	  
Cross	  (1995)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
15.	  
Dwarakanath	  &	  
Blessing	  (1996)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
16.	  
Goldschmidt	  
(1996),	  
Goldschmidt	   &	  
Weil	  (1998)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	  
17.	   Radcliffe	  
(1996)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
18.	   Trousse	   &	  
Christiaans	  
(1996)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	  
19.	   Perry	   &	  
Sanderson	  
(1998)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
20.	   Smith	   &	  
Tjandra	  (1998)	  
√	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
21.	   Smith	   &	  
Leong	  (1998)	  
√	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
22.	   Valkenburg	  
&	  Dorst	  (1998)	  
√	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
23.	   Busseri	   &	  
Palmer	  (2000)	  
	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   √	  
24.	   Austin	   &	  
Steele	  (2001)	  
	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	  
25.	   Martin,	  
Detienne	   &	  
Lavigne	   (2002);	  
Détienne,	  
Martin	   &	  
Lavigne	  
(2005)	  
	   	   	   √	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
26.	   Darses,	  
Détienne,	  
Falzon	  &	  Visser	  
(2001)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   √	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
27.	   Eckert	  
(2001)	  
	   	   	   √	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	  
28.	   Badke-­‐
Schaub	   &	  
Frankenberger	  
(2002)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	  
29.	   Boujut	   &	  
Laureillard	  
(2002)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	  
30.	  Stempfle	  &	  
Badke-­‐Shaub	  
(2002)	  
√	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	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Study	  ID	   Domain	   Participants	   Situation	   Method	  
Eng	   SW	   Arch	   Oth	   Stud	   Prof	   mee	   sess	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   quali	   cod	   surv	   smet	   othe	  
31.	   D’Astous,	  
Détienne,	  
Visser	   &	  
Robillard	  
(2004)	  
	   √	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
32.	  Détienne	  &	  
Visser	   (2006),	  
Visser	  (2009)	  
	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
33.	   Kratzer,	  
Leenders	  &	  van	  
Engelen	  (2008)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	  
34.	   Adams,	  
Mann,	   Jordan	  
&	  Daly	  (2009)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
35.	   Badke-­‐
Schaub,	  
Lauche,	  
Neumann	   &	  
Ahmed	  (2009)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
36.	   Baker,	  
Détienne,	   Lund	  
&	   Séjourné	  
(2009)	  
	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   √	  
37.	   Botturi	   &	  
del	   Percio	  
(2009)	  
	   	   	   √	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   	   	   √	   	  
38.	   Goldshmidt	  
&	  Eshel	  (2009)	  
	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	   	   	   	  
39.	  
Mabogunje,	  
Eris,	   Sonalkar,	  
Jung	   &	   Leifer	  
(2009)	  
√	   	   	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   √	   	   	   	   	  
40.	   McDonnell	  
(2009)	  
	   	   √	   	   	   √	   √	   	   	   	   √	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APPENDIX 2: SEGMENTATION “RULES” 
A) Segmentation of acts 
a. Linguistic forms of saying exactly the same thing in other words, or slightly 
reformulating it but without changing somehow the message or its 
communication are not considered as separate acts.  
b. Incomplete sentences or clauses that they do not communicate a message by 
themselves are considered as a separate act when they are the only elements of 
an utterance. In any contrary case they are not separated from the precedent 
or subsequent act to which they are more related. 
c. Regarding all acts, a general segmentation rule is that they form separate acts 
each time a physical or imaginary addressee is considered able to understand 
the message contained in them, taking into account the context of interaction. 
In this sense, they are always “self-contained”. 
d. Duplications and immediate concept clarifications inside the same utterance 
are not considered as separate acts. 
B) Segmentation of sequences 
a. Each sequence has ONE principal contribution act that can mainly be one of 
the following: open, verify, propose, present alternative, call for attention, 
oppose, explain, clarify, comment, interpret.  
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b. In many cases, this corresponds to the initiating act of the sequence. However, 
it is also possible that the principal act is manifested a little bit later in the 
sequence and, sometimes, just before the end of the sequence. 
c. In order to distinguish between the post-expansion feedback of a sequence and 
a new sequence, 
- if the feedback acts focus on the same object as the sequence’s main 
presentation, a new sequence is introduced in two cases: first, when a new 
communicative function is initiated; and second, when a new relevant aspect is 
presented, and it is treated in at least two representational acts 
- if the feedback acts introduce focus on a different object, only the second case 
mentioned above applies. 
C) Segmentation of episodes 
a. Episodes are segmented by topic. In the cases in which this is devised in sub-
topics, the criterion of segmentation is the making of a decision on one topic 
before passing on to another. In other words, if the sub-topic is introduced in 
order to facilitate decision-making on the main topic, and after it is discussed, 
the focus returns on the initial topic, the episode is not segmented. However, 
when some kind of decision, in the form of an intermediary representation, is 
reached regarding a topic, and subsequently a second, “independent” decision 
is taken regarding a sub-topic, extended in at least two sequences, the sub-
topic decision is treated as a separate episode. 
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b. However, it is also possible that a decision appears as “final” at one moment of 
interaction, but the team returns to it after one or more episodes. In these 
cases, we consider the second episode as a second, independent team decision-
making episode, and not as a continuation of the previously taken decision. 
Design is a dynamic socio-cognitive process in which objects, contents, and 
roles change continuously, even after some degree of specification is achieved. 
In this sense, “returning” to the same decision actually is not possible, as none 
decision remains the same during and after its specification. In any case, it is 
worth mentioning that our goal is not to identify how exact decisions 
regarding the design object were taken, but how the object is constructed 
through these decisions. 
c. Only episodes that can be somehow considered as “efficient” regarding the 
team deliberation process are included in the analysis. Such efficiency in our 
dataset is manifested through the emergence or confirmation of a relevant 
intermediary representation, that can be either the specification of a constraint 
or a requirement, or a final, in the sense of not put under further discussion, 
proposal. 
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APPENDIX 3: GUIDELINES FOR DESIGN ACTS’ 
IDENTIFICATION 
 
a. Specify (spe) 
-­‐ as concept definition: this is your blog now is it? (…) these are all the pages that 
I’m proposing that we put the work onto (trans. lines 103-105) 
-­‐ as object quality definition: So this is not Mac friendly? No (trans. lines 117-
118) 
-­‐ as object quantity definition: O sea estamos hablando de unas ochenta páginas 
(trad.: so, we are speaking of about eighty pages) (trans. lines: 7115-7116) 
-­‐ as metaphor: you know it’s kind of like ...it’s the stickerbook thing isn’t it  (trans. 
line 3373) 
 
b. Detail (det) 
 -   as list of concepts: We’ve got the, I mean the storyboard at the end, storyboarding, 
3D modeling (…), PostIt notes (trans. lines 4376-4381) 
-    as sequence of (past) events: and we’re kind () we can maybe schedule the 
different types of media that we’re thinking of using, and how we kind of manage those, 
and what kind of people are going to be helping us  (trans. lines 9-11) 
-    as a “mix” of concepts-events sequence: because for me, only having, all I 
have to guide myself is existing work, which is like written blogs, and (they don’t have 
anything) to do with what was done before (trans. lines 281-183) 
-    as adding of only one piece of information, which is, however, akin to 
form part of a sequence: I think where we will have most influence is in the sort of 
studio environment too, where we could sort of get the individual pages customizable 
(trans. lines 325-326) 
-    as hypothetical inference: where you basically you can talk into a, into your 
computer, while you navigate around your Compendium map, and explain what you’ve 
tried to do (trans. lines 660-662) 
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c.     Add 
 -    as result/consequence: so I was thinking that the next step would be to try and 
get some writing to go along with it, so they can actually paraphrase for you straight 
from the horses mouth (trans. lines 13-14) 
 -    as causal inference: I mean you can’t expect these people to come and sit for three 
hours at a time in course team meetings, because they are working on other courses 
(trans. lines 36-38) 
 -    as enhancing a concept or an idea: so the advice is to keep it short and pithier, 
and you know, if you can, bullet stuff (trans. lines 253-254) 
 -    as adding a “concept-event” relation: because because that’s going to change 
anyway, when the visuals (get) put in (trans. lines 1112-1113) 
 
d.    Generate (gen) 
         -    as a new topic introduction: Have you, have you, sorry… have you looked at 
the thing that A’s cut up that these guys are going to be writing? (trans. line 66) 
         -    as a new proposal: whereas it would be nice if you kind of put a bookmark 
somewhere here (trans. line 239) 
         -    as a new constraint: would you prefer it if we were writing into this? (…) 
Ideally but you’re Mac based and stuff like that (trans. lines 111-113) 
         -    as a new requirement: I think we would welcome some guidance though (trans. 
line 222) 
 
e.    Duplicate (dup) 
       -    as an exact repetition of another speaker’s expressed content: and I’m 
thinking, ok, is the style going to be less chatty (…) It is quite chatty, yeah (trans. lines 
284-290)  
       -   as a re-use of an idea, even though it is not exactly reproduced: because I 
think what would be nice to almost, you have free handover, you know you have a 
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development freeze in this (…) You know,  you’ve got this developing, it’s open to everybody 
(trans. lines 195-203) 
       -   as returning to an already expressed idea, by the same or another 
speaker: But also at other times you might see that and you think “I want to look back at 
that video that I watched last week with that person talking” (…) But then there’s kind of 
these multimedia element that people might want to review (trans. lines 2063-2111) 
      
f.    Modify (mod) 
        -   as an expression of a different perception: It’s a difficult one choosing music 
(…) I do like a bit of music (trans. lines 1967-1971) 
       -    as an expression of a different conception: But in my view the problem is that 
if you are talking about a lot of, if you’re talking about big documents,  it might make the 
process a bit tricky; so that’s why I would like to have a browse through (trans. lines 138-
139) 
       -  as an expression of a different conceptualization: I mean you can’t expect 
these people to come and sit for three hours at a time in course team meetings (…)I think 
what you’re asking for is better upfront help (trans. lines 36-40) 
       -    as an expression of a different contextualization: Do people from the TLS 
have a Java programmer? it would need to be seen if they’re available (trans. lines 744-
750) 
 
g.    Revolutionize (rev) 
       -    as an expression of doubt towards a concept: Now it’s a shame and sounds 
line a duplication of work (…) well, I don’t know, I don’t know if it’s duplicated (trans. 
lines 151-156) 
       -    as a substitution of a concept idea by another: So when they’ve got time they 
can just go in and () (check this) and give advice early on rather than this kind of frustrating 
(…) (trans. lines 205-208) 
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       -    as cancelling the truth of a statement: What we (need to do) would be to look 
at the model of another course (…)I think these days we don’t have those course particularly 
in existence (trans. lines 230-234) 
      -    as a total replacement of a statement by a confronting alternative: every 
block looked very similar (…)The alternative way is we start off by saying “ok, here’s the 
course team", well we introduce the course team different people, different personalities (trans. 
lines 386-394) 
 
h.    Merge (mer) 
     -     put together two previously mentioned concepts: these are the cards which 
…haven’t got any of the text that I had generated at all [laughs] on them (…) I mean the 
IMAGES are nice (…) but I just my idea my thought about it was that we had kind of had 
an image on one side and that that kind of a small amount of text (trans. lines 1733-1739) 
       -    synthesize in a solution: one of my anxieties is how we get from this to …to show 
to TLS (…)I think as you go along, () got an excellent CTA (…) she can do this 
transferring thing hopefully (trans. lines 166-168) 
      -    compare or disjunct two concepts: If they did a video, how can they have that 
on compendium? (trans. line 4411) 
 
i.    Evaluate  (ev) 
      -    express some estimation regarding a state of affairs: so I was thinking 
that the next step would be to try and get some writing to go along with it 
(…)This is again based on their availability (trans. lines 13-17) 
       -    attribute a positive or negative value to a state of affairs: so at least when 
you’re writing it, you’ve almost got a templated briefing for me to write a brief or in your 
mind, I mean I find that a lot easier way to work (trans. lines 59-60) 
       -    attribute a positive or negative value to a concept: Yeah that’s the thing 
with structured content, it’s more fiddly (trans. lines 117-118) 
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APPENDIX 4: STATISTICS TABLES 
A. Frequencies of design categories 
 
 
 
 
 
D1_activity Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
eval 1033 24.6 715 29.1 318 18.2
pres 1036 24.7 719 29.3 317 18.2
trans 2131 50.7 1021 41.6 1110 63.6
Total 4200 100.0 2455 100.0 1745 100.0
Overall Team 1 Team 2
D2_act Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 842 20.0 576 23.5 265 15.2
add 528 12.6 307 12.5 221 12.7
det 696 16.6 321 13.1 375 21.5
dup 327 7.8 183 7.5 144 8.3
ev 443 10.5 290 11.8 153 8.8
gen 421 10.0 251 10.2 170 9.7
mer 93 2.2 44 1.8 49 2.8
mod 245 5.8 121 4.9 124 7.1
rev 228 5.4 118 4.8 110 6.3
spe 377 9.0 244 9.9 134 7.7
Total 4200 100.0 2455 100.0 1745 100.0
Team 1 Team 2Overall
D3_object Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
G 56 1.3 42 1.7 14 .8
M 1108 26.4 604 24.6 504 28.9
O 429 10.2 114 4.6 315 18.1
P 385 9.2 235 9.6 150 8.6
R 387 9.2 205 8.4 182 10.4
S 1442 34.3 1027 41.8 415 23.8
T 393 9.4 228 9.3 165 9.5
Total 4200 100.0 2455 100.0 1745 100.0
Overall Team 1 Team 2
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B. Frequencies of communication categories 
 
 
C1_activity Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
alt 148 3.5 135 5.5 13 .7
att 543 12.9 362 14.7 181 10.4
cla 73 1.7 56 2.3 17 1.0
com 455 10.8 180 7.3 275 15.8
exp 539 12.8 307 12.5 232 13.3
ins 6 .1 6 .2 .0 .0
int 4 .1 4 .2 .0 .0
ope 243 5.8 125 5.1 118 6.8
opp 33 .8 33 1.3 .0 .0
pro 1926 45.9 1041 42.4 885 50.7
ver 230 5.5 206 8.4 24 1.4
Total 4200 100.0 2455 100.0 1745 100.0
Overall Team 1 Team 2
C2_act Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 433 10.3 139 5.7 294 16.8
agr 219 5.2 158 6.4 61 3.5
alt 80 1.9 62 2.5 18 1.0
att 162 3.9 121 4.9 41 2.3
cla 425 10.1 295 12.0 130 7.4
com 594 14.1 308 12.5 286 16.4
con 44 1.0 39 1.6 5 .3
exp 712 17.0 405 16.5 307 17.6
ins 13 .3 10 .4 3 .2
int 66 1.6 51 2.1 15 .9
jus 173 4.1 133 5.4 40 2.3
nar 24 .6 11 .4 13 .7
neg 93 2.2 65 2.6 28 1.6
ope 52 1.2 38 1.5 14 .8
opp 50 1.2 34 1.4 16 .9
pos 126 3.0 70 2.9 56 3.2
pro 681 16.2 345 14.1 336 19.3
psp 28 .7 22 .9 6 .3
ver 225 5.4 149 6.1 76 4.4
Total 4200 100.0 2455 100.0 1745 100.0
Overall Team 1 Team 2
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C. Complete crosstabulation between design and communication acts 
 
 
 
C3_persp Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
B 498 11.9 332 13.5 166 9.5
C 1588 37.8 539 22.0 1049 60.1
Cf 320 7.6 231 9.4 89 5.1
D 25 .6 11 .4 14 .8
E 173 4.1 102 4.2 71 4.1
F 312 7.4 295 12.0 17 1.0
M 237 5.6 160 6.5 77 4.4
P 112 2.7 59 2.4 53 3.0
S 118 2.8 73 3.0 45 2.6
T 98 2.3 51 2.1 47 2.7
U 423 10.1 365 14.9 58 3.3
V 44 1.0 44 1.8 59 3.4
X 252 6.0 193 7.9 0 .0
Total 4200 100.0 2455 100.0 1745 100.0
Team 1 Team 2Overall
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D. Distribution of design and communication patterns in each episode 
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E. Complete crosstabulation between design object and communication 
perspective 
 
 
 
F. Symmetric measures (Cramer’s V) between the most frequent design and 
communication activity patterns 
 
	   trans-­‐pres-­‐
trans	  
pres-­‐trans-­‐
trans	  
trans-­‐eval-­‐
trans	  
trans-­‐trans-­‐
trans	  
pres-­‐trans-­‐
pres	  
pro-­‐pro-­‐pro	   0.10	   0.08	   0.175	   0.089	   0.072	  
pro-­‐com-­‐pro	   0.18	   0.73	   0.151	   0.124	   0.100	  
pro-­‐att-­‐pro	   0.122	   0.046	   0.003	   0.052	   0.084	  
pro-­‐pro-­‐com	   0.084	   0.022	   0.151	   0.048	   0.010	  
pro-­‐exp-­‐pro	   0.031	   0.252	   0.108	   0.155	   0.053	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G. Crosstabulation between jointness and dialogicality per episode ID 
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H. Episodes ordered by episode ID (in grey the episodes with significant relation 
between jointness and dialogicality) 
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APPENDIX 5: ARGUMENT MAP 
Arguments	  made	  by	  one	  speaker:	   Arguments	  made	  by	  at	  least	  two	  speakers:	  	  
act	   speaker	   prop	   constr	   requir	   user_exp	   practi	   neg_cons	   pos_cons	   alt_neg	   alt_pos	   analog	   expert	   rule_b	   person_b	   users_b	   practi_ta	   practi_alt	   practi_expert	   exper_an	  
pro B     M 	  	   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B B     	  	   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B   M   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B M     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt A M     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
3	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att C   B   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
4	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att A   M   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
5	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B T     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
6	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro C   M   	  	   7	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
opp B   F   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
8	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B   F   	  	  
	   	   	  
9	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt B B     	  	  
	   	   	  
9	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B       	  	  
	   	   	  
10	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
11	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro C X     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
12	  
	   	  
	  	  
exp B F     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B X     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	  
	   	  
	  	  
neg B   M   	  	  
	  
14	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pos B       	  	  
	   	   	   	  
15	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro F     B 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
16	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
	  268	  
act	   speaker	   prop	   constr	   requir	   user_exp	   practi	   neg_cons	   pos_cons	   alt_neg	   alt_pos	   analog	   expert	   rule_b	   person_b	   users_b	   practi_ta	   practi_alt	   practi_expert	   exper_an	  
pro F     B 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
17	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt A F     	  	  
	   	   	  
18	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B   U   	  	   19	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg D   V   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
20	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
21	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B S     	  	   22	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B       	  	  
	   	   	  
23	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att B   U   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
24	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
jus F   P   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
24	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
 F       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
24	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
25	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
con B       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
26	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg F   V   	  	  
	  
27	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt F P     	  	  
	   	  
28	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
29	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
att B     V 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
30	  
	   	  
	  	  
pro B X     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
30	  
	   	  
	  	  
pro A C     	  	   31	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
con F B     	  	   32	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B     M 	  	  
	  
33	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B   M   	  	  
	  
33	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt B M     	  	  
	   	   	   	  
34	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pos B     M 	  	  
	   	   	   	  
34	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att A   F   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
35	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
com C       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
36	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act	   speaker	   prop	   constr	   requir	   user_exp	   practi	   neg_cons	   pos_cons	   alt_neg	   alt_pos	   analog	   expert	   rule_b	   person_b	   users_b	   practi_ta	   practi_alt	   practi_expert	   exper_an	  
exp C       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
37	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
att B   F   	  	  
	  
38	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B     F 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
39	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
40	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
alt F C     	  	  
	   	   	   	  
41	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att D   U   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
42	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B   F   	  	  
	  
43	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt B     B 	  	  
	   	   	   	  
44	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att A     F 	  	  
	  
45	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg A   P   	  	  
	  
45	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro D B     	  	   46	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt D C     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
47	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
exp	   F 	  	   F	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
48	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
pro	   A 	  	   	  	   M	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
49	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro D M     	  	  
	   	  
50	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus E       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
51	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
att B     F 1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
52	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
53	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B C     	  	  
	   	   	  
54	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro A C     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
55	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
56	  
	   	  
	  	  
psp A   U   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
57	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
pro A     M 	  	  
	  
58	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
59	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
con A       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
60	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act	   speaker	   prop	   constr	   requir	   user_exp	   practi	   neg_cons	   pos_cons	   alt_neg	   alt_pos	   analog	   expert	   rule_b	   person_b	   users_b	   practi_ta	   practi_alt	   practi_expert	   exper_an	  
att B     T 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
61	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
cla B     F 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
61	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B   X   	  	  
	  
62	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B   X   	  	  
	  
62	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
63	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
com B   B   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
64	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att G   F   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
65	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro G V     	  	  
	  
66	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B   F   	  	  
	  
66	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
  A       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
67	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro G Cf     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
68	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
  C     M 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
69	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus C     M 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
70	  
	   	  
	  	  
pro A S     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
71	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
72	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
pro E C     	  	   73	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus E   P   	  	   73	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
att E   F   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
74	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro G E     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
75	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus G       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
76	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
jus G   U   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
77	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
alt E P     	  	  
	  
78	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg A     S 	  	  
	  
79	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt A       	  	  
	   	   	   	  
80	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro C     B 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
81	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act	   speaker	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   practi	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   practi_alt	   practi_expert	   exper_an	  
jus C   M   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
81	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
82	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
jus C   M   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
83	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt G       	  	  
	   	   	   	  
84	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pos G       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
85	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt G       	  	  
	   	   	  
86	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro A     M 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
87	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
com C       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
88	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt C       	  	  
	   	   	   	  
89	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
exp A       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
90	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pos A       	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pro G C     	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alt G F     	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neg G   U   	  	  
	  
181	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
Team	  2	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neg A   U   	  	  
	   	   	  
182	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opp B       	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neg A   Cf   	  	  
	  
186	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neg A   U   	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att A   C   	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exp B   M   	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jus B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
190	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
jus B       	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jus B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
194	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
exp B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
194	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
att A   C   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
195	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A E     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
195	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro A U     1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
196	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
exp A       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
197	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
jus A     M 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
197	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
neg B   C   	  	  
	   	   	  
198	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pro B   T   	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opp A       	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pro B     B 	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pro B C     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
213	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B     C 	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
213	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro A   U   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
214	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
con A C     	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
214	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215	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
alt A       1	  
	   	   	  
215	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217	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com B       	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jus B     C 	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pro A Cf     	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jus A       1	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neg A   C   	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pro A C     	  	  
	   	   	  
223	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  
com B   P   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
224	  
	   	   	   	  
	  	  
pro B     E 	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pro A C     	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jus B       1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
230	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  280	  
act	   speaker	   prop	   constr	   requir	   user_exp	   practi	   neg_cons	   pos_cons	   alt_neg	   alt_pos	   analog	   expert	   rule_b	   person_b	   users_b	   practi_ta	   practi_alt	   practi_expert	   exper_an	  
com B       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
233	  
exp B       	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
233	  
pro B C     	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pro B     C 	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jus A       1	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pro B     C 	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alt B     C 	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neg B     C 	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com A   D   	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pro A C     	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pro B       	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com B Cf     	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pro A C     	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LINKS (IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE) 
Wordnet (definition of ‘deliberation’): 
http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=word-you-want 
Systems Engineering Glossary (definition of ‘design constraint’): 
http://www.argospress.com/Resources/systems-engineering/designconstr.htm 
Nielsen Norman Group (definition of ‘user experience’):  
http://www.nngroup.com/about/userexperience.html 
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ANNEX: CODED DATASET 
The coded dataset concerns 7625 interaction units coded with DROMEAS categories for 
two different teams working on different projects during a (sufficiently) long period of 
time. In this Annex all coded data are provided, in order to make clearer the analysis 
described throughout the dissertation. 
Apart from DROMEAS categories, put in the same order as presented in this 
dissertation, the following reading keys are also necessary: a) each green line separates an 
episode from its next one; in this line several information are given, such as the case 
identification (T1, T2), the number of meeting according to its order of appearance in the 
dataset (e.g. M5 corresponds to the fifth video-registered and analyzed meeting forming 
part of the dataset); and, finally, the episode type number, according to our classification; 
b) colored blocks (green, red, purple) correspond to intermediary representations 
(proposals, constraints, and requirements correspondingly), and user experience 
indicators are marked in orange; c) connecting lines appearing in-between ‘dialogue acts’ 
and ‘dialogue sequence’ represent argumentative connections, and they are named after 
one of the pre-defined and emergent argument types. 
In general, all names are changed to preserve participants’ anonymity, and as regards 
themselves, they are coded as ‘A’, ‘B’, etc. Given the large size of the dataset, it is 
presented in a CD-ROM, instead of a printed form. 
